Inter-Parliamentary Union
For democracy. For everyone.

World e-Parliament Report 2026



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Cover picture: A woman watches a television screen showing members of parliament and senators speaking at the parliament in Bangkok, Thailand. © Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images

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Foreword

The ninth edition of the *World e-Parliament Report* arrives at a moment of strategic clarity for parliaments. Two years have passed since the 2024 report documented an encouraging baseline: parliaments were investing in digital transformation, leadership engagement was broadening and cloud adoption was accelerating. What neither that report, nor most parliaments, could fully anticipate was the velocity of technological change as artificial intelligence (AI) moved from specialist capability to mainstream workplace technology. For parliaments, this acceleration has exposed a critical gap between technology adoption and institutional readiness to govern it.

The data from 118 parliaments across 89 countries reveals a sector advancing at different speeds. The median parliament has improved since 2024, indicating broad-based progress. Yet the distance between leading and emerging parliaments has widened. This creates a moment of genuine urgency and parliaments that wish to remain effective and responsive to citizens must act now.

Three findings deserve particular attention. First, governance must precede technology deployment, not follow it. Parliaments establishing clear institutional architecture, consolidating systems and defining roles before deploying advanced technologies advance most successfully. Second, process redesign must accompany technology integration. Parliaments that have attempted to overlay AI into existing workflows without reimagining those workflows report that technology inherits and amplifies existing weaknesses. Third, data governance is the foundation upon which effective AI deployment rests. Parliaments treating data as strategic infrastructure, not as an administrative by-product, deploy advanced technologies most effectively.

The report documents an encouraging trend that inter-parliamentary collaboration is accelerating. Parliaments are sharing with and learning from their peers, and more are participating in the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Centre for Innovation in Parliament. This growing community of practice offers hope; our sector advances most effectively when leading institutions share what they have learned and emerging parliaments access frameworks and ideas that others have already developed and validated.

This report supports institutional learning, providing evidence-based guidance grounded in real parliamentary experience. It is structured to serve different audiences: members of parliament seeking strategic context; Secretaries General and Speakers preparing institutional decisions; and ICT leaders and technical staff undertaking detailed digital transformation work. Whether you are leading a parliament advancing into new technological areas or building foundational digital infrastructure, this report will help to guide that journey.

Parliamentary digital transformation is now a core institutional priority for legislatures worldwide. By reading this report, learning from peer experience, and committing to a governance-led approach, parliaments can ensure they remain operationally resilient, democratically vibrant and genuinely responsive to the citizens they serve.



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Executive summary

The evidence from years of sustained innovation across parliaments is unequivocal. Digital transformation is no longer an optional upgrade or a back-office modernization project; it is the central mechanism through which parliaments secure operational resilience, deepen citizen engagement and strengthen legislative practice and accountability. For parliaments seeking to remain both effective and genuinely responsive to the citizens they serve, digital transformation is a strategic imperative.

The *World e-Parliament Report 2026*, the ninth in the series, provides a comprehensive assessment of digital transformation across 118 parliaments and chambers in 89 countries, plus 2 supranational parliaments. It builds on this with an analysis of articles from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)'s *Innovation Tracker* and *Transforming Parliaments* webinars, and from intelligence gathered by the IPU Centre for Innovation in Parliament (CIP).

Digital transformation has become systematic and technology decisions are increasingly championed by members and senior parliamentary staff. Despite this, the report exposes a fundamental constraint: technology (and artificial intelligence (AI) in particular) often arrives faster than the institutional capacity to govern it. In this landscape, the parliaments advancing most successfully are those that recognize this and establish governance before deploying new technology – a choice available to any parliament regardless of wealth or technical capacity.

Digital capabilities are advancing and the median parliament has improved since 2024, but the gap between the highest and lowest levels of digital maturity has widened. This divergence reflects differences in leadership, innovation culture and institutional vision. The most digitally mature parliaments link technology investment explicitly to strategic objectives and treat data as strategic infrastructure.

Moving from strategic intent to disciplined delivery can be where parliaments encounter difficulty, causing stalled adoption. What supports digital maturity are strong institutional processes: frameworks for assessment, methodologies for prioritization and structured approaches to building capacity alongside technical capability.

The report highlights four strategic imperatives that have proved important for sustained digital maturity:

- **Political ownership and senior leadership**: Given the strategic importance of digital tools to parliaments, successful digital transformation requires members and senior parliamentary staff, not only technical departments, to champion change and shape the tools that support their work.
- **Governance before technology**: Institutional readiness must precede deployment, not follow it – something that has proved challenging with the rapid advent of AI. Parliaments that establish governance processes before introducing advanced technologies outperform those that procure first and govern later.
- **Data as strategic infrastructure**: Technical advancement without data governance creates fragile systems. Parliaments that treat data as strategic capital deploy advanced technologies more safely and build resilience into their operations.
- **Effective communities of practice**: Parliaments that share experiences with their peers learn from early adopters and can scale solutions more safely. Participation in global networks and knowledge-exchange platforms is among the most effective routes to digital advancement.

The key findings of the report are:

1. Digital transformation has become a strategic, institution-wide undertaking.
2. Prioritizing governance ahead of technology deployment is a strong predictor of continued advancement of digital maturity.
3. AI adoption is fundamentally a governance challenge before it is a technical one.
4. Cloud infrastructure is now central to parliamentary resilience, with choices increasingly shaped by data sovereignty considerations.
5. Chamber modernization and hybrid operations have delivered tangible efficiency gains.
6. Public engagement depends on active, strategic effort, not simply publishing open data.
7. Digital maturity gaps are widening as leading parliaments accelerate.
8. Inter-parliamentary collaboration and peer-learning networks are among the most effective routes to digital advancement.

The report recommends that parliaments already well advanced in digital transformation continue to develop proactive governance, build innovation capacity, and share knowledge and experience with peers.

Parliaments at intermediate stages of digital modernization need to work systematically, focusing on transformation of the core functions that can return the greatest operational benefits. Alongside this iterative process, they should embed change management processes.

For parliaments establishing digital foundations, it is vital that they develop governance and strategic clarity first. This helps them build their implementation of digital programmes on strong institutional foundations, driven by an understanding of internal need and impact.

In practical terms, the *World e-Parliament Report 2026* recommends that parliaments:

1. Establish governance as the strategic foundation of digital transformation.
2. Establish AI governance frameworks before deploying AI systems.
3. Treat data as a strategic institutional asset.
4. Invest in infrastructure modernization, with resilience and sovereignty as guiding principles.
5. Modernize chamber operations, placing members at the centre.
6. Develop and execute active public engagement strategies that go beyond passive publication.
7. Invest in capacity-building, change management and digital literacy.
8. Participate actively in inter-parliamentary knowledge networks and draw on existing good practice.

This report provides the evidence and peer experiences parliaments need to navigate digital transformation with confidence. A diverse body of parliaments has demonstrated that digital transformation succeeds when it is anchored in a clear vision, high-level ownership, governance maturity and strategic alignment with parliament's values.

Ways to read this report

Different audiences might want to focus their reading on specific areas of the report. The following table offers some suggested orders of reading.

Audience	Start here	Then read	Drill down into
Members of parliament	Executive summary	Findings and recommendations; Trends	Sections relevant to your interests or committee's work; Parliamentary digital transformation since 2020
Speaker or secretary general	Executive summary; Introduction	Findings and recommendations	Changes since the previous report and future trends; Digital Maturity Index
Senior management	Executive summary	Findings and recommendations; Current state of parliamentary technologies; Trends	Parliamentary digital transformation since 2020
CIO or IT Director	Executive summary; Findings and recommendations	Trends; Parliamentary digital transformation since 2020; Digital Maturity Index; Current state of parliamentary technologies	Detailed analysis of parliamentary technologies
IT specialists	Current state of parliamentary technologies	Trends; Parliamentary digital transformation since 2020	Detailed analysis of parliamentary technologies in your functional area

Introduction

This 2026 edition of the *World e-Parliament* Report presents a clear picture of parliamentary digital capabilities moving forward but also shows that the gap between digital leaders and the rest is widening.

First published in 2008, this report series has tracked the evolution of digital technology in parliaments across nearly two decades. Each edition has documented technological change within legislatures, and this ninth edition recognizes a journey that has led to a sustained institutional commitment to digital transformation for many parliaments.

Parliamentary digital transformation is no longer an optional upgrade but is the central mechanism through which legislatures build operational resilience, deepen citizen engagement and optimize legislative output and accountability. The shift from back-office function to emergency response to strategic undertaking has profound implications for parliaments worldwide.

Institutional values come before innovation and governance before technology

Digital transformation has become systematic rather than episodic. Political ownership has intensified; technology decisions are now championed by senior leaders and elected representatives, not relegated to technical staff. Data is increasingly recognized as a strategic asset rather than an administrative by-product. Governance frameworks for emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) reflect an understanding that innovation divorced from institutional values creates risk, not opportunity.

The Digital Maturity Index (DMI) reveals a sector advancing broadly but at different speeds. The median parliament has moved upward in overall digital maturity since 2024, reflecting genuine sector-wide progress. Despite this, the gap between highest-maturing and least-mature parliaments has widened. This is not because least mature parliaments have declined in absolute capability; many have improved their technical infrastructure substantially. Rather, the frontier of parliamentary digital capability is advancing with such speed – driven by AI and data governance innovation – that maintaining steady investment means slipping behind peers and missing cumulative institutional advantage.

This creates a moment of strategic clarity. Parliaments that link technology investments explicitly to process improvement, establish governance maturity before technological deployment, and treat data as strategic infrastructure will advance their maturity position. Parliaments that cannot accelerate their modernization trajectories risk capability deficits that compound over time, creating long-term institutional disadvantage.

Besides the survey data, the *World e-Parliament Report 2026* systematizes the evidence from six years of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)'s *Innovation Tracker* series and from the last two years of its *Transforming Parliaments* webinars. It also draws on the collected intelligence from the IPU's Centre for Innovation in Parliament (CIP), built through its extensive networks. Together, this demonstrates how parliaments have advanced, identifying principles that enable sustainable digital transformation, and allows the report to add a stronger narrative, reflecting the direct experiences of parliaments.

AI is reshaping parliamentary work, and responsible governance frameworks help ensure that adoption strengthens democratic values and sustains public trust, while accelerating institutional capabilities.

AI is transforming the way parliaments will work in the future but it requires strong governance and a focus on AI literacy for all users

Digital transformation is becoming a strategic driver of institutional difference among parliaments. Parliaments advancing strategically will strengthen their effectiveness, resilience and public legitimacy.

This report offers evidence-based guidance rooted in real institutional experience. Parliaments from diverse regions, and with diverse constitutional frameworks, budgets and governance models, have demonstrated that digital transformation succeeds when it is anchored in clear vision, political ownership, governance maturity and strategic alignment with parliamentary values. The *World e-Parliament Report 2026* synthesizes this experience into findings and actionable recommendations designed for parliaments at all stages of digital maturity.

Digital maturity requires an ongoing institutional commitment to innovation, resilience and democratic effectiveness

This report provides the evidence, frameworks and peer experience parliaments need to navigate that journey with confidence. It is based on a survey that was distributed to parliaments through the IPU's channels between December 2025 and February 2026. The report uses data from 118 parliamentary chambers in 89 countries – a response rate consistent with previous editions.

The findings and recommendations for parliaments are presented, followed by a comparison of these findings to those of the 2024 report and broader technological trends over the last two years. An analysis of parliamentary digital transformation since 2020 follows, based on the IPU's *Innovation Tracker* series and *Transforming Parliaments* webinar series. The report then offers a new DMI based on the 2026 survey data. There is a high-level summary of the findings, identifying the current state of parliamentary

technologies and practices, before a detailed analysis of parliamentary technologies and practices, based on the analysis of the survey data. This structure offers opportunities for different audiences to select the level of detail that suits their requirements and interests.

Terminology used in this report

Tiers and deciles
This report uses the terms "tier" and "decile" to describe the digital maturity of parliaments. These are derived from the DMI in this report:

- **Deciles** range from 1 (lowest level of digital maturity) to 10 (highest level)
- **Tier 1** refers to the highest level of digital maturity; it means parliaments in the top three deciles (deciles 8–10)
- **Tier 2** refers to mid-level digital maturity parliaments (deciles 4–7)
- **Tier 3** refers to lower-level digital maturity parliaments (deciles 1–3)

Governance

The report uses the term "governance" to refer to digital governance, which is defined as the institutional framework of policies, strategies and oversight mechanisms through which a parliament manages its adoption and use of digital technology.

Findings and recommendations for parliaments

This section presents the key findings of the report and sets out targeted recommendations to support parliaments in their digital transformation journey. It draws on survey data and the previous analysis of articles and webinars to identify the most significant trends, challenges and opportunities in parliamentary digitalization.

Strategic imperatives

The report points consistently to four strategic imperatives that parliaments should be doing or planning to do. These imperatives characterize effective digital transformation, irrespective of a parliament's size, region or level of digital maturity.

- **Political ownership and senior leadership**: Successful digital transformation requires members and senior parliamentary staff, not only technical departments, to champion change and shape the tools that support their work. Parliaments where leadership and members engage actively in digital decisions sustain that engagement across electoral and budget cycles more successfully than those that do not.
- **Governance before technology**: Institutional readiness must precede deployment, not follow it. Parliaments that establish governance processes before introducing advanced technologies outperform those that procure first and govern later. This becomes increasingly true for AI, and ensuring high levels of AI literacy across the institution is vital.
- **Data as strategic infrastructure**: Technical advancement without data governance creates fragile systems. Parliaments that treat data as strategic capital deploy advanced technologies more safely and build resilience into their operations.
- **Effective communities of practice**: Parliaments that share experiences with their peers learn from early adopters and can scale solutions more safely. Participation in global networks and knowledge-exchange platforms is among the most effective routes to digital advancement.

Findings

Looking back at the three previous issues of the *World e-Parliament Report* (2020, 2022 and 2024) reveals a consistent pattern of findings. What was initially a technology challenge has progressively become an institutional one. In 2020, many parliaments had to react to the need for radically different ways of working that required digital tools to support them. By 2024, the DMI showed that technology adoption alone did not drive institutional advancement. Instead, governance became the critical differentiator. By 2026, this observation has become more acute as AI adoption has exploded. This report exposes a fundamental constraint: technology has arrived faster than the institutional capacity to govern it. The parliaments successfully managing this transition are those that have recognized the need for governance before deployment.

1. **Digital transformation has become a strategic, institution-wide undertaking**

   Digital transformation has moved beyond technology procurement. It is now embedded in the institutional mission, championed by senior leaders and elected representatives, and assessed against measurable improvements to parliamentary processes rather than technical specifications.

   a. Sixty-five per cent maintain formal digital transformation programmes; 73% developed multi-year digital strategies.

   b. Seventy-one per cent involve the secretary general in information and communications technology (ICT) decisions; 31% involve the Speaker (up from 25% in 2020); governance committees are present in 31% of parliaments.

   c. Governance is no longer left to technical departments; even small parliaments recognize digital transformation as strategic (65% have programmes).

2. **Prioritizing governance ahead of technology deployment is a strong predictor of continued advancement of digital maturity**

   Progression through digital maturity tiers follows recognizable patterns. The most revealing finding shows that advancing parliaments at the higher end of tier 2 are distinguished from those at the lower end of tier 2 by their approach to governance and whether ICT decision-making includes members and senior staff or remains administrative.

   a. Upper tier 2 (deciles 6–7) report board-level ICT oversight at 60–70%; lower tier 2 (deciles 4–5) at 20–30%; yet infrastructure and technical capabilities show modest differences.

   b. Capacity constraints are a barrier for 65% of tier 1, to 80% of tier 2 and 78% of tier 3. Tier 3 parliaments also report not being technically ready (70%) and governance clarity gaps (53%).

   c. Broadly, the most effective strategic interventions differ by tier: tier 3 benefits from establishing governance frameworks and skills development; tier 2 from change management; tier 1 from AI regulation (emerging technology) and knowledge-sharing with peers to understand trends.

3. **AI adoption is a governance challenge**

   Eighty-eight per cent of parliaments use AI in some form, yet only 48% have formal institutional adoption. The gap represents staff and members using tools without approval, training, oversight or risk assessment. This is referred to as "shadow AI".

   a. The least digitally mature parliaments (decile 1) report 75% staff usage but zero institutional adoption.

   b. Only 45% of parliaments assess risks, 38% assess legal requirements, 46% conduct zero compliance activity; all decile 10 (most digitally mature) parliaments conduct both risk and legal assessments.

   c. The geographic divide is sharp: Europe leads at 65% having risk assessments; the Pacific is at zero.

4. **Cloud infrastructure is central to parliamentary resilience, but data sovereignty shapes the choices parliaments make**

   Cloud adoption has reached 83% of parliaments, reflecting a genuine shift towards scalable, resilient environments. Choices about data sovereignty and jurisdictional control actively shape where parliaments host systems.

   a. Cloud adoption accelerated from 36% (2020) to 68% (2024) to 83% (2026).

   b. Planned migration towards government-managed clouds increased from 37% to 67%; half of cloud users favour single cloud types, while half diversify risk through multi-cloud strategies.

   c. Infrastructure security lags behind: only 57% have cybersecurity strategies, zero in decile 1.

5. **Chamber modernization has delivered tangible efficiency gains**

   Operational modernization of plenary and committee work has produced visible returns on digital investment. Sustainable modernization requires end-user leadership as well as connection to strategic initiatives such as data management.

   a. Electronic voting in plenary is 69% (up from 67% in 2024) but committee voting only 29%.

   b. The National Assembly of Malawi reduced voting time from over one hour to under 10 minutes while reducing printing costs.

   c. Video streaming from plenary averages 74% but there are stark inequalities between tier 1 (85%) and tier 3 (48%) for committee streaming. The use of hybrid participation contracted post-pandemic (60% to 36% in plenary).

6. **Public engagement requires active, strategic effort, not simply publishing open data**

   Publishing open data is necessary but insufficient. Parliaments with the most impactful public engagement strategies treat data as a service requiring active investment.

   a. Social media adoption is near-universal at 92%, yet specialist tools lag behind: e-petitions 35%, e-consultation on bills 30%, online discussion groups 12%; only 48% have formal strategy.

   b. Brazil's Chamber of Deputies invested to increase engagement with open data; parliaments publishing Portable Document Formats (PDFs) without engagement see minimal reuse.

   c. The gap is revealing: 92% publish open data yet 85% PDF-only; structured formats are underutilized (Extensible Markup Language (XML) 34%, application programming interfaces (APIs) 27%, JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) 1%).

7. **Digital maturity gaps are widening as leading parliaments accelerate**

   The median parliament has improved since 2024, but the gap between the highest and lowest levels of digital maturity has widened. The frontier is advancing with such speed that steady investment means slipping behind peers. Closing the gap requires ongoing institutional development with governance first, data second and technology third.

   a. More than half of parliaments experiencing ranking reductions improved absolute capability scores but fell in relative terms; the sector is becoming more capable overall but at widely varying rates.

   b. Tier 1 is advancing through AI deployment and data governance; tier 2 through infrastructure modernization and capacity-building; tier 3 through foundational digital services.

   c. Half of tier 3 spends less than 1% of their budget on ICT.

8. **Inter-parliamentary collaboration is one of the most effective routes to digital advancement**

   Diversity in the highest maturity tier reflects years of deliberate knowledge transfer, peer learning and regional cooperation.

   a. Eighty-eight per cent report learning from peers; CIP participation has grown from 27% (2020) to 48% (2026), with 32% more willing to participate.

   b. Sixty-four per cent actively provide support to others in at least one functional area; 93% are willing to do so; AI is defining cooperation priority (34% providing AI support to peers).

   c. Peer-to-peer knowledge transfer is often more effective than non-parliamentary external assistance.

Recommendations

The following recommendations reflect the evidence gathered. They are addressed to parliamentary leadership, Secretaries General, Speakers and senior ICT leaders, and reflect the institutional logic running through the findings: governance enables data governance, which enables safe and effective technology deployment.

1. **Establish governance as the strategic foundation of digital transformation**

   Parliaments should establish the governance conditions for digital transformation before deploying new systems. This means forming a dedicated working group or committee with genuine participation from members and senior administrative leadership, conducting an institutional readiness assessment to identify gaps between technology choices and parliamentary processes, and developing a multi-year digital road map with clear milestones linked explicitly to the parliament's strategic objectives.

2. **Establish AI governance frameworks before deploying AI systems**

   AI is in production across parliaments in transcription, translation, document summarization and legislative research, but governance has not kept pace. Forty-six per cent of parliaments conduct no AI compliance activity at all, despite widespread use. Parliaments should develop clear policies specifying permissible and prohibited AI uses; establish human-in-the-loop oversight; create audit trails and monitoring mechanisms; and consider formal AI governance certification. Governance of this kind does not slow down AI adoption. It is what makes adoption sustainable and democratically accountable.

3. **Treat data as a strategic institutional asset**

   Parliaments should consolidate fragmented IT systems, standardize metadata across legislative and operational data and establish centralized data pools. Data governance must precede AI deployment. Parliaments that treat data as an administrative by-product consistently find their technology investments underperform. Fragmented systems, inconsistent metadata and ungoverned data stores create the conditions for strategic misalignment that only becomes apparent when advanced technologies are introduced.

4. **Invest in infrastructure modernization, with resilience and sovereignty as guiding principles**

   For most parliaments, cloud migration offers significant advantages: reduced dependency on costly local infrastructure, improved disaster resilience and scalability that on-premises systems cannot match. Cloud adoption involves a portfolio of choices about where systems are hosted, under which jurisdiction, and with what governance over data access and retention. Parliaments should conduct a comprehensive infrastructure assessment, develop a migration road map, and ensure that choices are driven by resilience needs and data sovereignty requirements. For geographically isolated parliaments, alternative connectivity solutions may resolve decades-long infrastructure barriers rapidly and cost-effectively.

5. **Modernize chamber operations, placing members at the centre**

   Hybrid sittings, paperless workflows and electronic voting are proven, with documented efficiency and democratic gains across many parliaments. Such modernization should be treated as a core institutional investment. End-user leadership is the critical factor: parliaments should position members and staff at the centre of technology selection through governance committees and structured feedback, and measure and communicate the gains that result. Doing so builds the institutional case for sustained investment and ensures that digital tools survive changes in political leadership.

6. **Develop and execute active public engagement strategies that go beyond passive publication**

   Open data published on parliamentary websites serves a purpose but does not by itself serve citizens. Parliaments should invest in making data genuinely usable: structured machine-readable formats, user-centric portals, outreach to developers and civil society, and communication strategies calibrated to the channels where different audiences engage. This requires editorial judgement and institutional commitment alongside technical capability.

7. **Invest in capacity-building, change management and digital literacy**

   The technical systems required for digital transformation are generally available. The constraint is whether staff and members have the skills, confidence and support to use them well. Parliaments should develop digital and AI literacy programmes calibrated to different audiences, invest in cybersecurity awareness as a shared institutional responsibility, and implement genuine change management during technology deployments. Staff engagement, transparent communication about risks and benefits, and practical support structures significantly improve adoption and outcomes. AI training for members has risen from 16% to 49% of parliaments in two years, reflecting both need and a sustained institutional commitment.

8. **Participate actively in inter-parliamentary knowledge networks and draw on existing good practice**

   No parliament needs to solve every digital challenge in isolation. Parliaments benefit when they actively engage with the IPU CIP hubs and other inter-parliamentary platforms, participate in regional capacity-building programmes and contribute institutional innovations as shared resources for the wider parliamentary community. For smaller and less-resourced parliaments, peer exchange is one of the most cost-effective routes to advancing digital capability.

Putting the recommendations into practice

These recommendations apply across all parliaments, but their priority and sequencing differ depending on digital maturity.

For **parliaments with emerging digital maturity (tier 3; deciles 1–3)**, the most important action is to establish governance before acquiring further technology. A formal digital strategy, a senior leader with responsibility for ICT and a clear institutional road map are prerequisites for sustainable digital advancement. Where resources are constrained, a focused commitment to two or three areas is more effective than attempting broad improvement simultaneously: parliamentary systems, electronic voting and basic data governance are proven entry points. Parliaments in this tier are strongly encouraged to make use of the IPU/Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments (ASGP) *Guide to digital transformation in parliaments*,[1] which sets out practical pathways for institutions building foundational digital capability, and to engage with other parliaments, such as through the CIP programmes and peer networks. The CIP's Digital Maturity Assessment tool can also be helpful in guiding prioritization and decision-making (as can this report).

The primary challenge for **parliaments with mid-range digital maturity (tier 2; deciles 4–7)** is execution. Most tier 2 parliaments have digital strategies and appointed ICT leaders; the constraint is whether governance structures genuinely involve members and senior administrative leadership, and whether implementation is completing at scale rather than stalling at pilot stage. Parliaments in the lower part of this tier (deciles 4–5) should focus on broadening governance structures to include members and on establishing data governance as the foundation for more advanced technology deployment. Those in the upper part (deciles 6–7) are ready to begin formal AI governance. The IPU *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments*[2] provides a structured self-assessment that identifies where governance gaps exist before deployment begins – the experience of the Senate of Spain illustrates why this step matters.

The opportunity for **parliaments with advanced digital maturity (tier 1; deciles 8–10)** shifts from institutional development to leadership. Tier 1 parliaments are advancing rapidly, but the sector advances most effectively when leading institutions share what they have learned. Active participation in communities of practice, contribution of architectural frameworks and validation protocols, and direct peer-to-peer support to emerging parliaments are the highest-value actions available at this tier. Internally, the priority is proactive governance of emerging technologies, particularly AI, ahead of deployment rather than in response to it. The IPU *Guidelines for AI in parliaments* and the *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments* both provide frameworks for embedding this governance discipline before new capabilities are introduced.

Resources to support digital transformation can be downloaded from the IPU website:

- *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments*
- *Guidelines for AI in parliaments*
- *Use cases for AI in parliaments*
- IPU/ASGP *Guide to digital transformation in parliaments*
- IPU *Innovation Tracker* series
- *Transforming Parliaments* webinar series

1. IPU/ASGP, *Guide to digital transformation in parliaments*, 2023.
2. IPU, *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments*, 2025.

Trends

Two years marks a short interval in the life of an institution, yet between the publication of the *World e-Parliament Report 2024* and this 2026 edition, a perceptible shift has occurred in how parliaments approach digital transformation. The shift is not technological in character; it is institutional.

The two years since the 2024 report have been among the most consequential in recent technology history. Generative AI moved from specialist tool to mainstream workplace technology: large language models became embedded in productivity software used by parliamentary staff, often without institutional decision or policy. The European Union Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AI Act) marked the first comprehensive legislative framework for AI and set a regulatory precedent that other jurisdictions are adopting or adapting. Agentic AI moved from the lab into early enterprise deployment. At the same time, geopolitical changes and the concentration of capability among a small number of commercial providers raised new questions about dependency, data residency and the long-term sustainability of institutional reliance on external platforms. For parliaments, these developments have arrived as conditions to be managed.

In 2024, the report documented an encouraging baseline: parliaments were investing in digital transformation. Often as a legacy of the COVID-19 pandemic, leadership engagement was broadening, cloud adoption was accelerating and digital tools were at the heart of parliament as infrastructure capability advanced steadily. What neither the 2024 report nor most parliaments anticipated was the velocity of AI adoption once tools became easily accessible to end-users. The dramatic rise in what is termed "shadow AI" – staff and members using generative AI tools without institutional approval, training or risk assessment – has exposed a critical gap between technology adoption and institutional readiness to govern it.

This gap is not driven by lack of awareness or resistance to AI governance. Rather, it reflects the pace of technological change outstripping the capacity of institutions to respond. End-users discover tools that improve their work and adopt them. Governance structures, policies and risk frameworks struggle to keep pace. This pattern carries important implications for how parliaments must now think about digital transformation.

The institutional readiness challenge

The 2024 report correctly identified governance as an emerging challenge. The 2026 evidence shows that the challenge has become acute. A recognizable pattern has emerged among parliaments advancing most rapidly: governance maturity – establishing clear institutional architecture, consolidating systems, defining roles and accountability – must be established before advanced technologies are deployed. More specifically, process redesign must precede technology integration. Parliaments that have attempted to overlay AI into existing workflows without reimagining those workflows report that technology inherits and amplifies existing weaknesses. Those that have redesigned processes first, then integrated AI, report substantially better outcomes.

This sequencing – governance first, data governance second, technology third – was not discussed directly in 2024 but is now emerging as the defining characteristic that distinguishes parliaments advancing their maturity from those reaching a plateau despite comparable investment.

Evidence also points to a further dimension: the critical importance of culture and human factors. Parliaments report that risk aversion, fear of failure and resistance from middle management can stall adoption. Yet some of the most valuable learning comes from things that do not work. Parliaments advancing most rapidly have built cultures that treat experimentation as normal and failure as a learning tool rather than a career risk. This represents a fundamental shift in how digital transformation is understood: as a change management and cultural challenge, not merely a technical one.

Digital sovereignty and emerging dependencies

By 2026, data sovereignty and data residency have moved from niche concerns to central features of parliamentary digital strategy. Multiple parliaments have also experienced the impact of vendor dependency: cloud providers deprecating models, withdrawing services or changing terms with minimal notice. A response has been to establish "pragmatic autonomy", where parliaments maintain the ability to operate critical functions independently while using commercial infrastructure where appropriate. This goes beyond simple procurement and requires technical planning, sustained governance and long-term institutional commitment.

A related concern has emerged around what might be called "model sovereignty". Parliaments adopting large language models that vendors regularly update or deprecate face constant pressure to retest and revalidate systems. Some have responded by developing smaller, bounded models suited to specific parliamentary functions; others have negotiated vendor agreements defining deprecation timelines. These institutional responses reflect a maturing recognition that complete technological independence is neither achievable nor desirable; rather, that understanding and actively managing dependency is essential.

Emerging governance thresholds

Agentic AI systems capable of autonomous action across multiple steps without human intervention at each stage are moving from research to practical deployment. This represents a governance threshold distinct from conventional AI. Three specific risks require attention:

- Prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in content cause systems to behave unintentionally
- Tool abuse, where agents use their capabilities beyond the intended scope
- Data leakage, where information accessed during tasks is inadvertently exposed

Governance frameworks adequate for conventional AI are unlikely to be sufficient for agentic systems, requiring new approaches to oversight and accountability.

Beyond technical governance, the question of content authentication has become concrete rather than theoretical. Parliaments whose proceedings are published online and whose members routinely share content on social media are discovering that audiences cannot reliably distinguish authentic material from selectively edited or fabricated versions. Standards for content provenance and authenticity are moving into the pilot phase and are likely to become essential to parliamentary credibility.

The workforce imperative

A trend with long-term institutional implications is emerging: future staff will arrive as "AI-first workers" and many students already use AI tools routinely. Parliaments will face growing pressure to compete for digital talent as younger workers migrate towards organizations offering contemporary digital working environments. This shifts AI adoption from an optional investment to a workforce retention imperative. Institutions unable to offer modern digital tools risk losing the people they most need to retain.

The shape of change

What emerges when comparing 2024 with 2026 is accelerating divergence. Parliaments where governance has kept pace with technology, and that understand that process redesign must accompany deployment and that organizational readiness is as important as technical capability, are advancing rapidly and with confidence. Where this is not the case, technology deployments can become sources of risk rather than value. The gap is driven by institutional choice and leadership vision, rather than budget or technical capacity.

Table 1. Key indicators of change: 2024 to 2026

Indicator	2024	2026	Change
Parliaments with a multi-year digital strategy	69%	73%	+4pp*
Cloud adoption	68%	83%	+15pp
Cybersecurity strategy in place	53%	57%	+4pp
Renewable energy self-generation	13%	23%	+10pp
Internet connectivity described as "more than adequate"	35%	50%	+15pp
AI use in some form	28%	88%	+60pp
AI governance structures planned or in development	39%	49%	+10pp
AI training provided to members	16%	49%	+33pp
AI tools in parliamentary library	13%	26%	+13pp
Staff feeling overwhelmed by volume of communications	20%	33%	+13pp
Parliaments providing AI support to peers	7%	34%	+27pp
Parliaments learning from their peers	82%	88%	+6pp

**pp = percentage points*

These forces of change operate across all tiers, but their implications differ substantially depending on where a parliament currently stands. The key technology, governance and societal trends for each tier of digital maturity are outlined below.

Tier 1 (deciles 8–10): From deployment to governance accountability

The challenge for tier 1 parliaments over the next two to three years is less about adopting new technologies than about governing what has already been deployed, and taking responsibility for leading the wider sector.

Technology trajectories

AI deployment in tier 1 has moved from pilot to production: transcription, translation, legislative research and document management are established functions. The next frontier is AI-assisted legislative analysis, amendment clustering and large-scale processing of public submissions. These applications depend on well-governed data architectures, and the transition from data as administrative by-product to strategic infrastructure is not yet complete across tier 1. Cloud strategy is also maturing, with parliaments moving towards multi-cloud arrangements and government-managed hosting for sensitive systems. As commercial providers consolidate, managing dependency on externally maintained large language models will become a practical governance challenge.

Governance trajectories

Existing AI governance frameworks in tier 1 are largely reactive, designed for current applications rather than those arriving. Agentic systems require oversight models that go beyond conventional AI: parliaments need accountability chains that remain meaningful when a system acts without human intervention at each step. These frameworks should be developed before deployment, not in response to it.

Content provenance is shifting from technical experiment to institutional necessity. Parliaments that have invested most heavily in digital transparency are paradoxically most exposed to the credibility risks of synthetic media and will need to lead on content authentication standards. Cybersecurity threats will continue to increase in sophistication; AI-enhanced threat detection is already in deployment in some legislatures and will become standard, although members and staff remain the most persistent vulnerability.

Cultural and societal trajectories

Citizens accustomed to high-quality digital services in commercial contexts apply comparable expectations to public institutions. When parliaments fall short, the consequences are tangible: declining trust and vulnerability to narratives that present the institution as remote or irrelevant. Active, data-driven public engagement is a democratic necessity, not an optional enhancement. The broader obligation for tier 1 is to share frameworks and learning with the wider parliamentary community; the sector advances most effectively when leading institutions make their experience available to others.

Tier 2 (deciles 4–7): Closing the execution gap

The primary challenge for tier 2 is closing the gap between strategic intent and capability, which appears to be widening as tier 1 advances, particularly among parliaments in the lower half of tier 2 (deciles 4–5).

Technology trajectories

Cloud adoption will continue across tier 2, but migration without accompanying data governance creates real risks: vendor dependency, data residency uncertainty and systems that share information inconsistently. The specific danger is partial deployment, where migration stalls before completion and institutions carry the costs of both old and new infrastructure.

AI usage across tier 2 stands at 88%, but formal institutional adoption is only 50–60%, meaning a substantial share of use remains ungoverned. Parliaments that establish governance frameworks before the next wave of AI capability arrives will manage the transition more effectively than those that do not. For upper tier 2, the near-term opportunity is AI transcription and translation at scale; for lower tier 2, the priority is completing at least one core function fully rather than holding several at partial deployment.

Governance trajectories

The critical differentiator within tier 2 is governance inclusivity: whether ICT decision-making involves members and senior staff or remains more operationally driven. This is an institutional choice, not a resource constraint. Parliaments in lower tier 2 that broaden their governance structures create the conditions for advancement that technology investment alone cannot provide. Data governance will emerge as the practical constraint for all of tier 2: parliaments approaching the threshold for more advanced AI or open data work without coherent data architecture will find their investments underperform.

Cultural and societal trajectories

Only half of tier 2 parliaments have formal public engagement strategies, yet societal expectations of meaningful digital access to parliamentary processes are rising. Parliaments that invest in active engagement now build institutional capacity that cannot be created retrospectively. The legal and regulatory environment will also affect tier 2 unevenly: the EU AI Act is directly relevant to European parliaments in this tier and will shape procurement and governance requirements, while those outside equivalent frameworks face fewer external pressures but also less structured support.

Tier 3 (deciles 1–3): Accelerating without losing governance foundations

Tier 3 parliaments face structurally different challenges. The forces shaping tier 1 and tier 2 are real but secondary to the foundational task: building the institutional conditions for sustained digital transformation where resources, connectivity and technical staff are constrained.

Technology trajectories

The most consequential technology development for tier 3 is connectivity. Low-Earth-orbit satellite networks are becoming commercially accessible, and, as the Starlink deployment on the Pacific island of Kosrae, part of the Federated States of Micronesia, demonstrated, decades of connectivity barriers can be bypassed in months. Cloud-based document management, transcription and legislative management systems are available at costs and complexity levels appropriate for small and resource-constrained parliaments. These are not emerging technologies; they are deployed solutions, and the barrier to adoption is awareness and governance readiness rather than technical capability.

AI is arriving in tier 3 through existing tools rather than deliberate deployment. With 75% of tier 3 staff already using AI informally, the risk is ungoverned adoption: data exposure, dependency on unsuitable tools and decisions taken without accountability. AI transcription offers a significant opportunity, enabling small parliaments to maintain and publish parliamentary records without large staff resources.

Governance trajectories

The governance imperative for tier 3 is to develop practical frameworks defining permitted AI tools: a named senior responsible person for ICT and a concise digital strategy create the institutional conditions that make all subsequent investment more effective. Where such frameworks are absent, it typically reflects the competing pressures on small parliaments rather than any lack of capability.

Donor and partner dependency is a structural vulnerability. Where digital programmes are shaped primarily by donor priorities rather than institutional need, investments frequently lack sustainability, and the typical logic of donor-funded projects sits in tension with the governance-first sequencing that sustainable advancement requires. The IPU's Digital Maturity Assessment tool, *Guide to digital transformation in parliaments* and *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments* offer frameworks specifically designed for this context.

Cultural and societal trajectories

In many tier 3 countries, the democratic environment is under pressure, and parliaments face institutional legitimacy questions that go beyond digital capability. Digital transformation that visibly serves citizens, making proceedings accessible and enabling participation despite geographic distance, builds institutional legitimacy alongside operational efficiency.

Mobile-first design is a practical necessity in many tier 3 contexts, where mobile devices are the primary means through which citizens access digital services. Parliamentary services designed for desktop environments with mobile as an afterthought will consistently underperform.

The risk of widening structural divergence is real. Tier 3 parliaments advancing steadily face the prospect of meeting 2024 standards at a point when the sector has moved to 2028 expectations. Regional peer learning, as demonstrated by Pacific parliaments sharing pragmatic solutions, is the most accessible route to compressing timelines without requiring each institution to solve problems that others have already resolved.

Parliamentary digital transformation since 2020

The CIP's *Innovation Tracker*[3] is a quarterly electronic bulletin about innovations in the way parliaments do their work and has been published by the IPU since 2020.

The period since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has redefined the operational reality of legislatures worldwide. Faced with an existential challenge to their continuity, parliaments achieved "five years of innovation in five months". As the immediate crisis subsided, ICT had irreversibly shifted from a behind-the-scenes support function to the strategic centre of parliamentary operations. This section of the report looks at six years of the IPU *Innovation Tracker* series, using the articles to map the evolution of digital technologies and their impact beyond the pandemic. The stories told through data in the *World e-Parliament Reports* that cover this period are brought to life through the words of the parliaments themselves.

For parliamentary leadership, the imperative has evolved. The narrative is no longer about digitizing paper processes or adopting emergency remote tools. Today, digital transformation is a continuous, strategic undertaking that directly shapes a parliament's resilience, transparency and democratic effectiveness. The experiences of parliaments demonstrate that well-governed technology aligned with institutional mission creates many benefits, such as enhanced efficiency, strengthened public trust and improved legislative quality.

Building strategic foundations and institutional resilience

The most successful digital transformations begin by stepping back to assess foundational architecture. Procuring new software is insufficient if underlying infrastructure and governance remain weak. Digital maturity is not achieved through technology acquisition alone; it is built through institutional readiness.

This realization prompted the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to utilize the European Parliament's IT Maturity Assessment Tool (IMAT) to evaluate how technology served institutional objectives. The assessment revealed a critical gap: technology decisions were tactical, lacking a clear connection to improved parliamentary processes. Armed with this insight, the Assembly shifted from reactive procurement to developing a structured, long-term road map that directly links IT investments to institutional value.

Institutional resilience also requires reimagining physical infrastructure. Cloud migration reduces dependency on expensive local servers and mitigates the vulnerability of physical equipment. Following Cyclone Gita's devastation – which destroyed 80% of its ICT infrastructure – the Legislative Assembly of Tonga transitioned to cloud-based document management. The shift created greater disaster resilience while allowing MPs to access crucial information even from remote outer islands. For small island developing States, pragmatic innovations exemplify how strategic infrastructure choices ensure democratic continuity regardless of geographical isolation. When the State Legislature of Kosrae (part of the Federated States of Micronesia) deployed the Starlink satellite internet, it bypassed decades of connectivity barriers in months, enabling the parliament to broadcast live sessions directly to constituents.

Faced with the physical constraints of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Shura Council of Bahrain successfully maintained legislative continuity by holding fully remote plenary meetings. To support remote operations, the Council transitioned its committee sittings to virtual formats, migrated its local intranet to a cloud-based portal and built on its pre-existing MP's "Digital Briefcase" system to distribute agendas and session documents directly to members.

Mature digital strategy treats data as a strategic asset. The House of Representatives of Indonesia executed a highly disciplined transformation across three phases. Phase I established governance foundations and appointed a chief information officer (CIO). Phase II reframed data from an administrative by-product into strategic capital by consolidating fragmented systems and standardizing metadata across a "One Data" portal. Only after achieving this governance maturity did Phase III introduce AI pilots. This sequencing – governance first, then data governance and finally technology – demonstrates that institutional readiness must come before technological deployment.

> These examples demonstrate that strategic sequencing matters more than technology selection. Bosnia and Herzegovina identified the gap between tactical procurement and institutional purpose; Tonga and Kosrae demonstrated that infrastructure choices have direct democratic consequences; Indonesia showed that governance and data maturity must precede advanced technology deployment; and Bahrain's Shura Council showed that strong governance and good planning enable a faster, more resilient response in a crisis.

Emergency remote procedures during the pandemic have evolved into institutionalized hybrid sittings and a "digital-first" mindset. The modernization of plenary and committee workflows has generated tangible efficiency gains and transformed the daily work of members.

The National Assembly of Malawi completely overhauled its chamber management, transitioning to paperless operations. By digitally distributing session papers and implementing electronic voting, the parliament reduced voting time for a 193-member chamber from over an hour to under 10 minutes

3. The articles referred to in this report can be found here.

while simultaneously reducing printing costs. Similarly, the Parliament of Namibia embraced "digital-first" operations, achieving a 95% rate of electronic document circulation and utilizing high-definition digital feeds to broadcast live sessions directly to the public. These operational gains extend beyond efficiency metrics; they reflect how digital infrastructure enables MPs to serve their constituencies more effectively while maintaining full parliamentary engagement.

Crucially, successful modernization occurs when it is championed by end-users. The National Assembly of Zambia anchored its digital transformation within the Parliamentary Reforms and Modernisation Committee. By positioning elected representatives at the centre of technological change, the parliament ensured that new tools – such as their eChamber mobile application – directly served democratic purposes rather than becoming "technology-for-technology's-sake" exercises. This MP-led model builds institutional continuity to sustain digital transformation but it also creates institutional risk where high turnover of MPs results in a lack of continuity.

> The common thread across Malawi, Namibia and Zambia is that the efficiency gains from chamber modernization are real and measurable, but they happen when members are actively involved. End-user leadership is not a governance nicety but a factor determining whether digital investment translates into sustained institutional change.

Rebuilding public trust through strategic data engagement

In an era of declining public trust and rising misinformation, parliaments are recognizing that transparency cannot be passive. Simply publishing open data is insufficient; data must be accessible, usable and strategically targeted to foster genuine two-way democratic dialogue.

The Chamber of Deputies of Brazil demonstrated this principle by treating open data as a service requiring active engagement. Rather than static databases, the Chamber invested in what might be called "data marketing": hosting hackathons, engaging software developers on GitHub, and providing user-centric data formats. This proactive engagement transformed raw legislative data into actionable democratic knowledge. The Chamber has recorded an average of seven million API calls per week, representing genuine demand for structured parliamentary information. This volume reflects deliberate institutional choices to make data usable, not merely available.

To engage younger demographics and combat political disengagement, parliaments must communicate through the channels where citizens spend their time. The Parliament of Austria launched a modern, multimedia newsroom and established an official TikTok channel. Rather than formal procedural explanations, the newsroom team – modelled on professional media operations – produced short educational videos and hosted live Q&A sessions directly from the parliament building. The reach proved remarkable: a single plenary livestream drew over 15,000 TikTok users, many engaging with parliament for the first time. This success demonstrates that parliaments can adapt to contemporary social media environments safely and effectively without compromising institutional dignity.

> Brazil and Austria illustrate the same principle from different directions: passive publication does not produce engagement, and digital reach does not automatically translate into democratic participation. What is required is deliberate institutional investment in data usability, audience research and channel strategy.

The AI frontier: Governing innovation while safeguarding democracy

AI represents a significant technological leap for parliaments. AI tools are now in production to automatically transcribe proceedings, translate languages and cluster complex legislative amendments. Yet the global consensus from parliamentary CIOs is unequivocal: AI adoption is not primarily a technical challenge; it is a governance challenge.

The Federal Assembly of Switzerland operated on a foundational principle when developing AI-powered library systems: "Trust isn't a feature, it's the foundation". This principle shaped their entire approach. They mandated strict "human-in-the-loop" oversight so that users have the power to view exactly from which official documents the AI drew its answers, and to switch the AI system off entirely. Efficiency must not come at the expense of integrity or transparency.

To prevent fragmented "shadow IT" projects, parliaments require comprehensive strategic frameworks. The German Bundestag developed the Cloverleaf AI model, a systematic framework mapping over 180 AI use cases across legislative work, support services, and internal administration. This prevents silos, optimizes resource allocation and ensures all AI deployments remain aligned with ethical principles.

Risk assessment and formal governance are non-negotiable prerequisites. When the Senate of Spain applied the IPU's *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments*, they discovered a telling pattern: their high technical capabilities masked dangerous gaps in risk management and monitoring of democratic impact. This assessment provided the credible tool needed to elevate AI governance to senior leadership level. Reflecting this maturity, the Council of Representatives of Bahrain achieved International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 42001:2023 certification for its AI management systems, becoming the first legislative body globally to embed AI governance within a formal, auditable framework. This certification reflects an institutional decision to treat responsible AI deployment as a core governance issue.

AI adoption is also a change management exercise. The House of Commons of Canada prioritized employee communication, establishing an AI hub, providing awareness campaigns and tracking staff sentiment throughout implementation. By actively addressing concerns and providing practical guardrails, they shifted staff attitudes to overwhelming positivity, facilitating safe organizational integration.

> The parliaments cited here approached AI adoption differently yet arrived at the same conclusion: managing AI most effectively means treating governance as the prerequisite and AI literacy as critical. Taken together, these examples highlight that technical deployment without institutional preparedness creates risk.

The call to leadership

The evidence from six years of sustained parliamentary innovation is unequivocal. Digital transformation is no longer an optional upgrade or a back-office modernization project. It is the central mechanism through which parliaments secure operational resilience, deepen citizen engagement and optimize legislative output and accountability.

For parliamentary leadership, the mandate is clear. Successful digital transformation requires sustained political will, robust governance frameworks and the strategic alignment of ICT investments with institutional mission and democratic values. By treating digital maturity as a core institutional priority and actively participating in global peer-learning networks, parliaments can ensure they remain not only operationally efficient but democratically vibrant and genuinely responsive to the citizens they serve.

Taking the digital parliament from strategy to implementation

Where the above section highlights case studies and learning from the extensive archives of the *Innovation Tracker* series, this section takes a more tightly focused look at the lessons emerging from the CIP's *Transforming Parliaments* webinar series since the last report was published (2025–2026).

The evidence presented in this report clarifies that digital transformation succeeds when parliaments establish governance as the strategic foundation and treat institutional readiness as a prerequisite for technology deployment. Yet the transition from strategic intent to operational reality remains where many parliaments struggle. The gap is not one of resources or technical capability alone but of institutional methodology: how to move from ad hoc adoption to systematic, sequenced implementation. In the examples that follow, parliamentary approaches to digital transformation are highlighted.

Across the parliaments advancing most effectively, several consistent patterns have emerged that relate to new ways of thinking about technology deployment: frameworks for assessment, methodologies for prioritization, and structured approaches to building institutional capacity alongside technical capability. The webinar series hosted by the CIP throughout 2025 and 2026 captured these emerging practices, revealing how parliaments are operationalizing the strategic principles outlined in this report's findings.

Mapping institutional readiness through digital maturity assessment

Parliaments moving beyond planning to implementation consistently report that formal digital maturity assessment was a turning point. Rather than proceeding with technology decisions based on vendor proposals or departmental requests, these institutions first asked: where are we now, what gaps exist, and what sequence of steps will move us towards our vision?

The examples of the Senate of Spain, in terms of AI governance, and the House of Representatives of Indonesia, regarding digital transformation, are discussed above. They show that the value of formal assessment lies in creating a shared language and understanding across stakeholders who often work in isolation.

> Maturity frameworks provide a common vocabulary, allowing technicians and elected representatives to discuss the same challenge. This alignment can be more valuable than the assessment score itself.

Structuring implementation through use case mapping

Once institutions understand their readiness, the question becomes: where should investment focus first? Parliaments proceeding without such prioritization often manage scattered initiatives with little institutional coherence. The solution is systematic use case mapping – a disciplined process to identify where technology creates genuine institutional value rather than pursuing what vendors market or what staff request.

The German Bundestag's AI Cloverleaf AI model, discussed earlier, provides a structured example. Rather than allowing artificial categories (departments, functions, hierarchies) to drive technology priorities, the model breaks parliamentary work into individual operational tasks. It then maps where AI creates measurable impact. This task-level analysis reveals unexpected patterns. The Bundestag discovered that transcription of proceedings offered the highest value across a range of workflows – supporting researcher access, enabling automated translation, reducing manual bottlenecks, and providing material for data analysis. By contrast, AI-assisted bill drafting, which seems attractive in abstract terms, proved less useful because it requires extensive human judgement and context that AI tools cannot reliably replicate. The model's power lies in distinguishing between technically possible applications and institutionally valuable ones.

The House of Commons of Canada has institutionalized this approach through a three-phase portfolio methodology. The first phase, "Intake", gathers ideas from staff consultations and observations of emerging tools. The second, "Sorting", categorizes use cases to identify overlapping needs and common requirements. The third, "Solution Matching", deploys existing tools to meet those needs or escalates new requirements to priority lists. Critically, each proposal is scored against complexity versus organizational value – a simple metric that focuses resources on initiatives benefiting the largest number of users with the clearest impact on parliamentary operations.

Transcription of proceedings emerged as the canonical use case across parliaments implementing AI. For small and resource-constrained institutions, manual transcription creates insurmountable mountains of unprocessed debates – a bottleneck that prevents public access to parliamentary records and constrains downstream services such as research and analysis. The parliaments of Barbados and Fiji each implemented AI-powered transcription but through different pathways. Barbados partnered with external vendors to deploy remote systems, clearing decades of historic backlog within months and fundamentally shifting staff roles from transcription to editorial verification. Fiji pragmatically integrated AI tools already present in their existing infrastructure (the dictation tools in Microsoft 365), reducing costs while dramatically improving staff well-being by eliminating unsustainable manual workloads. The specific technical pathway mattered less than the institutional outcome: records now reach citizens weeks rather than months after proceedings, and staff energy is directed towards quality assurance rather than data entry.

> Systematic use case mapping helps to focus technology investment where it adds most institutional value. The key distinction is between what is technically possible and what is institutionally valuable.

Building institutional capacity for sustained transformation

Technology deployment ultimately depends on people. The parliaments advancing most effectively recognize that technical readiness must be accompanied by institutional readiness. Specifically, the capacity of members and staff to use tools effectively, and the organizational culture to support learning and change, matter.

Training needs assessments emerge as a foundational step. The National Assembly of Zambia began its digital transformation journey with a comprehensive survey of all members and staff. The assessment revealed that while 92% of respondents wanted training, widespread misconceptions about AI persisted, helping create a clear baseline for curriculum design. More importantly, they identified hidden expertise within the institution. The Parliament of Austria, conducting a similar audit, discovered a stenographer fluent in Python who subsequently contributed directly to the parliament's speech-to-text system. This hidden capability, invisible to organizational charts, became a critical resource.

Equally important is institutional sponsorship. Zambia elevated one member to the role of digital champion, visibly championing AI adoption as a strategic priority. This high-level advocacy signalled institutional intent more powerfully than IT department announcements alone could achieve. Peer-to-peer advocacy proved more effective than top-down messaging: when members spoke to the practical value of tools in their specific roles, adoption accelerated.

The National Assembly of France grounded abstract principles in a practical AI usage charter that addressed the human question: when can I use AI, and when must I apply human judgement? The charter distinguished strictly between data classifications: cloud-based AI tools were permitted only for public information, while confidential or internal data remained on secure, on-premises servers. This clarity reduced staff hesitation and established that human verification remains mandatory for all AI-assisted legislative work. The charter transformed governance from a constraint into a clarity mechanism – staff understood the boundaries and could proceed with confidence.

> Training needs assessments reveal not only gaps but also hidden expertise that organizational charts do not see. High-level sponsorship and peer-to-peer advocacy accelerate adoption more effectively than top-down messaging from ICT teams alone.

Digital accessibility

Digital accessibility is both a democratic imperative and a practical implementation challenge. This report shows that 75% of parliaments take steps to ensure their digital content is accessible to people living with disabilities. The European Parliament's Digital Accessibility Competence Centre explored how this translates into operational reality. The central lesson was that accessibility must be treated as a shared institutional responsibility rather than a technical speciality: it requires top-level mandate, integration into procurement criteria from the outset and training tailored to the specific roles of staff, from editors and designers to developers. The European Parliament's experience illustrates the value of including certified professionals with lived experience of disability within accessibility teams, both as a practical resource and as a clear signal that there is a genuine institutional commitment.

Accessibility and cybersecurity sometimes appear to pull in different directions: security measures designed to verify identity or restrict unauthorized access (such as CAPTCHAs or session time limits) can create significant barriers for users relying on assistive technologies. The resolution lies in co-design, bringing accessibility and cybersecurity expertise together from the outset. Rather than treating one as a constraint on the other, this allows parliaments to deliver services that are both secure and inclusive.

> Embedding digital accessibility requires institutional mandate, procurement criteria that include accessibility requirements, and role-specific staff training. Where accessibility and cybersecurity appear to conflict, co-design is required from the outset to deliver services that are both secure and inclusive.

Strategic patterns and implications

The parliaments advancing most effectively share a common discipline: they map before they build, assess before they deploy and invest in people before they scale

Across these emerging practices, several consistent patterns emerge.

First, parliaments are replacing ad hoc adoption with structured governance. Charters, usage guidelines and dedicated oversight committees are becoming standard.

Second, the focus is consistently on displacement rather than replacement – AI as a tool to amplify human capability, with human-in-the-loop protocols for sensitive outputs.

Third, parliaments are increasingly reliant on shared frameworks and international standards, moving away from institutional isolation towards peer-benchmarked practice.

These operationalizing approaches validate the strategic findings of this report. They demonstrate that governance-before-technology sequencing is not theoretical but proven. They show that maturity assessment provides parliaments with diagnostic clarity. They illustrate that institutional capacity – both technical and human – must be developed intentionally. Most importantly, they reveal that digital transformation succeeds not through the perfection of individual initiatives but through disciplined, sequenced, institution-wide commitment to aligning technology with democratic purpose.

Extracts from *Innovation Tracker* articles and *Transforming Parliaments* key findings are used throughout this report to highlight experience and key findings.

Digital Maturity Index

The Digital Maturity Index (DMI) provides a comprehensive measure of parliamentary digital capability across seven functional areas: governance and strategy, infrastructure, parliamentary systems, supporting users in parliament, digital content and publishing, public engagement, and AI.


Benchmarking helps parliaments define good practice and adapt their own digital initiatives accordingly. The DMI supports parliaments in setting strategic priorities, measuring progress and collaborating as they learn from one another.

Self-assessment data carries inherent limitations: responses can contain overestimates, underestimates and errors.

The 2026 assessment covered 102 parliaments from 86 countries plus 2 supranational parliaments. By comparison, the 2024 survey included 113 chambers from 84 countries; the difference in total count reflects the fact that bicameral parliaments that submitted a single survey response are listed once, whereas in the full data analysis that follows they are separated out. Importantly, 95 parliaments participated in both surveys, creating a stable cohort to track genuine institutional progress. Among these consistent respondents, patterns show steady acceleration in digital capacity investment. Digital maturity itself remains contextual and flexible and cannot be defined without understanding individual parliamentary circumstances and constraints. The authors have therefore analysed and adjusted the data to account for these factors.


The median parliament has moved marginally upward since 2024, indicating moderate, broad-based improvement across the sector rather than isolated gains among leading performers. This confirms that parliamentary digital transformation is becoming a norm. However, significant challenges remain, particularly for parliaments in lower digital maturity tiers.

Figure 1. Distribution of parliaments by DMI score



The digital landscape is becoming more stratified. The gap between the highest-maturing and least mature parliament has widened – not because lower-tier parliaments have lost ground, but because the frontier of parliamentary digital capability is advancing rapidly, particularly through AI adoption. Maintaining parity with current digital maturity levels requires sustained investment and modernization.


Figure 2. Average digital maturity by functional area



Digital maturity varies significantly across the seven functional areas. Across all parliaments, the highest average digital maturity scores are in infrastructure, governance and strategy, and digital content and publishing, reflecting established parliamentary practices in these domains. Lower scores in public engagement highlight both areas for improvement and the impact of emerging technology. This variation underscores that comprehensive digital transformation requires attention to all seven areas, not selective advancement.

It is notable that among parliaments that experienced ranking reductions between 2024 and 2026, more than half improved their absolute digital capability scores. These parliaments increased their digital maturity yet saw rankings fall because others advanced faster. This indicates that the entire parliamentary sector is becoming more digitally capable but at widely varying rates.

Figure 3. Digital maturity distribution functional area




The CIP defines three levels of digital maturity, based on decile rankings in the DMI:

- Tier 1 (deciles 8–10) are the most digitally mature parliaments
- Tier 2 (deciles 4–7) are the mid-range parliaments
- Tier 3 (deciles 1–3) are parliaments with emerging and developing digital maturity

Digital maturity varies substantially across regions, with important patterns of diversification emerging between 2024 and 2026. The IPU uses six regional classifications: Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, Pacific, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 4. Distribution of parliaments by decile and region




In 2026, 33 countries occupy the highest digital maturity (tier 1, deciles 8–10). These represent the most digitally mature parliaments. Europe dominates numerically with 18 countries, followed by the Americas (7). The distribution seen in the 2026 DMI suggests geographic diversification is increasing with greater representation from developing regions in the higher tiers. Advanced digital maturity is no longer concentrated in traditional Western democracies and is becoming a genuinely global phenomenon.

Table 2. Regional distribution by tier

	Americas	Asia	Europe	Middle East & North Africa	Pacific	Sub-Saharan Africa
Tier 1	44%	10%	41%	40%	20%	4%
Tier 2	25%	40%	48%	20%	40%	52%
Tier 3	31%	50%	11%	40%	40%	44%

Thirty-five countries occupy tier 3, the lower digital maturity deciles (1–3). Small island developing States and least developed countries feature prominently, reflecting genuine structural constraints: limited budgets, small technical teams, geographic isolation and competing development priorities. However, notably present in the lower tiers are parliaments from advanced democracies – countries typically assumed to have mature digital capabilities. These unexpected entrants likely reflect either institutional disruption or poorer-quality response to the survey rather than genuine digital capability loss. Nonetheless, they highlight an important finding: digital maturity requires sustained institutional commitment. Capability achieved in one survey cycle cannot be assumed to persist without ongoing investment, governance attention and resource allocation.

Figure 5. Spread of scores by region



Why capability gaps are widening

Modern parliaments are no longer simply procuring technology – they are restructuring IT architectures, treating data as a strategic asset and embedding digital governance into institutional strategy. It is about people, process, technology and culture and requires sequential digital maturity that investment alone cannot accelerate.

Indonesia's House of Representatives demonstrates a phased approach, first consolidating IT systems and establishing governance (Phase I), reframing data as a strategic asset (Phase II), then introducing AI pilots (Phase III). Parliaments missing this sequence risk the gap Bosnia and Herzegovina's Parliamentary Assembly identified: solid infrastructure but weak strategic alignment.

These examples highlight that excellence must improve incrementally across different areas. Infrastructure gains without parallel progress in governance, strategy and capability leave overall digital maturity stagnant.

Growing parliament's digital capabilities

The 2026 DMI shows a sector advancing at different speeds. Tier 3 parliaments have improved in absolute terms, yet they have fallen further behind. The gap has widened because leading parliaments are advancing faster. This analysis explores what characterizes each tier, what explains differences within tiers, and what pathways enable progression towards greater digital maturity.

Tier 3 (deciles 1–3): Emerging digital maturity

Approximately 34% of parliaments. Concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa (44%), the Pacific (40%), and low-income countries (100%).

The core challenge for tier 3 parliaments is institutional misalignment

Technology is acquired tactically: voting systems without updated standing orders, open data portals publishing PDFs instead of reusable formats. Bill drafting (45% adoption) and committee voting (29%) remain largely manual. Staffing is thinly stretched (~25 full-time equivalent (FTE) for ~150 members) and recruiting experienced staff is a barrier for 68%. AI deployment is ungoverned: 75% of staff use AI informally, but there is no formal institutional adoption, creating shadow risk.

The critical vulnerability here is that the governance framework to direct technology towards process improvement is fragile or absent. Technical capability and shadow adoption without institutional alignment create orphaned systems and introduce risk, and parliaments risk being driven by donor priorities rather than their own.

Tier 2 (deciles 4–7): Mid-range digital maturity

Approximately 34% of parliaments. Geographically diverse across all regions.

In this group of parliaments, strategy outpaces execution. Eighty-three per cent have multi-year digital strategies and 75% have appointed digital leaders, yet implementation lags behind. Cloud adoption spans 38–50% of critical systems. Electronic voting in plenary reaches 46% (versus 21% in tier 3), but committees lag behind. Public engagement is expanding – 50% use targeted methods for young people – but only half have formal engagement strategies.

The variation in governance practices is pronounced. Upper tier 2 parliaments (deciles 6–7) demonstrate board-level ICT oversight with genuine member involvement; technology choices align with parliamentary processes. At the lower end of tier 2 (deciles 4–5), CIOs are in place but inclusive structures are lacking, and technology decisions remain administratively driven or donor-influenced. AI usage is 88%, with 50–60% formal institutional adoption – a frontier where informal experimentation transitions to governed deployment.

Advancement in tier 2 is indicated more by increasing institutional maturity than by technology choices

What distinguishes upper tier 2 from lower tier 2 is institutional, not technological: inclusive governance, explicit data governance embedded in decision-making, technology aligned to process improvement rather than vendor features, at least one core function fully modernized at scale, and staffing that matches ambition. This upper tier shows the pathway that lower-decile parliaments can follow.

Tier 2 represents the frontier of parliamentary digital transformation – parliaments that have moved beyond reactive procurement and are building institutional frameworks that enable sustained advancement.

Tier 1 (deciles 8–10): Most digitally mature parliaments

Approximately 32% of parliaments, primarily European (55%) and from the Americas (21%) with only 12% from either Asia or the Middle East and North Africa and 4% from sub-Saharan Africa.

A core strength of tier 1 parliaments is that strategy explicitly guides procurement through institutional road maps

Governance precedes technology deployment; formal AI frameworks are in place before pilots. Data architecture is strategic infrastructure; enterprise data platforms consolidating legislative, administrative and operational data are standard. Core legislative processes are fully digitalized: bill drafting and amendment management stand at 90%+ adoption; electronic voting is standard in plenary and committees.

Public engagement is active and data-driven; tier 1 parliaments use targeted approaches rather than broadcast publishing. Only 27% of decile 10 parliaments work directly with civil society organizations (CSOs) (versus 80% in decile 5), suggesting that the most mature parliaments have built internal capacity to sustain engagement independently. This reflects maturity: transition from dependency to self-sufficiency.

Tier 1 is diverse. Some parliaments excel across all dimensions; others show strength in governance and infrastructure with different transparency philosophies. Tier 1 includes excellence achieved through different institutional pathways – multiple routes to high-decile status.**Regional cooperation as a pathway to advancement**


Geographic diversification in the highest maturity tier reflects effective regional knowledge transfer. The Chamber of Deputies of Chile exemplifies this through ArchileBot, an AI conversational assistant for legislative archives, originally developed by the European Parliament. By hosting technical sessions for the parliaments of Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay and sharing their architecture and validation protocols, Chile turned institutional success into a regional public good.

Pacific parliaments show similar progress through regional cooperation. Operating with minimal IT capacity, these parliaments have deployed pragmatic solutions by learning from each other: Starlink satellite internet to overcome connectivity barriers and cloud-based document management for resilience against infrastructure decay and natural disasters. They show that parliaments need not innovate in isolation.

Pathways to advancement

Appropriate, practical governance must precede technology. This is not a constraint, it is a choice open to parliaments at all levels of digital maturity.

Figure 6. Pathways to advancing digital maturity



Tier 3 to tier 2: Establish governance first

Tier 3 parliaments struggle to move from isolated projects to strategic programmes, hindered by absent governance structures and competing immediate pressures. The foundational move is governance, not technology.

- Establish governance first
- Conduct a readiness assessment
- Develop and communicate a road map
- Balance quick wins and foundations

Tier 2 to tier 1: Scale implementation with change management

Tier 2 parliaments often develop solid strategies but struggle to execute at scale.

Upper tier 2 (deciles 6–7):

- Translate governance into effective execution
- Embed change management and outcome assessment
- Invest in staffing and capacity

Lower tier 2 (deciles 4–5):

- Strengthen governance inclusivity, ensuring senior ownership and member involvement
- Establish data governance

Tier 1: Sustain leadership and scale knowledge

Tier 1 parliaments can establish themselves as knowledge leaders and centres of excellence.

- Establish AI governance proactively ahead of deployment, and establish formal frameworks before pilots
- Focus on knowledge-sharing and peer-learning networks to accelerate the sector
- Measure and communicate impact using data to justify investment
- Develop specialized expertise

Closing the gap

Tier 3 parliaments maintaining steady investment still fall behind in terms of their overall digital maturity because better-resourced peers are accelerating more quickly. Several parliaments experienced ranking reductions despite absolute capability improvements, not because they declined but because they did not accelerate as rapidly as others.

For tier 3, compress timelines through regional support, prioritize two or three areas relentlessly, and establish peer-learning networks. A parliament that fully modernizes electronic voting, legislative management systems and public engagement may leapfrog peers improving everything moderately. Advancement requires institutional capacity: establishing governance that precedes procurement, treating data as strategic infrastructure, completing implementations at scale, maintaining focus through budget cycles and leadership changes, and sustaining investment in skilled staff.

The priorities for each tier are described in the "Findings and recommendations for parliaments" section above:

- **Tier 1:** Establish emerging technology governance proactively, shift from internal innovation to knowledge-sharing, and develop specialized expertise that becomes a sector resource
- **Tier 2:** Scale implementation, complete at least one core function fully and embed change management from project inception
- **Tier 3:** Governance first, strategic clarity second, then sequenced implementation

The pathways exist and digital capability is advancing. Parliaments that wish to maintain or improve their digital maturity must accelerate institutional commitment. This is not a problem requiring radical intervention but one needing clear strategic choice, governance maturity and sustained resource allocation. New technologies, particularly AI, offer small and developing parliaments significant opportunities. Such tools can be considered strategic accelerators; however, they must be implemented with care and subject to appropriate governance and controls.

Digital maturity by parliament

This section presents the 2026 DMI results, examining how parliaments are distributed across maturity levels and how they approach the seven functional areas of digital capability.

The DMI provides a diagnostic tool for parliaments to assess capabilities, identify peer comparisons and track progress. The 2026 results demonstrate that parliamentary digital transformation is advancing globally, although at varying rates and through different institutional pathways. The opportunity for all parliaments is to learn from this comparative data, make strategic choices about digital priorities, and commit to sustained investment in capabilities that support parliamentary effectiveness and democratic accountability.

The following table presents all 102 parliaments included in the 2026 Digital Maturity Assessment, organized by tier and decile ranking. Note that parliaments are listed **alphabetically by country within each tier and decile** and that this table reflects the responses submitted by those parliaments.

Table 3. 2026 Digital Maturity Index

Country	Tier	Digital Maturity Index	Governance and strategy	Infrastructure	Parliamentary systems	Supporting users in parliament	Digital content and publishing	Public engagement	Artificial Intelligence
Bahrain – Shura Council	1	10	10	9	10	9	9	10	10
Brazil – Chamber of Deputies		10	10	10	9	10	10	10	10
Brazil – Federal Senate		10	7	6	10	6	10	8	10
Canada – House of Commons		10	10	9	10	7	7	6	9
Chile – Chamber of Deputies		10	9	10	10	7	10	8	10
European Parliament		10	10	10	4	10	9	10	10
France – Senate		10	7	8	9	5	8	9	10
Ireland		10	10	10	8	9	9	8	9
Republic of Korea		10	8	9	10	9	10	10	10
United Kingdom		10	9	10	9	9	7	7	7
Austria		9	7	9	6	9	8	10	7
Estonia		9	5	8	10	7	8	5	9
Fiji		9	10	9	4	5	10	9	5
Finland		9	6	9	9	10	10	9	7
France – National Assembly		9	3	10	8	9	10	7	8
Israel		9	6	10	9	7	9	4	8
Mauritius		9	7	8	6	9	9	3	10
Morocco – House of Representatives		9	9	8	9	4	4	9	9
Paraguay – Chamber of Deputies		9	9	7	4	5	8	10	5
Ukraine		9	8	5	7	9	7	9	9

Country	Tier	Digital Maturity Index	Governance and strategy	Infrastructure	Parliamentary systems	Supporting users in parliament	Digital content and publishing	Public engagement	Artificial Intelligence
Australia – Senate		8	10	10	6	4	7	5	7
Bahrain – Council of Representatives		8	7	7	8	7	4	9	9
Canada – Senate		8	7	10	7	6	4	7	7
Italy – Senate		8	6	9	8	7	8	7	8
Mexico – Senate		8	9	9	7	7	9	5	9
New Zealand		8	8	9	5	3	8	5	7
Norway		8	6	8	8	7	4	8	8
Slovakia		8	8	9	10	9	8	9	7
Slovenia – National Assembly		8	6	7	10	7	6	7	5
Denmark	2	7	6	5	6	6	3	6	8
Germany – German Bundestag		7	10	5	5	3	4	4	9
Hungary		7	5	7	9	7	8	4	8
Indonesia		7	9	7	4	5	8	8	6
Lithuania		7	4	6	7	9	7	4	8
Netherlands – House of Representatives		7	5	6	4	7	10	8	7
Poland – Sejm		7	1	7	10	6	10	5	6
Spain – Senate		7	2	6	4	6	9	6	8
Switzerland		7	6	5	8	6	4	8	8
Tanzania (United Republic of)		7	10	8	7	9	5	10	7
Zimbabwe		7	9	7	5	2	7	10	8
Costa Rica		6	8	7	8	5	4	8	3
Italy – Chamber of Deputies		6	4	4	9	6	9	3	6
Kazakhstan – Senate		6	7	3	6	7	3	8	7
Libya		6	8	2	5	5	5	6	7
Namibia		6	6	4	2	9	5	7	6
Romania – Senate		6	8	4	9	1	4	7	2
Rwanda		6	9	10	4	7	8	9	10
South Africa		6	6	5	5	9	4	9	5
Spain – Congress of Deputies		6	6	8	9	6	8	2	3
Trinidad and Tobago		6	5	6	2	5	9	6	3
Algeria – National People's Assembly		5	5	6	4	7	3	7	5
Burundi – Senate		5	4	3	5	5	6	10	9
Ecuador		5	4	5	8	4	6	4	3
Germany – Bundesrat		5	1	5	2	2	7	2	10
Iceland		5	3	8	5	4	6	5	1
Kenya		5	5	5	4	3	3	6	5
Luxembourg		5	6	6	8	1	3	3	5
Moldova		5	2	5	7	4	7	6	4
Papua New Guinea		5	3	6	2	2	4	9	5
Portugal		5	4	7	5	9	1	1	1
Zambia		5	5	4	5	7	3	6	5
Andorra		4	6	6	7	2	5	1	2
Angola		4	5	6	4	1	5	3	5
Japan – Senate		4	4	8	6	5	7	1	1
Malawi		4	6	2	5	4	8	10	4
Montenegro		4	3	6	3	9	5	5	2
Netherlands – Senate		4	6	3	7	6	7	1	6
North Macedonia		4	5	3	6	7	7	2	5
Pakistan – Senate		4	8	4	2	3	6	4	4
Poland – Senate		4	3	2	3	4	4	8	4
Solomon Islands		4	5	6	2	4	5	6	4
Vanuatu		4	9	6	3	10	4	3	1
Armenia	3	3	1	2	3	7	5	4	5
Democratic Republic of the Congo – Senate		3	3	3	1	2	1	3	9
Dominican Republic		3	3	4	5	2	5	3	1
Ghana		3	4	4	2	4	1	7	5
Greece		3	2	1	9	1	1	1	6
Japan – House of Representatives		3	1	3	5	6	5	2	2
Oman		3	1	4	5	5	2	5	1
Romania – Chamber of Deputies		3	2	2	8	1	4	5	2

Country	Tier	Digital Maturity Index	Governance and strategy	Infrastructure	Parliamentary systems	Supporting users in parliament	Digital content and publishing	Public engagement	Artificial Intelligence
Suriname		3	9	4	2	9	3	1	1
Uruguay		3	5	3	5	2	2	4	1
Algeria – Council of the Nation		2	4	2	2	2	2	3	4
Bangladesh		2	4	5	3	1	2	2	3
Bhutan		2	2	3	1	3	2	4	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina		2	2	1	3	4	3	1	3
Botswana		2	1	2	3	2	2	7	1
Guyana		2	1	1	3	3	4	5	1
Lesotho – Senate		2	5	1	2	2	3	5	3
Pan-African Parliament		2	4	3	2	4	1	3	6
Seychelles		2	3	3	1	4	6	3	4
Sierra Leone		2	6	1	1	3	6	5	3
Azerbaijan		1	2	3	4	1	1	2	1
Djibouti		1	1	1	2	4	1	2	3
Kiribati		1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1
Lebanon		1	1	1	1	3	1	1	2
Lesotho		1	2	2	1	1	1	2	2
Madagascar		1	4	1	4	1	3	1	4
Maldives		1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2
Pakistan – National Assembly		1	1	3	1	5	2	1	3
Palau		1	1	1	1	1	1	3	2
Tonga		1	3	1	1	1	2	3	2

Summary

Digital maturity is interconnected and excellence in AI requires excellence in underlying data

The 2026 DMI shows parliamentary digital transformation advancing through diverse pathways and at varying speeds. Overall digital maturity has increased, yet the distance between leading and emerging parliaments has widened, reflecting different investment rates and strategic choices. The seven functional areas show that digital maturity is a portfolio of interconnected capabilities that parliaments must develop according to their institutional context and strategic priorities. Parliaments that leverage this comparative data to benchmark position, learn from peers at higher levels, and commit to sustained investment in strategically aligned capabilities will strengthen both their effectiveness and their democratic accountability.

Strategic imperatives for sustained digital maturity

Achieving a sustainable and mature digital capability requires an ongoing institutional commitment across three areas:

Political ownership of modernization: Successful digital transformation requires elected representatives to champion change. Zambia's Parliamentary Reforms and Modernisation Committee, composed entirely of members, ensures technology serves democratic purposes and builds institutional continuity across electoral and budget cycles.

Data as strategic infrastructure: Technical advancement without data governance creates fragile systems. The House of Representatives of Indonesia demonstrates that treating data as strategic capital is an important prerequisite for deploying advanced technologies effectively.

Collaborative knowledge transfer: Parliaments advancing most rapidly share experiences and strategic frameworks across borders. Chile's regional leadership in Latin America and coordinated solutions among Pacific small island developing States demonstrate that peer experience is the most valuable resource of institutions. Participation in the CIP thematic hubs allows institutions to learn from early adopters and scale solutions safely.

Current state of parliamentary technologies and practices

This section presents a summary of the key findings of the report for each category, in other words, digital governance, strategy and management; infrastructure; parliamentary systems; supporting users in parliament; digital content and publishing; public engagement; AI; and inter-parliamentary collaboration. This is followed by detailed analysis and in-depth discussion of the findings, which readers are encouraged to explore should they wish to find out more about a specific functional area or technology.

Digital governance, strategy and management

Digital governance is advancing, but persistent gaps between mature and foundational parliaments are widening rather than closing

Data from the 2026 survey provides compelling evidence that digital governance and strategic management have become increasingly central to parliamentary effectiveness, yet also reveals persistent gaps between the most and least digitally mature institutions. The data shows clear disparities where top-decile parliaments have embedded robust governance frameworks, formal digital strategies and dedicated leadership structures, while those in lower tiers struggle with basic capacity and resources. This divergence is neither accidental nor inconsequential but is directly related to overall digital maturity, and creates a scenario where institutional capacity, funding and infrastructure gaps self-reinforce and become greater over time.

Over two thirds of parliaments now maintain multi-year digital strategies, with leadership increasingly engaged

The positive findings are significant. Over two thirds of parliaments now maintain multi-year digital strategies, and 65% have adopted formal digital transformation programmes. Investment levels are rising, with 21% of parliaments now allocating more than 10% of their budgets to ICT, a substantial increase from 8% in 2012. Leadership is increasingly engaged: the secretary general is involved in ICT governance in 71% of parliaments, and a growing number have appointed dedicated CIOs. Innovation is no longer the preserve of a few: 88% of parliaments report learning from peers, and 53% maintain formal working groups to drive innovation.

Insufficient funding remains the top barrier, cited by 61% of parliaments and 96% in sub-Saharan Africa

These figures mask concerning underlying patterns. Insufficient funding remains the most significant barrier to digital transformation, cited by 61% of parliaments – and 96% of those in sub-Saharan Africa. Lack of experienced staff is the second-most prominent barrier, affecting 58% of respondents, with notable shortages in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Smaller parliaments and those in lower-income countries face acute challenges. Similarly, only 45% of tier 3 parliaments have a multi-year digital strategy, compared with 97% in tier 1. The absence of a clearly identified ICT leader in 24% of parliaments – predominantly smaller institutions – suggests that capacity-building remains an urgent priority.

The sectoral analysis reveals three pathways for institutional innovation, reflecting maturity and resource availability. Tier 1 parliaments pursue integrated, technology-sophisticated strategies centred on AI and data governance, embedded within formal digital frameworks. Middle-transition, tier 2 parliaments focus on change management and capability-building as prerequisites for more advanced adoption. Lower-foundation parliaments in tier 3 appropriately prioritize citizen engagement and organizational readiness, reflecting a realistic assessment of capacity constraints. These are not hierarchical stages but parallel strategies, yet they reflect a reality: without efforts to address systemic capacity gaps and ensure adequate resourcing, the digital divide between parliaments will continue to widen. Even though all parliaments can advance their digital maturity, some are better placed to move more quickly.

Bridging these gaps requires sustained commitment to investment, capacity-building and inter-parliamentary collaboration. The growing culture of peer learning demonstrated by the 88% figure offers hope, as does the IPU's ongoing commitment to supporting parliamentary modernization through the CIP. However, goodwill alone is insufficient. Parliaments in resource-constrained settings require targeted technical support, access to affordable solutions and recognition that digital governance is not a luxury but a prerequisite for effective legislative oversight and democratic accountability.

Key learning from the *Innovation Tracker* series:

Strategic foundations matter: Effective digital governance requires assessment and planning before large-scale implementation.

Governance structures enable sustainability: Formal committees, directorates and steering structures are essential to embedding digital strategy into the institutional fabric.

End-user involvement is critical: Involving MPs in digital strategy helps to ensure technology adoption is sustainable and that users are at the centre of decision-making.

Phased, deliberate approaches work: A planned multi-phase road map avoids undermining institutional readiness.

Institutional codification ensures continuity: Formalizing digital strategy through directorates and action plans ensures that digital governance survives leadership changes and budget cycles.

Infrastructure

Basic infrastructure is near-universal, but quality, resilience and sophistication vary sharply by maturity tier

Infrastructure remains a cornerstone of parliamentary digital maturity, yet the data reveals a stark divergence in adoption patterns between advanced and foundational parliaments. While nearly all legislatures now have basic digital infrastructure in place – reliable electricity, internet connectivity and Wi-Fi access – the quality, resilience and sophistication of these foundations vary markedly by digital maturity tier and country income level.

Cloud adoption has reached 83% of parliaments, up from just 36% in 2020

Cloud adoption continues its steep upward trajectory, rising from 36% of parliaments in 2020 to 68% in 2024, and reaching 83% in this survey. This acceleration reflects a fundamental paradigm shift from capital-intensive, on-premises infrastructure towards scalable, operationally flexible cloud environments (and a shift from capital expenditure to operational expenditure). Internet reliability stands at 94%, with half of parliaments now describing their connectivity as "more than adequate", a significant improvement from 35% in 2024. Renewable energy generation has doubled, with 23% of parliaments now generating their own power – up from 13% in 2024 – signalling growing investment in environmental sustainability and operational resilience. Service-level agreements with external suppliers have become nearly universal at 88%, establishing clearer expectations and accountability in service delivery.

Only 57% of parliaments have an internal cybersecurity strategy, and none in decile 1 do

The headline figures mask significant capacity gaps. Cybersecurity strategy adoption remains inadequate: while 72% of parliaments follow national cybersecurity standards, only 57% have internal cybersecurity strategies in place, and no decile 1 parliaments report having one. A formalized internal structure with cybersecurity responsibility exists in only 66% of parliaments, falling to 28% in tier 3 and zero in decile 1. These shortfalls are particularly troubling given the rising sophistication of cyber threats and the expanding digital footprint of parliamentary operations.

Staffing patterns reveal capacity constraints that compound technical challenges. While larger parliaments employ substantial ICT teams, smaller parliaments struggle to attract and retain specialist expertise. There remains a strong reliance on external contractors: 15% of parliaments employ more contractors than internal staff, raising long-term sustainability and institutional knowledge retention concerns. The balance typically favours internal resourcing only in mission-critical areas such as data management (97% internal) and infrastructure management (95% internal), while software development shows a more even split between internal and external capacity (53% internal, 47% external). This suggests that many parliaments lack the sustained in-house expertise to manage complex, integrated digital systems.

Cloud strategy reveals deliberate institutional choices around data sovereignty and risk management. Half of cloud-using parliaments favour single cloud types – with private clouds preferred by 19% of all parliaments – while the other half implement multi-cloud strategies to diversify risk and avoid over-dependence on commercial providers. The planned shift towards government-managed clouds (from 37% to 67% over time) indicates that parliaments are actively seeking solutions that preserve cloud benefits while maintaining data sovereignty. This tension between technical capability and institutional control is particularly acute for smaller States and those with limited digital infrastructure.

The divergence extends to library services: while three quarters of parliamentary libraries have online catalogues and 76% automate cataloguing, adoption of emerging technologies remains uneven. Open data provision stands at 51%, and AI research tools have reached only 26% of parliamentary libraries. Tier 1 parliaments have integrated these tools broadly, while tier 3 and decile 1 parliaments remain substantially unequipped.

Electrical infrastructure and power reliability, once critical differentiators, have now stabilized as baseline expectations. The fall from 100% (2024) to 91% with 24/7 power reflects the data now capturing parliaments in conflict zones or experiencing infrastructure crises (notably Ukraine), rather than systemic deficiency. Across functioning democracies, diesel backup generation (75%) and uninterruptible power supplies (74%) are now standard provisions.

These findings underscore a paradox: technical infrastructure has become increasingly mature and standardized globally, yet governance of that infrastructure – cybersecurity oversight, strategic service-level management and capability-building – remains fragmented. The infrastructure needed to run a sophisticated digital parliament exists; the institutional frameworks to secure, manage and evolve that infrastructure do not universally follow. This gap places parliaments in lower tiers and lower-income countries at particular risk: they inherit the technical burden of modern ICT systems without necessarily possessing the governance, expertise or resources to manage them safely. Narrowing this gap requires targeted investment in cybersecurity capacity, institutional knowledge-building and regional collaboration on shared infrastructure challenges.

Parliamentary systems

Back-office functions are near-universally digitized yet core legislative workflow has barely moved since 2016: AI is starting to change this

Parliamentary digital systems show operational strength in back-office functions but persistent weakness in legislative workflows. Back-office and administrative functions – digital archives (81%), human resources (81%), financial management (80%) – have achieved near-universal adoption. By contrast, core legislative processes remain digitally underdeveloped: bill and amendment drafting stand at 45% and 48% respectively, little changed since 2016 (42% and 45%). This reveals a two-tier system: parliaments have invested in information management and infrastructure while deprioritizing the modernization of legislative workflows.

However, there is evidence elsewhere in this report that parliaments are beginning to see benefits in this area from the introduction of AI-based tools.

Committee voting is the least digitized function at just 29%, against 69% in plenary

Committee work presents a critical vulnerability. Committee voting remains the least digitized function across the entire data set at just 29%, despite plenary voting reaching 69%. This gap is not explained by technical barriers but rather by institutional resistance, absent pressure for change, or the dominance of consensus-based procedures in committees. The disparity signals that legislative core processes – particularly at committee level – lag substantially behind operational modernization.

Hybrid plenary participation fell from 60% in 2022 to 36% in 2026 as parliaments reverted post-pandemic

Remote participation contracted sharply post-pandemic. Hybrid plenary participation fell from 60% (2022) to 36% (2026), and fully remote capability collapsed from 26% to 9%. However, committees retained greater durability: 56% maintain hybrid functionality (down only slightly from 60%), reflecting deliberate institutional choices to preserve witness participation capability. This divergence reveals that remote tools serve different purposes across parliaments.

Audiovisual systems have expanded but remain unequally distributed. Large-screen displays in plenary now reach 93% of parliaments (up from 80% in 2024), with video streaming at 74%. However, committee video streaming shows stark inequality: 85% in tier 1 parliaments versus 48% in tier 3, reflecting resource-constrained parliaments' prioritization of plenary chambers over committee infrastructure. Regional variation is substantial, with sub-Saharan Africa showing a 30-percentage-point gap between plenary (77.8%) and committee (48.1%) video capability.

Official verbatim records reveal institutional pathways rather than linear progression. Speech recognition adoption has grown from 8% (2010) to 31% (2026), while manual transcription has declined from 47% to 26%. Stenographic machines remain marginal and stable at 14%. Critically, 83% of stenographic users do not employ speech recognition – these are institutional pathways, not points on a spectrum. The Americas' preference for stenographic machines reflects organizational inertia and established operator bases rather than technological preference, while Asia's movement towards speech recognition reflects capacity-building at scale.

Digital preservation lags behind formalization. Seventy-five per cent of parliaments maintain contemporary archives, but only 52% have formal preservation policies. This pragmatism-before-governance pattern is pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa (59% archiving, 19% policy), suggesting operational capability precedes institutional framework.

Overall, parliamentary systems reflect deliberate institutional choices constrained by resources. Digitization shows inequality by tier and region, with tier 1 parliaments operating in a fundamentally different legislative ecosystem from tier 3. The sharp discontinuity between top and bottom deciles suggests that basic digital capability is a structural threshold. Plenary operations have achieved substantial digital integration, while committee operations and legislative drafting remain persistently weak despite two decades of investment. This pattern indicates that technological capability is necessary but insufficient: institutional culture, procedural tradition and resource constraints shape digital adoption as powerfully as technical feasibility.

Supporting users in parliament

High-income parliaments offer twice the digital tools of low-income parliaments, entrenching inequality

Parliamentary support for users – both members and staff – has reached near-universal baseline provision for essential hardware and helpdesk support yet reveals sharp and persistent disparities in advanced digital capabilities. Basic equipment provision (86% desktop or laptop computers, 89% helpdesk support) is strong but there remain significant gaps between rich and poor parliaments (high-income parliaments average 8.2 digital tools versus 4.1 for low-income). The sharpest points of difference are foundational infrastructure tools such as intranet portals, remote office access, and parliamentary research databases. Geographic clustering reinforces income-based inequality: Europe and the Americas outperform substantially, while sub-Saharan Africa lags behind across most indicators. Training priorities have shifted markedly, with AI training for members rising from 16% in 2024 to 49% in 2026, while cybersecurity remains a consistent top priority for both members (64%) and staff (77%), reflecting recognition of the human element as the critical security vulnerability.

AI training for members has tripled in two years, from 16% in 2024 to 49% in 2026

Professional certification of ICT staff presents a counter-intuitive pattern: less-resourced parliaments invest proportionally more in formal qualifications (low-income parliaments average 5.8 certifications versus 3.6 for high-income), suggesting deliberate institutional trade-offs between equipping members with tools and formalizing staff expertise. Overall, parliaments are approaching digital support as a multidimensional challenge requiring sustained investment across infrastructure, training and professional development – although the distribution of that investment varies substantially by context and available resources.

Digital content and publishing

Fifty-four per cent of parliaments have a formal digital content policy, but formal governance frameworks remain underutilized despite substantial investment in digital infrastructure.

Chamber size is the strongest predictor of policy adoption, concentrating digital governance in the largest parliaments

Parliamentary digital transformation is progressing unevenly across the world. Over half of parliaments (54%) have adopted formal digital content policies, and 45% have open data publishing policies. Digital governance is, however, concentrated among large, wealthy and digitally mature parliaments. Notably, chamber size is the strongest predictor of policy adoption – large parliaments are nearly twice as likely to have content policies and more than twice as likely to have open data policies as small parliaments. The Speaker has a more prominent role in digital governance than in 2024 (37%, up from 27%), particularly in lower-income and lower-maturity parliaments, suggesting that visible political leadership is essential in institutions with limited but emerging digital capacity.

Digital media adoption approaches near-universality for websites (98%) and social media (97%), yet diversity in media channels remains highly stratified by region and income. Live-streaming through third-party platforms is well-established at 85%. However, significant variation exists in advanced media types. The Americas favour instant messaging and broadcast media (75–80%), while Europe prioritizes web television (TV) (82%) and asynchronous delivery. Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates "digital leapfrog" adoption, with high live-streaming (88%) but low proprietary web TV (25%), suggesting reliance on external platforms over infrastructure investment. Income and parliament size both predict media breadth: high-income parliaments average 5.2 media types versus 4.1 for low-income parliaments, and large parliaments average 5.8 types versus 4.6 for small ones.

Twenty-one per cent of parliaments still do not publish plenary voting records online – a significant transparency gap

Website content is broadly standardized, with 13 of 15 content categories available on average. Core parliamentary information (MP lists, committee details, leadership) reaches 97–99% availability. However, transparency regarding legislative processes is less comprehensive: explanations of legislative procedure (77%) and budget processes (49%) lag behind. Notably, 65% of websites lack transparency about website ownership and management, and 21% do not publish plenary voting records online – a significant gap.

The publication of parliamentary business has improved marginally since 2024. Forty-two per cent of parliaments publish plenary agendas and 38% publish committee agendas at least one week in advance. Income level, region and parliament size all predict publication breadth and timeliness, with European parliaments and those in the Americas publishing more comprehensively than those in other regions.

Open data is widespread at 92%, but PDF dominance at 85% limits machine-readable reuse

Open data publishing is widespread (92% of parliaments), yet growth has plateaued at foundational formats. PDF remains dominant (85%), although advances in AI extraction have improved its utility. Structured formats lag behind: searchable text (57%), downloadable spreadsheets (44%), XML (34%), and APIs (27%) are significantly underadopted. Digital maturity strongly predicts adoption breadth, with a sharp acceleration from decile 7 upwards. When parliaments publish open data, 86% do so via their own website, while only 3% partner with external organizations such as parliamentary monitoring organizations, suggesting limited integration with civil society data ecosystems.

Future trends point to accelerated AI integration, website modernization around accessibility and mobile responsiveness, and movement towards structured open data formats. However, implementation capacity and sustained funding remain implicit constraints.

Public engagement

Social media is near-universal, but specialist tools for consultation and deliberation remain significantly underused

Social media dominates public engagement channels at near-universal adoption (92%), with e-petitions (35%) and dedicated smartphone apps (27%) significantly lagging behind. While 50% of parliaments specifically employ digital methods to communicate with young people, the data reveals persistent underutilization of specialist tools for consultation (30% using e-consultation on bills, 23% on issues) and engagement platforms (online discussion groups at only 12%). Regional variations are pronounced, with the Americas leading adoption of diverse tools and sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific showing lower uptake of specialist platforms.

Fewer than half of parliaments have a formal strategy for online public participation

Only 48% of parliaments have a formal strategy for online public participation, and only 53% have digital educational and outreach resources to support engagement. Strategic governance remains inconsistent: while 84% of parliaments have specialist staff for outreach and education and 71% for public engagement, responsibility for defining strategic objectives is distributed across multiple roles, with the secretary general involved in 60% of parliaments and the Speaker in 47%. Where public participation remains embedded within communications functions (46% of parliaments) rather than treated as a strategic responsibility, parliaments risk remaining in broadcast mode rather than developing genuine two-way engagement.

Feeling overwhelmed by engagement has risen from 20% to 33%, as success creates new administrative pressures

Barriers to effective participation have declined since 2024, with 74% of parliaments identifying at least one barrier compared with 81% previously. However, significant disparities persist between high- and low-income countries. Citizens' lack of internet access and digital skills remain the most-cited barriers (35% and 33% respectively), but high-income parliaments are increasingly focused on managing the quantity of engagement (41% reporting feeling overwhelmed), suggesting that engagement success creates new administrative challenges. Low-income parliaments face persistent infrastructure constraints (88% citing internet access as a barrier) and the number of parliaments reporting staff feeling overwhelmed with communications has increased from 20% (2024) to 33%.

Committee engagement through digital tools shows consolidation rather than expansion. Website usage has declined from 91% (2024) to 79%, while social media has stabilized at 63% (from 70%). Email has emerged as more important for responding to submissions (43%, up from the 2024 baseline), and mobile app adoption remains limited at 13%. The most common committee engagement purposes are communicating information about work and scope (79%) and publishing outcomes (73%), while direct engagement with the public is less common (38% via websites, 33% via social media). This reflects a broadcast-focused rather than dialogue-oriented approach to committee transparency.

Working with CSOs remains underutilized as a mechanism to extend parliamentary reach. Seventy per cent of parliaments work with CSOs, although only 47% do so formally. Notably, the most digitally mature parliaments (decile 10) are less likely to work directly with CSOs (27%) compared with mid-maturity parliaments (decile 5 at 80%), suggesting that high-maturity parliaments prefer informal arrangements or have sufficient internal capacity. This represents an opportunity for lower-capacity parliaments to strengthen civil society partnerships as a scaling mechanism.

Assessment of engagement effectiveness remains a critical gap. Only 32% of parliaments have conducted formal or informal assessments of their digital communication impact, and only a minority use sophisticated tools to analyse public submissions. Most parliaments rely on manual analysis by staff and committees, with a small group piloting AI-based sentiment analysis and topic identification. This suggests significant scope for parliaments to develop more systematic, data-driven approaches to understanding public engagement outcomes.

Parliaments identify clear lessons from two years of intensive digital engagement. Live-streaming, social media and short-form video have substantially improved access to parliamentary work, particularly among younger audiences, yet greater visibility does not automatically translate to meaningful participation. Effective engagement requires clear, plain-language communication supported by visual formats and narrative framing focusing on people and impacts rather than procedure. Targeted, inclusive and hybrid approaches – segmenting audiences and combining in-person and digital channels – yield better results than "one-size-fits-all" strategies. However, persistent digital divides driven by infrastructure, cost and digital literacy skills remain structural constraints, particularly in lower-income countries. Trust and information integrity are cross-cutting concerns, with parliaments managing both the opportunities and risks of social media. Sustained engagement depends on dialogue, internal capacity-building and long-term citizenship education, with many parliaments seeing civic education partnerships with schools and universities as foundational to democratic participation.

Artificial intelligence

AI adoption has outpaced governance, creating a critical mismatch between deployment and institutional capacity

Artificial intelligence (AI) uptake is happening along three trajectories reflecting different combinations of adoption, governance maturity and compliance activity. Shadow-adoption parliaments (one sixth of respondents) use AI without formal governance; planned-maturation parliaments (just over half) are actively developing governance frameworks; mature-governance parliaments (one quarter) have established formal structures and face new scaling challenges. These trajectories require different support: entry-level frameworks for shadow adoption, accelerated deployment for planned maturation, and advanced governance evolution for mature institutions.

Eighty-eight per cent of parliaments use AI, yet only 48% have formally recorded institutional adoption

Eighty-eight per cent of parliaments now use AI in some form, yet only 48% have recorded institutional adoption. This gap reflects "shadow AI", where staff and members use tools without formal approval or oversight. The gap varies sharply by maturity – decile 10 parliaments report 83% institutional adoption, while decile 1 parliaments report zero adoption despite 75% staff usage. This suggests that institutional capacity to formalize and govern use, rather than tool access, is a limiting factor.

Development of governance protocols remains fragmented and concentrated in large, wealthy, digitally mature institutions. Board-level oversight exists in 32% of parliaments, steering committees in 28%, and formal AI policies in 24%. Yet 49% are planning governance structures, and 14% remain unengaged. External ethics committees exist in only 5% of parliaments. Digital maturity is the strongest predictor: decile 10 parliaments cluster around 90% across all governance measures, while deciles 1–3 report near-zero formal governance.

AI deployment shows clear maturity gradients. Transcription of proceedings is live in 39% of parliaments, translation services in 30%, and document summarization in 24%.

These operational applications have transitioned to production use. Tools supporting members' legislative work remain predominantly pilot-focused, averaging only 8% in production and 10% in pilots. This reflects an important lesson: AI delivers value where tasks are high-volume, routine and measurable; it remains experimental where tasks are complex or interpretive.

Pilot projects are the dominant evaluation methodology, used by 63% of parliaments. However, sophistication varies dramatically. Advanced parliaments embed pilots within formal governance structures and measure impact before deployment. Many parliaments run pilots informally, driven by user requests. Approximately 28% lack systematic approaches altogether, relying instead on informal exploration or planning to implement formal methods.

Forty-six per cent of parliaments conduct no AI compliance activity at all, despite widespread deployment

Compliance and risk assessment activities present a dangerous gap. Eighty-eight per cent of parliaments use AI, yet only 45% assess its risks and 38% assess legal requirements. Forty-six per cent conduct no compliance activity. This gap is most acute in low-maturity institutions: all decile 10 parliaments conduct legal and risk assessments, while 92% of decile 1 parliaments conduct none. Europe leads in compliance activity (65% risk assessment), while Asia reports zero risk assessments.

Capacity and resources represent the dominant barrier, cited by 74% of parliaments. This barrier reflects the institutional effort required to govern AI responsibly. Low-income parliaments are challenged by training and AI literacy barriers (88%), indicating their constraint is skills, not money. Mid-maturity parliaments (tier 2, deciles 4–7) experience the most acute capacity pressure at 80%, suggesting this is the critical transition zone.

Communication about AI adoption is widely recognized as a change management challenge. The most effective strategies combine sustained practical training with formal governance frameworks, multi-channel communication tailored to different audiences and transparent dialogue about risks and limitations. Yet nearly a quarter of parliaments have not yet begun formal communication, suggesting many institutions are still in the early stages.

Looking forward, parliaments must recognize that AI adoption is not a technical project but an institutional change process requiring sustained engagement, clear governance, careful evaluation and investment in skills. High-maturity parliaments must shift from periodic assessment to continuous monitoring. Mid-maturity parliaments must treat compliance as foundational. Low-maturity parliaments require urgent external support in building compliance capacity and evaluation frameworks – and are strongly advised to follow the good practices provided in the IPU's *Guidelines for AI in parliaments*[4] and *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments*. Bridging the gap between adoption and governance requires building institutional capacity to understand what is being deployed, manage its risks and communicate its implications.

Inter-parliamentary collaboration

Over 9 in 10 parliaments are willing to support peers, with AI emerging as the defining cooperation priority

Inter-parliamentary collaboration is one of the most effective routes to digital advancement, delivering pragmatic operational benefits while reinforcing democratic resilience and institutional capacity.

Ninety-three per cent of parliaments are willing to support peers, with nearly two thirds actively doing so in at least one functional area. Participation in structured forums is growing substantially, with 48% of parliaments having engaged with the IPU's CIP, with a further 32% expressing willingness to participate. Beyond the CIP, parliaments participate in diverse regional and global networks including the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD), the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA) and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA).

The benefits of collaboration are many. Parliaments emphasize pragmatic problem-solving, where peers facing similar challenges enable institutions to avoid duplication and accelerate implementation of proven practices. Benchmarking and validation against peers provide both confidence in chosen approaches and evidence for institutional modernization. Cooperation supports targeted skills development through training programmes, study visits and bilateral exchanges, building capacity for both technical staff and members. Cost-effectiveness emerges as a significant benefit, enabling parliaments to overcome research and development limitations by sharing solutions. Beyond operational gains, collaboration strengthens democratic resilience, builds lasting professional networks and reinforces the mutual trust essential to long-term institutional modernization.

A gap exists between willingness and provision of support in several technical areas, representing substantial untapped potential for knowledge transfer around technical infrastructure. AI has emerged as the defining cooperation priority, with parliaments seeking peer learning on AI governance and implementation, reflecting recognition that sustainable adoption requires shared learning in this emerging field. Looking forward, collaboration is evolving from episodic engagement towards deeper institutionalization: formalized feedback mechanisms, shared digital infrastructure repositories, technical working groups and sustained staff exchange programmes. The success of longer-term twinning arrangements demonstrates the transformative potential of hands-on, sustained cooperation. Future cooperation structures are also encompassing institutional resilience, with proposals for shared backup infrastructure and crisis response frameworks.

4. IPU, *Guidelines for AI in parliaments*, 2024.

Detailed analysis of parliamentary technologies and practices

This section, which is primarily aimed at senior technology leaders in parliament, provides significant material for benchmarking a parliament's digital maturity and for identifying digital transformation pathways, particularly when used with the CIP's Digital Maturity Assessment and interactive DMI tools. It provides a detailed analysis of the survey findings that are summarized above and is grouped according to the eight thematic areas of the report:

- Digital governance, strategy and management
- Infrastructure
- Parliamentary systems
- Supporting users in parliament
- Digital content and publishing
- Public engagement
- Artificial intelligence (AI)
- Inter-parliamentary collaboration

Each section starts with an alphabetical list of the "top 15" parliaments according to their digital maturity in that area. These lists are based on the survey data provided and should be seen as subjective. They highlight that, within their overall digital maturity, parliaments can have distinct strengths and weaknesses.

Digital governance, strategy and management

As parliaments adopt new digital tools, they modernize processes and shift internal culture. Digital transformation helps parliaments deliver more efficient and user-centric services to MPs, staff and the wider public. But, for it to be effective, leadership and governance are needed.[5]

In terms of the DMI, this section shows moderate divergence, with top-decile parliaments demonstrating strong governance frameworks and formal digital strategies and lower-tier parliaments focused more on operational practicalities. Regional variations are notable, with Europe particularly strong. Smaller parliaments and those in lower-income countries face challenges in establishing formal strategic approaches.

Table 4. DMI: Top 15 ranking of parliaments in governance and strategy (alphabetical order)

Country	Digital Maturity Index	Governance and strategy	Infrastructure	Parliamentary systems	Supporting users in parliament	Digital content and publishing	Public engagement	Artificial intelligence
Australia – Senate	8	10	10	6	4	7	5	7
Bahrain – Shura Council	10	10	9	10	9	10	10	10
Brazil – Chamber of Deputies	10	10	10	10	9	10	10	10
Canada – House of Commons	9	10	9	10	7	7	6	9
Chile – Chamber of Deputies	10	9	10	10	7	10	8	10
European Parliament	10	10	10	4	10	10	10	10
Fiji	8	10	9	4	5	9	9	5
Germany – German Bundestag	7	10	5	5	3	6	4	9
Indonesia	7	9	7	4	5	7	8	6
Ireland	10	10	10	8	9	8	8	9
Morocco – House of Representatives	9	9	8	9	4	5	9	9
Paraguay – Chamber of Deputies	9	9	7	4	5	9	10	5
Tanzania – (United Republic of)	7	10	8	7	9	5	10	7
United Kingdom	10	9	10	9	9	8	7	7
Zimbabwe	7	9	7	5	2	7	10	8

Digital strategy

Creating a detailed plan for digital transformation is essential for the modern parliament, as this helps define the steps needed to make the programme a success. Almost three quarters of parliaments (73%) reported having a multi-year digital strategy, highlighting the importance of good planning to manage the increasing complexity of digital tools and services. The picture is not universal and, while 97% of tier 1 (and 100% of decile 10) parliaments have a digital strategy in place, only 45% of tier 3 (and 25% of decile 1) parliaments do so.

5. IPU and ASGP, *Guide to digital transformation in parliaments*, 2023.

Table 5. Strategic planning and digital transformation programmes

Parliament has:	%
A multi-year strategic plan	75%
A multi-year digital/ICT strategy	73%
A programme for digital transformation and/or modernization	65%
A formal vision for creating a more sustainable parliament through digital transformation	57%
A formal project management methodology used for implementing new digital initiatives	51%


Two thirds of parliaments (65%) have a programme for digital transformation, but fewer (57%) have a vision for creating a more sustainable parliament using ICT. Fifty-nine per cent of parliaments have both a multi-year digital strategy and a digital transformation programme in place. Again, the difference between tier 1 and lower-tier parliaments is stark: 81% of tier 1 parliaments have a digital transformation programme but only 46% do so in tier 3. As Table 6 shows, parliaments rarely have a digital strategy without also having a strategic plan.

Table 6. Parliaments with digital strategies, strategic plans and/or digital transformation programmes

Strategic plan	Digital strategy	Digital transformation programme	%
Yes	Yes	Yes	54%
Yes	Yes	No	11%
Yes	No	Yes	2%
Yes	No	No	9%
No	Yes	Yes	5%
No	Yes	No	3%
No	No	Yes	4%
No	No	No	13%

The same pattern as above is reflected for parliaments using formal project management methodologies. Although just over half (51%) of all parliaments do so, this includes 100% of decile 10 parliaments but none in decile 1.

Figure 7. Distribution of digital transformation programmes and project management methodologies by decile



Bosnia and Herzegovina –Strategic IT maturity assessment

The Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina had invested in IT infrastructure but lacked a strategic framework connecting those investments to institutional value. Technology decisions were being made tactically in response to immediate needs, rather than as part of a coherent digital transformation road map.

They used the European Parliament's IT Maturity Assessment Tool (IMAT), to audit their digital strategy, key processes and IT efficiency. The results revealed an underdeveloped enterprise architecture and absence of clear key performance indicators. Armed with these insights, parliament developed a structured, realistic road map to progress from an "initial" to a "structured" level of digital maturity by 2029, highlighting that successful transformation requires aligning IT portfolios directly with organizational priorities rather than reacting to immediate crises.

Digital leadership

The importance of strong leadership is reflected in the governance of ICT within parliaments. In the parliaments that responded to the survey for this report, the secretary general is involved in ICT governance and oversight in 71% of cases, and the Speaker in 31%. The same figures were 69% and 33% in 2024 and 51% and 25% respectively in 2020, suggesting a settled but solid focus on the strategic use of ICT. Neither the secretary general nor the Speaker is involved in 21% of parliaments (falling from 27% in 2024). There is no distinct pattern in terms of size or country income level.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, 12% of respondents report that ICT governance is overseen by the Speaker but not the CIO even where they have identified having a specific ICT lead in parliament. While the involvement of external consultants in governance and oversight of ICT is not common practice, it is decidedly more pronounced within tier 3 parliaments (29% versus 6% in tier 1).

Table 7. Governance and oversight roles 2024 and 2026

Role	2024	2026
Speaker	33%	31%
Secretary general	69%	71%
Senior management	56%	53%
Dedicated senior ICT leader (e.g. CIO)	61%	65%
Committee/working group for ICT	31%	31%
Members	15%	17%
At an operational or project level	22%	23%
External consultants	11%	11%


Only 76% of parliaments report having a clearly identified ICT leader, such as a CIO or IT director, representing a decline from 86% in 2024. This decrease is attributable to lower levels of ICT leadership among small parliaments (63%), compared with medium and large parliaments (86% and 87% respectively). Geographical variation is also evident, with 94% of parliaments in the Americas and 87% in Europe having clearly identified ICT leadership, falling to 50% among Pacific parliaments. There is a clear difference between tier 1 (deciles 8–10) parliaments, where 94% have clear ICT leadership, and tier 3 (deciles 1–3), where only 56% do so. While the CIO is involved in governance and oversight in 84% of tier 1 parliaments (92% of decile 10), this is only the case in 44% of tier 3.

Zambia – MP-led modernization

Digital transformation can fail when IT departments are isolated from the users they serve. To ensure technology directly served democratic functions, the National Assembly of Zambia placed elected representatives at the centre of modernization decisions. By establishing the Parliamentary Reforms and Modernisation Committee, members could evaluate IT initiatives and provide feedback. This helps to ensure that technology solutions align with parliamentary needs. It also builds the institutional continuity required to sustain funding across multiple budget cycles.

Eighty-five per cent of parliaments maintain a dedicated ICT department, consistent with the 2024 figure. While this figure is 100% for decile 10 parliaments and averages 97% for all tier 1 parliaments, it falls to 75% for tier 3 and 58% for those in decile 1.

Figure 8. Parliaments with a dedicated ICT department



The share of parliaments with ICT staff embedded in other departments is 41% (a notable rise from 28% in 2024). However, only 11% of parliaments have ICT staff within departments and no specific ICT department. In most parliaments (55%) ICT staff are based in a specific ICT department. For bicameral parliaments, 59% have separate ICT groups for each chamber, although 27% collaborate.

Table 8. Structure of ICT department in bicameral parliaments


Organizational structure	%
One ICT group supports both chambers	34%
Each chamber has its own ICT group or unit, and they work independently	32%
Each chamber has its own ICT group or unit, but they work on some projects and tasks together	27%
Other	5%

Budget

The longitudinal data from this report series highlights that overall ICT spend as a percentage of budget shows an upward trend, and this continues in 2026. More parliaments allocate at least 10% of their overall budget to ICT, and fewer less than 5%. Data shows that, in 2012, 23% of parliaments spent less than 1% of their budget on ICT and only 8% spent more than 10%. In 2026, 18% are spending less than 1%, and 21% more than 10%. This latter figure reflects a pattern of increased spending at these levels, up from 15% in 2020 and 20% in 2024. This trend is shown in Figure 9, which indicates the percentage of parliaments in each band of relative ICT spend for the current survey, as well as historically back to 2012.

Those parliaments allocating more than 10% of their budget are skewed towards high-income countries (32%), more likely to be in the Americas (31%), or the Middle East and North Africa (30%), and in tier 1 (36% versus no parliaments in tier 3). Conversely, parliaments allocating less than 1% of their budget to ICT are smaller (24%), likely to be in sub-Saharan Africa, the Pacific or the Middle East and North Africa (all 30%) and least likely to come from the Americas (6%) or Europe (9%). Fifty-two per cent of tier 3 report spending less than 1% on ICT and no parliaments in decile 10 do so. This shows a clear pattern between the level of ICT investment a parliament can make and its level of digital maturity. It suggests that these differences in investment will further exacerbate the gap between the most digitally mature parliaments and those that struggle for budget and resources.

Figure 9. Percentage of overall budget spent on ICT, 2012–2026




Innovation

It is through innovation that parliaments can modernize, becoming more efficient and effective. Innovative practice also helps build resilience. It is well documented in this report series that the COVID-19 pandemic was a catalyst for parliamentary innovation – 84% of parliaments surveyed for the 2022 report said that they had become more innovative because of the pandemic. While it is also clear that the level of innovation has normalized, it is encouraging that the number of parliaments with a formal innovation strategy has increased from 26% in 2020 to 40% in this report. The share using informal innovation methods has risen from 59% to 69%.


The only longitudinal fall has been in the percentage of parliaments with a working group or committee supporting innovation, which dropped from 61% to 42% between 2020 and 2024, and currently stands at 53%. More parliaments report employing staff with a formal role in innovation, rising from 35% in 2020 to 47% in 2026. The distribution of these roles across parliaments is uneven: 68% of tier 1 parliaments (83% of decile 10), falling to 35% of tier 3 (25% of decile 1).

Figure 10. Staff with a formal innovation role by DMI tier



The 2022 report noted that connecting and collaborating with other parliaments had been transformative and the 82% of parliaments that said that they "learned from other parliaments" in 2024 has risen to 88% in this report. Collaboration and exchange are valued across the range of parliaments, and the CIP experience reflects this: in 2025, the *Transforming Parliaments* webinar series attracted participants from almost 150 parliaments from 79 countries.

Figure 11. Innovative practices within parliaments



Other responses to this question show individual parliaments "learning from the market" or from other public organizations and having "innovation as part of [our] major strategy".

The survey asked parliaments to share new or innovative practices. The responses show clusters in three themes reflecting institutional maturity and capacity where high-maturity parliaments (tier 1) pursue integrated, technology-sophisticated strategies where AI and automation emerge as the dominant theme, embedded within formal digital governance structures and coordinated strategic frameworks. This reflects mature institutions treating AI as a policy and governance challenge, not merely technical implementation.

Middle-transition parliaments (tier 2) occupy a preparatory phase where change management, capability-building and data analytics predominate. This tier contains a critical inflection point: decile 6 marks a threshold where innovation narratives shift from "preparing for change" (emphasizing organizational readiness and staff development) to "implementing sophisticated change" (emphasizing formal governance structures and technology deployment). Notably, data analytics emerges as a theme in tier 2, suggesting it functions as an intermediate capability stage preceding advanced AI adoption.

The lower-maturity parliaments (tier 3) appropriately prioritize citizen engagement and organizational readiness, with limited systematic technology deployment. This reflects strategic appropriateness rather than technological disadvantage: parliaments at this maturity stage realistically focus on public accessibility and foundational capacity-building as prerequisites for later sophistication. Geographical and income-level patterns reinforce this logic – high-income European and Middle Eastern and North African parliaments pursue AI-intensive strategies, while sub-Saharan African and Pacific parliaments emphasize capability development and citizen services. The absence of formal digital governance structures in lower-maturity contexts suggests these institutions function as enabling preconditions rather than cosmetic additions: their emergence correlates with the capacity to deploy and coordinate complex initiatives like AI governance frameworks.

The three innovation worlds reflect realistic differences in institutional capacity and priorities:

Tier 1 parliaments lead on emerging technologies. They combine advanced technology with formal governance structures, citizen engagement and data analytics. They treat innovation as a strategic institutional priority requiring coordination and oversight across parliament.

Tier 2 parliaments benefit from consolidating and optimizing existing systems, modernizing services and adopting technology selectively. Their focus is on improving accessibility and operational efficiency, rather than pursuing technological sophistication for its own sake.

Tier 3 parliaments concentrate on building the organizational foundations for digital transformation: developing governance, staff skills, processes managing change effectively, and improving how citizens access services. For these parliaments,capability-building must come before advanced technology deployment.

Table 9. Innovative practices within parliaments

AI and automation	Coordination of AI initiatives across parliament with the AI working group
	Portfolio and performance management
	Organizing a hackathon focused on AI applications for parliaments, aiming to engage students and AI experts and promote greater citizen participation
	Adopting ISO-aligned practices for AI governance to help standardize how AI is assessed, implemented and monitored, ensuring consistency, accountability and responsible use
Digital governance/ governance structures	Establishment of a digital governance body: an interdisciplinary body of experts of the parliamentary administration
	Establishing a cross-functional digital transformation steering committee
	Coordination of AI initiatives across parliament with the AI working group
	Implementation of an integrated data-driven digital governance model
	Long-term vision and plan – integration of new technologies to support parliamentary activities for the next several generations
Digital transformation	New and innovative practices to strengthen ICT governance, accelerate digital transformation, and improve ICT management across parliament
	Implementation of a comprehensive suite of integrated ICT systems to digitally transform parliament
	Establishment of a digital governance body – coordinates and steers all digital transformation efforts in parliament
	Emphasis on openness, interoperability and collaboration – both internally and with other parliaments
Digital services/ citizen engagement	Open innovation and ecosystem engagement: launching a parliamentary digital innovation challenge targeting youth and start-ups to co-create solutions and accelerating the adoption of innovative digital services and use cases
	A holistic approach within the parliamentary administration for bringing together different divisions of parliament regarding the data life cycle of various topics and aiming also to provide open data
	Advanced ICT-enabled broadcasting, digital display and media management system

Change management/ capability-building	Measures to continuously optimize processes
	Aligning our internal policies with the national plan/regulatory direction for AI adoption, balancing compliance requirements with our innovation agenda and operational needs
	Parliament is in the process of developing a constituency dashboard aimed at improving members' access to constituency level data and information
	It includes the planning and implementation … to keep the IT infrastructure and application landscape up to date, protect the systems from threats … and ensure the digital sovereignty of the [parliament]
Data analytics/ business intelligence	The focus is on good cross-departmental cooperation that creates transparency regarding responsibilities, processes and requirements
	Core legislative processes have been automated
	ISO 42001-aligned AI governance and standards
	Establishing a common understanding and big picture of data governance with organizational and semantic tasks supporting a "data governance policy" – a precondition for new ways of sourcing (cloud) as well as use of AI tools and services
	Administrative and operational efficiency has been strengthened through digital platforms
	Modernizing legislative and administrative processes through integrated digital platforms, electronic document and records management, and enhanced cybersecurity frameworks
Security/ cybersecurity	Deployment and configuration of a security operations centre
	Risk, security and compliance by design
	Certified with ISO 42001 and ISO 27001 certifications
Workflow systems	Integrated legislative digital platforms: deployment of fully integrated, end-to-end digital platforms supporting legislative drafting, committee management and document life cycle workflows, ensuring interoperability, traceability, efficiency and real-time collaboration
	Core legislative processes have been automated
	Digitizing forms and minutes through free tools

Argentina – Digital strategy codified through institutional directorates

The Chamber of Deputies of Argentina established a directorate for modernization, innovation and institutional strengthening, which evolved into the nerve centre for the Chamber's entire modernization agenda. By codifying digital strategy into an institutional structure with a formal open congress action plan – committing the institution to digitizing administrative documents, implementing digital signatures and creating open data pools – Argentina demonstrated that sustainable transformation requires institutional embedding beyond executive commitment alone, ensuring continuity across budget cycles and leadership changes.

Barriers to digital transformation

Modernizing parliaments through digital tools is about technology-supported culture and process change. New systems and new ways of working often require a change to culture and modernized practices.

Barriers to the effective use of ICT within parliaments are consistently discussed throughout this report series and have included a lack of staff capacity, as well as inadequate funding – the latter being an issue regardless of country income level. Previous reports also noted how persistent strategic and systemic challenges were impacting on ICT delivery and deployment. This survey followed the 2024 survey by exploring the barriers to digital transformation in more depth to try and understand what factors hold back parliamentary modernization.

Table 10. Barriers to digital transformation

Barrier	2026	2024
Insufficient funding for digital transformation	61%	59%
Lack of experienced staff	58%	48%
Culture within parliament	47%	44%
Lack of understanding about the potential benefits of digital transformation	42%	21%
Lack of necessary national infrastructure (beyond parliament)	29%	21%
The organizational structure of parliament	28%	25%
High turnover of staff	20%	13%
No barriers exist	14%	11%
No demand for more digital services	6%	7%

While 14% of parliaments saw no barriers to digital transformation, a significant 61% identified insufficient funding as a barrier. This is a more significant issue for Pacific parliaments (80%) and those in sub-Saharan Africa (96%) compared to Europe and the Middle East and North Africa (both 40%). Income level is significant, with 100% of low-income parliaments and 79% of lower-middle-income parliaments identifying funding challenges, but only 43% of high-income parliaments. This data also reveals that income level is no guarantee of sufficient funding for parliamentary modernization. The digital maturity of parliament appears to be a clearer factor: 36% of tier 1 parliaments identify this issue, rising to 89% for tier 3.

Lack of experienced staff is the second-most prominent barrier facing parliaments, with 58% identifying this. Forty per cent of tier 1 parliaments experience this as an issue, as do 68% in tier 3. The issue is most predominant in Asia (70%), sub-Saharan Africa (63%) and Europe (60%) and less so for parliaments in the Middle East and North Africa (40%). And while finding experienced staff is an issue for 75% of low-income parliaments, it is also a barrier facing 61% of high-income parliaments.

Indonesia – Phased governance and data readiness before AI

The House of Representatives of Indonesia executed a deliberate three-phase road map, treating AI adoption as "fundamentally an institutional readiness challenge, not merely a technological one". Phase I (2020–2022) consolidated fragmented IT systems and appointed a CIO; Phase II (2022–2023) reframed data as "strategic capital" by establishing a One Data portal and standardizing metadata across departments; only after achieving this maturity did Phase III (2024–2025) introduce AI through targeted pilots.

This phased approach demonstrates that the most digitally mature parliaments build governance and data foundations before deploying advanced technologies, addressing the barriers of staff inexperience and lack of understanding about digital transformation's benefits.

Infrastructure

The previous section looked at governance and strategic delivery of ICT within parliaments. This section explores more deeply the infrastructure aspects of the digital parliament, including how parliaments deliver and manage their ICT operational capabilities, including staffing, their ICT systems and infrastructure, including ICT use in libraries.

The DMI shows a high convergence around advanced infrastructure capabilities, with most parliaments in decile 4 and above deploying cloud services, network virtualization and outsourced hosting as standard approaches. These industry-standard systems have become baseline expectations rather than areas of institutional differentiation. For those parliaments in the lower tier of digital maturity, they mark objectives that modernization programmes can work towards.


Table 11. DMI: Top 15 ranking of parliaments in infrastructure

Country	Digital Maturity Index	Governance and strategy	Infrastructure	Parliamentary systems	Supporting users in parliament	Digital content and publishing	Public engagement	Artificial intelligence
Australia – Senate	8	10	10	6	4	7	5	7
Austria	9	7	9	6	9	8	10	7
Bahrain – Shura Council	10	10	9	10	9	10	10	10
Brazil – Chamber of Deputies	10	10	10	10	9	10	10	10
Canada – House of Commons	9	10	9	10	7	7	6	9
Canada – Senate	8	7	10	7	6	5	7	7
Chile – Chamber of Deputies	10	9	10	10	7	10	8	10
European Parliament	10	10	10	4	10	10	10	10
Fiji	8	10	9	4	5	9	9	5
Finland	10	6	9	9	10	10	9	7
France – National Assembly	9	3	10	8	9	8	7	8
Ireland	10	10	10	8	9	8	8	9
Israel	9	6	10	9	7	10	4	8
Rwanda	6	9	10	4	7	7	9	10
United Kingdom	10	9	10	9	9	8	7	7

Staffing

While the largest ICT department has 550 FTE staff, this is an outlier. The average parliament has 73 ICT staff, 46 of which are full-time equivalent staff employed by parliament and the remainder are contractors. The average ratio of members to ICT staff is 5.8 (the highest being 32.6). Tier 1 parliaments have an average of 4.2 members per ICT staff member, rising to 6.2 for tier 2. In tier 3 the figure is 8.4 members per ICT staff, double that of tier 1 parliaments.


Figure 12. FTE ICT staff, range and median



Some ICT staff in parliaments are government, rather than parliamentary, employees. Notable outliers here are Bangladesh, Costa Rica and Mexico, where all ICT staff are employed by the government, and Australia, where a majority are. Fifteen per cent of parliaments state they have more external contractors than internal staff; however, there is no pattern to this trend, and it seems to be based on either culture or operational requirements.

There are clear patterns that emerge when it comes to resourcing parliaments and the data shows that high-income parliaments have higher staff numbers than low-income ones. It also shows some geographical bias, where parliaments in the Americas and Europe have on average significantly more ICT staff than parliaments in sub-Saharan Africa. The most significant factor affecting the number of ICT staff is digital maturity; parliaments in a high decile employ more ICT staff than those in low deciles.

Figure 13. Average ICT staffing by DMI tier and decile



The balance between internal and external staff is typically 3:1 in favour of internal staff. Data management and ICT infrastructure management are the disciplines most likely to be internally resourced. Although there is no area where the average parliament uses more external resources than internal, delivery of cloud services (54% internal versus 46% external) and software development (53% and 47%) show a more even split. The functional area least likely to be undertaken by parliaments is business analysis and requirements management (12%).

Fiji – Agile vendor management for small IT teams

With an IT team of fewer than 10 staff, Fiji successfully launched "Parliament TV" and multilingual broadcasting by relying heavily on external vendors. However, they strictly managed the project's deliverables and support through tight service-level agreements. Their operational mantra, "We don't know everything so we bring in what we need and then gradually make it our own", perfectly illustrates how parliaments can safely manage external dependencies without losing institutional control.

Table 12. Use of internal and external ICT staff by functional area (totals add up to more than 100%)

	Internal	External	Not provided
Broadcast services	75%	46%	5%
Business analysis and requirements management	76%	23%	12%
Cloud services	62%	54%	9%
Cybersecurity	83%	44%	7%
Data management	97%	19%	0%
ICT infrastructure management	95%	37%	1%
Management of social media tools	91%	9%	7%
Open data repositories/ portal	81%	25%	11%
Project management	91%	32%	3%
Software development	77%	69%	4%
Testing	89%	50%	5%
User training and support	92%	44%	2%
Web services	88%	56%	3%

Service-level agreements and support

As a parliament's digital architecture becomes more critical to its operations and more complex, ensuring uptime and service delivery becomes even more important. Service-level agreements (SLAs) ensure that expectations around ICT support are agreed and explicit, promoting mutual understanding and allowing performance to be measured. Where parliaments work with external suppliers, 88% have SLAs in place, and 51% with all their suppliers.

Table 13. Service-level agreements (external and internal)

With	%
External contractors	88%
All	51%
Some	37%
Internal departments	37%

Electrical power supply

In the 2024 issue, all parliaments reported having a reliable, 24/7 electrical power supply; however, this has fallen to 91% in this survey. This is accounted for by three parliaments in sub-Saharan Africa, two in the Pacific, one in the Middle East and North Africa and one in Europe, which is Ukraine and therefore self-explanatory.

Table 14. Reliability of electrical power supply and sources of regular backup

Does parliament have a reliable, 24/7 electrical power supply?		91%
What sources of electrical power does parliament use on a regular basis?	Service from the national grid	92%
	UPS to manage load shedding/rolling blackouts	74%
	Diesel generators to manage load shedding/rolling blackouts	75%
	Generates some of its own power (e.g. from solar)	23%

These figures do not necessarily mean that electricity is permanently available through the national grid. In fact, 9% of parliaments reported that they did not draw their power from a national electricity network, which was largely consistent with previous surveys. In 2024, parliaments were asked about alternative sources of electricity to which they have regular access to accommodate rolling blackouts or other power outages across the network. Seventy per cent of parliaments said they had some form of uninterruptible power supply (UPS), and 72% reported having diesel generators on the parliamentary premises to manage load shedding and rolling blackouts, and whether these were regular, planned or occasional. These figures have risen to 74% and 75% respectively.

In 2024, 13% of parliaments generated some of their own electricity from sources such as solar or wind, although this was heavily biased towards high-income countries. The 2026 survey shows an increase in self-generation to 23% and a more even spread both in terms of income level and region. Parliaments in the Middle East and North Africa were the most likely to generate their own power (50%) and those in the Pacific least likely (20%).

Internet connectivity


A parliament's internet connection is now an essential service, forming a critical part of the digital infrastructure. All parliaments reported having connectivity to the internet, which has consistently been the case since 2018. Ninety-three per cent of respondents are satisfied with the speed of their connection. Half describe it as "more than adequate"', which compares to 35% in 2024. Parliaments are also satisfied with the reliability of their connection (94%). Of the parliaments that describe their internet connection as being unreliable, six are in sub-Saharan Africa and one is in the Pacific region. Four of these parliaments are in decile 2 and three in decile 1.

Tonga – Cloud as disaster recovery

The Legislative Assembly of Tonga illustrates the importance of reliable internet connectivity for parliaments. In 2018, Cyclone Gita destroyed the parliament's century-old building and 80% of its ICT equipment and paper records. Instead of rebuilding vulnerable local servers, Tonga partnered with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to migrate entirely to the cloud. This provided sustainable disaster resilience and the benefit of allowing MPs to access documents from remote outer islands even when physical infrastructure failed.

Eight parliaments identified that their internet connectivity is too slow for their needs – seven in sub-Saharan Africa and one in the Middle East and North Africa. In terms of digital maturity, there is a greater spread, with two parliaments being in decile 5, one in decile 3 and the remainder in deciles 1 and 2.

Figure 14. Internet speed and reliability




Wi-Fi is now a standard provision within the parliamentary estate. Ninety-eight per cent of parliaments offer it to members, 97% to staff and 69% to the public and visitors. These figures show a small increase on previous surveys.

Hosting infrastructure


Parliaments almost universally have access to an on-premises network to access files and applications (95%) and a further 4% plan to have this in the future. Seventy-eight per cent of parliaments offer remote access via a virtual private network (VPN), an increase of nine percentage points since 2024, with a further 16% planning this functionality.

Figure 15. Where parliamentary data and applications are hosted



The use of cloud storage for documents and, increasingly, for applications has accelerated sharply since 2016. In 2020, 36% of parliaments reported using cloud infrastructure; by 2024, this had grown to 68% and, in this survey, 83% of parliaments now utilize cloud services in some form. This trajectory reflects a fundamental shift away from capital-intensive on-premises server management towards scalable, operationally flexible cloud environments.

Figure 16. Use of cloud storage and hosting by parliaments, 2016–2026



Across all cloud-using parliaments, 54% currently host in a private cloud environment (with a further 22% planning this) and 37% of parliaments host in government or public-sector-managed clouds (30% plan to). In total, 44% of parliaments use public cloud providers such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) (with 31% planning this). This distribution, combined with the prevalence of private cloud selection among single-cloud users, reveals that parliaments remain concerned about entrusting their data exclusively to commercial providers or external jurisdictions.

South Africa – Treating cloud migration as a "business project"

The experience of the Parliament of South Africa shows that migrating to the cloud requires rigorous data protection and governance frameworks. Before moving systems off-premises, the parliament had to formally classify its data and update policies governing data access, retention and disposal. This highlights that cloud migration is not just an IT project, but a strategic business decision requiring user trust and strict data sovereignty rules.

The rapid adoption of cloud infrastructure raises important questions around data sovereignty and the legal jurisdiction of sensitive parliamentary data. The choice of hosting infrastructure matters, and analysis of cloud choices suggests deliberate, strategic decision-making. Among the parliaments using cloud services, half select a single specialized cloud type – 19% favouring private clouds, 12% government-managed clouds, and 10% public cloud providers – while the other half mix multiple cloud types, diversifying risk. This even split between single and multi-cloud strategies suggests that parliaments are not adopting cloud services passively but are making calculated choices aligned with their governance priorities.

Digital sovereignty

Digital sovereignty refers to the ability of a parliament or public institution to use, govern and control the digital systems it relies on, in compliance with its jurisdiction and in alignment with its fundamental values.

It is not a binary condition, and complete technological independence is neither realistic nor necessary for most institutions. What matters is understanding dependency on external providers, managing it actively and maintaining the capacity to respond when that dependency is tested.


Data sovereignty is an issue for all parliaments but becomes particularly acute for parliaments in smaller States or those with limited digital infrastructure, where the trade-off between technical capability and institutional control creates genuine strategic tension. The planned shift towards government clouds (an increase from 37% to 67% planned) indicates that parliaments are actively seeking solutions that preserve both cloud benefits and data sovereignty.

Mozambique – Navigating legislative barriers to the cloud

Despite running out of local server storage, the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique realized that moving to the cloud was not straightforward. With no national regulation permitting public institutions to use the cloud, it highlights that the barrier to adoption was just as likely to be legal or financial as technical.

The breakdown of hosting by application type in Figure 17 shows that most parliamentary applications are still hosted on the premises. Only collaboration tools, e-learning and video conferencing are more likely to be cloud-based. The greatest disparity is seen between a strong preference for on-premises hosting of databases (90% on-premises; 33% in-cloud) and print publishing applications (82% on-premises; 10% in-cloud)

Figure 17. Application hosting by type (%)



The data viewed across issues of this report suggests a gradual shift towards cloud hosting of applications. As noted in the 2024 report, parliaments still show a strong preference towards locally hosted applications. Disparities exist in the use of cloud, with tier 1 parliaments averaging seven hosted application categories but tier 3 only three.

Cybersecurity


Given the critical importance of cybersecurity for protecting parliaments' digital assets and information, it is surprising to see that only 57% of parliaments have a cybersecurity strategy. This shows a modest increase from 53% in 2024, where a further 26% said that they were intending to develop one.

Table 15. Cybersecurity measures adopted by parliaments

	Yes	Planning	No
Parliament has a cybersecurity strategy	57%	29%	11%
Parliament has adopted or follows national cybersecurity standards or guidelines.	72%	23%	5%
There is a formally identified internal structure responsible for cybersecurity	66%	16%	14%
Cybersecurity is the responsibility of a government agency or other public body	39%	5%	41%

While many parliaments have taken steps to address cybersecurity concerns by adopting standards, assigning responsibilities, developing strategies and establishing internal structures, there remains room for improvement: 8% of parliaments have no clear strategic approach to cybersecurity and 5% no plans to implement one (the four parliaments in this latter category are all in tier 3). Digital maturity is again a strong predictor, with 100% of tier 1 parliaments having a formally identified internal structure responsible for cybersecurity, 76% of tier 2 but only 28% of tier 3 (and none in decile 1). In terms of a cybersecurity strategy, 90% of tier 1 parliaments (100% of decile 10) have one in place but no decile 1 and only 19% of tier 3 parliaments do so.

Figure 18. Cybersecurity strategy and internal structure in place by decile



Bahrain's Shura Council – Partnering for national security

Recognizing that the shift to remote work and cloud hosting dramatically increased their risk profile, the Shura Council of Bahrain decided not to build a cybersecurity fortress in isolation. Instead, they partnered directly with the Bahrain National Cyber Security Center to develop internal strategies, set protection standards and proactively monitor threats. Aligning parliament's cybersecurity with government cybersecurity agencies is a highly effective way to mitigate institutional risk.

Library services

The use of digital tools in parliamentary libraries follows the broader patterns for digital adoption in parliaments. In 2026, in terms of automated tools for managing library content, three quarters of parliamentary libraries have an online catalogue and 76% a digital application for cataloguing acquisitions. Fewer have tools for digital rights management (37%). These functional areas show a moderate but steady increase from previous reports in the series.


Table 16. Use of digital applications by functional library area

	%
Cataloguing of acquisitions	76%
Online catalogue	75%
Circulation system	68%
Archiving of digital resources	65%
E-resource management capabilities	61%
Acquisition and claiming of serials	57%
Acquisition of monographs	55%
Digital rights management (DRM)	37%

Parliaments employ a range of digital tools to support library services. The use of these is steady and consistent with previous reports. The provision of open data shows a slight increase from 46% in 2024 to 51% and cloud storage from 36% to 43%. The most notable change comes in the use of AI for research and information gathering, having risen from 13% of parliaments in 2024 to 26%.


As in other areas, the adoption of newer digital applications in parliamentary libraries is skewed towards the more digitally mature parliaments. While two thirds of tier 1 parliaments (66%) provide open data, this falls to 15% in tier 3 (and only 8% in decile 1). Likewise, 39% in tier 1 (and half of decile 10 parliamentary libraries) report using AI but only 3% in tier 3 and no parliaments in deciles 1 or 2 do so.

Figure 19. Behind-the-scenes library technologies



The use of digital tools in terms of library management is matched by the steady rise in user-facing tools that parliamentary libraries are now able to offer. Almost three quarters of parliaments offer an intranet for members to access library content (73%) and 68% provide a library website. These figures represent little change over previous reports in the series.

Figure 20. Online tools for library users



Parliamentary systems

This section focuses on parliamentary systems and examines the implementation of different IT systems and digital tools that support key parliamentary functions. It provides a comprehensive overview of ongoing trends and patterns in the digitization of parliaments, painting a picture of parliaments embracing the "e-Parliament" model, defined in the *World e-Parliament Report 2018*:

> An e-Parliament places technologies, knowledge and standards at the heart of its business processes, and embodies the values of collaboration, inclusiveness, participation and openness to the people.[6]

Plenary and committee operations reflect substantial diversity in technical capability across the range of parliaments surveyed. From voting systems to hybrid meeting capabilities and digital workflows, such diversity is appropriate and necessary: different parliamentary procedures, chamber structures, legislative cycles and procedural norms create different cultural practices and different digital infrastructure requirements. Good practice in this area relies on aligning digital capability with specific institutional need, context and procedure rather than pursuing standardized solutions or technology for its own sake.

6. IPU, *World e-Parliament Report 2018*, 2018, p. 5.

Table 17. DMI: Top 15 ranking of parliaments in parliamentary systems

Country	Digital Maturity Index	Governance and strategy	Infrastructure	Parliamentary systems	Supporting users in parliament	Digital content and publishing	Public engagement	Artificial intelligence
Bahrain – Shura Council	10	10	9	10	9	9	10	10
Brazil – Chamber of Deputies	10	10	10	9	10	10	10	10
Brazil – Federal Senate	10	7	6	10	6	10	8	10
Chile – Chamber of Deputies	10	9	10	10	7	10	8	10
European Parliament	10	10	10	4	10	9	10	10
Fiji	9	10	9	4	5	10	9	5
Finland	9	6	9	9	10	10	9	7
France – National Assembly	9	3	10	8	9	10	7	8
Ireland	10	10	10	8	9	9	8	9
Mauritius	9	7	8	6	9	9	3	10
Mexico – Senate	8	9	9	7	7	9	5	9
Netherlands – House of Representatives	7	5	6	4	7	10	8	7
Poland – Sejm	7	1	7	10	6	10	5	6
Republic of Korea	10	8	9	10	9	10	10	10

Parliamentary functions supported through ICT

The longitudinal data from this report series reveals a more complex picture than headline adoption figures suggest. While most parliamentary functions have now achieved some level of digitization, the overall pattern from 2016 to 2026 has plateaued. The modest improvements in 2026 require careful interpretation: some represent genuine expansion of digital practice, while others likely reflect sample composition changes rather than systemic innovation.

Table 18. Digitization of functional areas, 2016–2026

Functional area	2026	2024	2020	2016
Bill drafting	45%	51%	50%	42%
Amendment drafting	48%	51%	46%	45%
Bill status/tracking	65%	63%	63%	64%
Amendment status/tracking	54%	55%	55%	55%
Database of laws passed by parliament	80%	73%	75%	74%
Analysis of budget proposed by the government	38%	30%	–	–
Plenary calendars and schedules	75%	75%	73%	78%
Minutes of plenary sessions	75%	71%	69%	79%
Plenary speeches and debates	76%	72%	73%	78%
Plenary voting	69%	67%	66%	67%
Committee voting	29%	27%	21%	-
Committee reports	70%	63%	68%	72%
Committee calendars and schedules	71%	69%	68%	70%
Minutes of committee meetings	62%	57%	60%	68%
Questions to the government	64%	58%	46%	50%
Managing members' financial allocations	62%	63%	–	–
Management of library resources	71%	61%	65%	59%
Online library catalogue	74%	69%	65%	57%
Digital archive of parliamentary documents	81%	74%	79%	68%
Financial disclosure of members' interests	39%	41%	36%	38%
Human resources management	81%	77%	80%	77%
Financial management	80%	82%	81%	76%


The data exposes significant variations in the depth of digitization. Back-office and administrative functions have achieved broad adoption: digital archives (81%), human resources systems (81%), financial management (80%) and legislative databases (80%) are near-universal. By contrast, the core legislative process – bill and amendment drafting – remains stubbornly low at 45% and 48% respectively, little changed from 2016 (42% and 45%). This gap is instructive: it suggests that parliaments have prioritized information management and infrastructure over the modernization of legislative workflows. This may be, at least in part, due to the complexity of the legislative process and trust in digital tools for such important core parliamentary work.

Committee work presents a particular vulnerability. While committee calendars (71%) and reports (70%) are widely digitized, committee voting remains the least digitized function in the entire data set at only 29%. This gap is not explained by technical barriers: plenary voting reaches 69%. The persistence of manual committee voting suggests either institutional resistance, the absence of business case pressure or the dominance of consensus-based procedures where recorded voting is less common.

Most improvements from 2024 to 2026 are modest, the exceptions being library resources management (+10 percentage points) and budget analysis (+8 percentage points). However, this data obscures the fact the increases in adoption do not mean that underlying technologies or processes have advanced. A parliament implementing a basic digital archive does not differ materially from one adopting a cloud-integrated system with version control and federated search; both register as "digital" despite vastly different capabilities.

The limitation of this data is that it measures system availability, not actual use or integration into deliberative practice. A parliament with a digital bill-drafting system that is seldom used, or one where amendments are still primarily managed through parallel manual processes, registers identically to one where digital workflow is embedded in daily practice. To understand whether digitization of parliamentary functions is genuinely advancing, this chapter will explore some of this functionality in more detail.

Figure 21. Digitization of selected functional areas by decile



Digitization of selected functional areas by decile demonstrates that digitization of the core legislative process – bill drafting, amendments and status tracking – is heavily concentrated in tier 1, where adoption rates reach 90% or higher. However, adoption collapses across tier 2, dropping to 60–70%, and the distribution widens substantially in tier 3, where adoption rates plummet to near zero in some cases. The dramatic cliff in tier 3 is particularly revealing as it suggests the least digitally mature parliaments have very limited access to digital legislative tools, irrespective of the specific function. This is not a gradual digital divide but a sharp discontinuity, with tier 1 parliaments operating in a vastly different technology ecosystem from those in tier 3.

Document management

Almost 6 out of 10 parliaments (57%) report having a system for managing bill texts in digital format as legislation moves through the legislative process. However, systems vary widely in capability: some parliaments operate fully integrated legislative management systems (LMS), while others rely on customized office software with minimal automation. Going beyond the headline figures, the data shows substantial variation in underlying functionality.

Among parliaments with document management systems, three quarters (75%, or 45% of all participants) can handle plenary amendments to bills, and 71% have workflow capability to route documents through deliberative stages. Some 7 in 10 systems (70%) include all actions taken by parliament on a bill. These core functions represent the baseline expectation for any LMS and suggest that where systems exist, they do address parliament's primary needs.

Table 19. Document management system functionality

Function	%
Can handle plenary amendments	75%
Workflow capability	71%
Includes all actions taken by parliament on a bill	70%
Can handle committee amendments	68%
Can handle all possible versions of a bill	64%
Exchanges data with other systems outside the parliament	49%
Can show the changes in a bill that the amendment would make	48%

The data reveals two significant vulnerabilities. First, fewer than half of parliaments with a document management system (48%) can visualize or display the specific changes that an amendment would make to bill text (and across all parliaments this drops to 30%). This is a striking contrast with the 75% of parliaments that can apply plenary amendments. The gap suggests systems that are transaction-oriented (amendments are recorded and processed) but not analysis-oriented (the substantive effect is not transparent). For those seeking to understand the impact an amendment could have, this represents a material limitation.

Second, only 49% of document management systems can exchange data with systems outside parliament. This is significant if bills originate elsewhere. A document management system unable to automatically import or synchronize bill versions from external sources is constrained as an integration point in the legislative pipeline. This creates a weak point where errors could arise.

Version control is another area of concern. Only 64% of systems can handle all possible versions of a bill as it evolves through multiple amendment rounds. The remaining 36% operate with limited versioning capability, creating risk of confusion, lost amendments or legislative history gaps.

The digitization of the legislative process presents as one of adequacy for internal operations but with fragility at the boundaries. Parliaments have invested in systems that move bills through their own procedures reliably. But those same systems do not always solve the harder challenges: transparency of amendment impact, integration with external actors and robust version control. These gaps may not be visible to casual observers, but they shape the legislative process in ways that affect both efficiency and accountability.

Integrated amendment workflows in the Chamber of Deputies of Italy

To minimize paper processes and improve the resilience of its legislative workflow, the Chamber of Deputies of Italy introduced the "Geo-Camera" app, functioning as a "digital briefcase" for members. During the annual budget session, members utilized this system to digitally submit over 3,000 amendments and sub-amendments, which were instantly routed to the relevant committee's real-time dashboard. Committee staff could then compile and publish digital amendment dossiers, while members could track the status of submissions remotely and read the current text under examination directly from their personal devices in real time. This fully integrated workflow shows how advanced document management systems can eliminate the "fragility at the boundaries" by successfully connecting individual MPs' submissions directly to the committee and plenary consideration stages.


Voting systems

Voting systems remain diverse and context-dependent across parliaments. Over 60% of parliaments employ multiple plenary voting methods, with the specific method depending on the vote and procedural circumstances.

The majority (54%) primarily use manual voting in the plenary, continuing a well-recorded decline from 78% in 2018. An additional 21% combine manual voting with electronic tallying. Among parliaments with electronic voting, 43% use voting buttons at assigned seats, while 29% deploy touch screens. Remote voting declined from a peak of 22% (2022) to 16% in plenary and 8% in committees.

Committee voting remains predominantly manual (79%), with limited adoption of electronic alternatives.

Figure 22. Voting methods



Expediting the vote in the National Assembly of Malawi

The transition from manual to electronic voting offers significant efficiency gains. The National Assembly of Malawi overhauled its plenary operations by introducing a new digital chamber management system. As part of this digital-first initiative, standing orders were adapted to make the electronic distribution of session papers the default, significantly reducing printing costs. More importantly, the system replaced the parliament's cumbersome manual voting procedures; the new electronic system allows all 193 members to cast their vote securely in 10 minutes or less, a process that previously took over an hour to complete.

Remote participation

Remote participation in parliamentary sessions emerged as a vital tool that kept parliaments functioning during the COVID-19 pandemic. By 2022, 60% of parliaments had adopted or were operating hybrid proceedings for both plenaries and committees, where some members attended in person while others participated online. In the same year, 26% had held or could hold fully remote plenary sessions.

These capabilities have contracted substantially by 2026. Only 9% of parliaments now offer fully remote plenary sessions, while 36% support hybrid plenary participation. The majority (62%) lack remote functionality as standard. Where remote plenary participation is available, it is typically conditional: limited to members unable to attend in person because of illness or other specific circumstances.

Remote participation in committees has proven more durable. Fifty-six per cent of parliaments continue to support hybrid committee sessions (down only slightly from 60% in 2022), and 16% can hold fully remote committee meetings. This sustained investment reflects recognition of the institutional value hybrid committees provide, particularly in enabling greater participation of external witnesses.

Table 20. Methods of remote participation

	Plenary		Committees	
Method	2026	2022	2026	2022
Hybrid	36%	60%	56%	60%
Fully remote	9%	26%	16%	35%
No remote functionality	62%	–	43%	–

Audio/visual systems

The availability of live-streaming (near-live-streaming) from plenary sittings has increased from 61% in 2016 to 93% in 2026, with 81% of parliaments using automatic video recording technologies (it was 69% in 2016).

Large-screen displays have become standard in parliamentary chambers. Ninety-three per cent of parliaments now use them in plenary (up from 80% in 2024), and 83% in committee rooms (up from 78%). These screens primarily display information during sessions – text and video streaming (both 74%) and graphics (70%) – in plenary. In committees, video streaming is less prevalent (69%, up from 55% in 2024).

Videoconferencing presents a contrasting pattern. It is more widely available in committees (77%, up from 67%) than in plenary (58%, up from 48%) – the inverse of the pattern for video streaming.

The variation in capability by digital maturity is notable. Large-screen video streaming in plenary shows modest variation: 72% of tier 1 and 77% of tier 3 has this capability. Committee video streaming, however, shows far greater disparity, with 97% of tier 1 parliaments compared to 44% in tier 3. This variation suggests that lower-tier parliaments prioritize equipping their primary plenary chamber over investing in technology across multiple committee rooms.

Table 21. Use of large-screen displays in plenary and committees

	Plenary	Committees
Video streaming	77%	72%
Text	77%	73%
Graphics	73%	71%
Still pictures	62%	65%
Videoconferencing	58%	77%

Regional variation in audio/visual capability is more substantial. Plenary video streaming ranges from 100% in the Middle East and North Africa to 70% in Europe, with Asian parliaments leading in text display (87%) and graphics (87% in committees). Committee video streaming shows even sharper regional divides: the Americas, Asia and Europe cluster at 75–81%, while sub-Saharan Africa lags behind at 48% – a 30-percentage-point gap from the region's plenary capability. Videoconferencing remains the most regionally variable function. The Americas leads in plenary videoconferencing (75%) and committees (88%), while Middle Eastern and North African parliaments, despite near-universal plenary video streaming, have limited videoconferencing in the plenary (33.3%). This variation reflects not only resource constraints but also different strategic choices about which audiovisual capabilities parliaments prioritize for different purposes and venues.

Scaling committee broadcasting in Fiji

While outfitting multiple committee rooms for live-streaming often presents a resource barrier for smaller legislatures, the Parliament of Fiji successfully scaled its broadcasting capabilities through strategic vendor partnerships and agile implementation. Supported by the UNDP, the parliament launched "Parliament TV" to increase institutional transparency. Crucially, the IT department expanded this capability beyond the main chamber by integrating HD cameras, Wi-Fi and videoconferencing facilities into its committee rooms. Using two dedicated control rooms, the parliament can now flexibly broadcast live public hearings and scrutiny sessions from its committees directly to a free-to-air digital TV channel, its website and its Facebook page, ensuring that committee work is as accessible to the public as plenary debates.

Official verbatim report

The data across the report series provides insights into the methods used for recording the official verbatim report of parliamentary proceedings. In 2026, the most widely reported method remains recording in digital format using a PC, employed by 62% of parliaments. This is unchanged from 2024 and consistent with the range of 57–71% seen since 2010.

The most significant shift is the growing adoption of speech recognition technology. In 2026, 31% of parliaments now employ this method, marking a further consolidation of the upward trend from 8% in 2010, 14% in 2018 and 25% in 2020. This trajectory reflects continuous advancements in speech recognition accuracy and ease of deployment.

The traditional method of recording by hand and transcribing into digital format continues its long decline. In 2026, only 26% of parliaments reported using this approach, down from 47% in 2010 but representing stabilization at the 2024 level. The sustained shift away from manual recording is now nearly complete, with the method relegated to a minority practice.

Stenographic machine usage remains marginal and stable. At 14% in 2026, it is consistent with levels seen in 2024 and 2016 (both 14–15%), showing no meaningful growth or decline. This method appears to have found its niche among a small proportion of parliaments but shows no signs of renewal.


Digitizing the official record in Estonia

The Estonian Parliament successfully deployed "HANS", an automated speech recognition system based on large language models designed specifically for parliamentary use. The system automatically transcribes all plenary and committee meetings, recognizing over 200 specific speakers, including MPs and government ministers.

The project was driven by two main factors: older transcription tools lacked modern security, and recruiting young people to perform the intensive, repetitive work of traditional stenography had become challenging. By deploying HANS, the parliament was able to fully digitize the transcription process, effectively replacing a retiring team of four stenographers. Crucially, the system maintains strict human-in-the-loop oversight while achieving an accuracy rate of around 95%.

Overall, the data confirms a decisive move towards automated digital recording methods. The PC-based approach provides steady baseline coverage, while speech recognition technology continues to expand – albeit at a steadier pace than in the 2020–2024 period. Stenographic machines and manual transcription together account for less than 41% of parliaments, down from 62% in 2010. This represents a fundamental shift in how parliaments document their proceedings, with implications for efficiency, accessibility and the possibility of AI-powered downstream analysis of legislative content.

Figure 23. Recording of the official verbatim report



This pattern of institutional choice becomes clearer when examining the relationship between stenographic machines and speech recognition technology. Only 17% of stenographic machine users employ speech recognition technology, indicating these are alternative rather than complementary approaches to verbatim reporting. The use of speech recognition tracks closely with digital maturity and higher income levels. Speech recognition is very much a "modern infrastructure" technology and there is a near-linear relationship between digital maturity and speech recognition adoption. This is strikingly different from stenographic machines, which show no meaningful decile trend. Geographical and economic factors correlate with stenographic adoption: the Americas, particularly among upper-middle-income parliaments, shows the strongest preference for stenographic machines. This pattern suggests that stenographic traditions, once established, persist as institutional pathways, or dependencies, rather than waypoints on a single trajectory towards speech recognition. The limited diffusion of hybrid approaches indicates that parliaments adopting stenographic systems have invested in operators and procedures that may create organizational inertia, making wholesale transition to speech recognition less straightforward than technical capability alone would suggest.


Archiving and preservation

Parliamentary documentation creates an important and meaningful legacy of knowledge, forming a core part of a nation's history. The preservation of parliamentary records is, therefore, an important process. The share of parliaments with a formal policy in place for the digital preservation of documents remains static at 52%, although this has risen from 33% in 2018. While a further 36% report that they are planning such a policy, it is telling that there is little change since the last report.

Where the report series does see an increase is in the share of parliaments that maintain a digital archive for contemporary parliamentary documents, rising to 75% from 69% in 2024. Twenty-nine per cent of parliaments have a working contemporary archive but no formal preservation policy, suggesting that parliaments are *doing* digital archiving before *formalizing* it. Sub-Saharan Africa is the extreme case: 59% have archives, but only 19% have a policy, with 70% stating they plan to develop one.

The digital preservation of historical documents also shows an increase, from 52% in 2024 to 56% in 2026.

Figure 24. Policies and practices for digital archives



Crowdsourcing archives in the Hellenic Parliament

The true value of a digital archive lies not just in preservation, but also in usability. Historically, the Hellenic Parliament in Greece stored parliamentary questions as scanned image files, which severely limited the ability of researchers and citizens to search or study the original content. To solve this, researchers at the parliament's Scientific Service launched the Hellenic Optical Character Recognition (OCR) Team, an innovative crowdsourcing platform. The initiative brings together a network of academics, students and software developers to systematically process and convert decades of paper-based and non-processable digital oversight data into open, structured formats (like XML). This "citizen science" approach to archiving allows disparate areas of historical and political research to be interlinked, transforming static legacy documents into active, machine-readable open data.

Supporting users in parliament

This section examines the current state of ICT support and services provided to MPs and parliamentary staff. It reviews the provision of hardware, software and user support services, highlighting the differences between parliaments based on digital maturity, income levels and geography. It explores training and development priorities for both members and ICT staff, with a particular focus on the critical importance of cybersecurity awareness and technical certifications. By analysing these key aspects, the report provides insights into how parliaments are ensuring that MPs and staff are equipped and suitably trained to navigate an evolving technology landscape.

Table 22. DMI: Top 15 ranking of parliaments in supporting users in parliament

Country	Digital Maturity Index	Governance and strategy	Infrastructure	Parliamentary systems	Supporting users in parliament	Digital content and publishing	Public engagement	Artificial intelligence
Austria	9	7	9	6	9	8	10	7
Bahrain – Shura Council	10	10	9	10	9	10	10	10
Brazil – Chamber of Deputies	10	10	10	10	9	10	10	10
European Parliament	10	10	10	4	10	10	10	10
Finland	10	6	9	9	10	10	9	7
France – National Assembly	9	3	10	8	9	8	7	8
Ireland	10	10	10	8	9	8	8	9
Lithuania	7	4	6	7	9	8	4	8
Mauritius	8	7	8	6	9	7	3	10
Republic of Korea	10	8	9	10	9	10	10	10
Slovakia	9	8	9	10	9	10	9	7
Tanzania (United Republic of)	7	10	8	7	9	5	10	7
Ukraine	9	8	5	7	9	9	9	9
United Kingdom	10	9	10	9	9	8	7	7
Vanuatu	4	9	6	3	10	4	3	1

Provision of equipment, tools and support

The provision of hardware and basic support is now near-universal, but advanced digital tools remain concentrated among wealthier parliaments. Almost 9 out of 10 parliaments provide desktop or laptop computers to members (86%) and 58% provide mobile devices. Remote meeting tools are available in 77% of cases, and 89% have helpdesk support available. However, there are clear differences in advanced capabilities: high-income parliaments average eight tools compared to four for low-income parliaments, reflecting a clear, graduated relationship between national income and ICT provision that holds consistently across all regions.

The sharpest differentiators between tier 1 and tier 3 parliaments are the infrastructure-layer tools that enable broader digital participation: intranet portals (+49-percentage-point gap), remote office tools (+49 percentage points), ICT training to members (+47 percentage points), and parliamentary research databases (+46 percentage points). Without these foundational systems, other tools deliver substantially less value. Geographical clustering reinforces other inequalities, where Europe and the Americas consistently outperform while sub-Saharan Africa shows particularly low adoption of intranet portals (41%), data plans (22%) and digital signatures (19%).

Mobility and personalized support in Bahrain

The Shura Council of Bahrain demonstrates how modernizing digital infrastructure requires rethinking both hardware provision and user support. The Council completely phased out desktop PCs, providing laptops to staff and tablets with dedicated mobile data plans to members of parliament. This shift prioritized agility and remote participation capability. Equally important was restructuring user support: the IT department established a 24-hour, two-line helpdesk and assigned individual support staff to groups of 10 MPs, providing personalized assistance that significantly boosted user confidence. The combination of mobile-first hardware with embedded, dedicated support created an ecosystem where technology adoption became feasible rather than frustrating – a model that less-resourced parliaments attempting digital transformation might consider, albeit at the cost of proportionally higher IT staffing investment.

Remote voting tools remain a frontier capability, available in only 29% of high-income parliaments and absent entirely from low-income parliaments. Notably, no parliament formally reported providing AI-based chatbots or tools to assist members. Yet the data suggests that strategic investment can overcome resource constraints: a small number of lower-middle-income parliaments provide a significant range of tools, matching or exceeding many high-income peers.

Table 23. Provision of hardware, applications and support services

	%
Hardware	
Desktop or laptop computers	86%
Mobile devices	58%
Software and applications	
Data plans	38%
Remote office tools	55%
Remote meeting tools	77%
Remote voting tools	22%
Digital signature tools	38%
Intranet portal	67%
Legislative document management system	57%
Parliamentary research databases	53%
User support	
AI tools/bots to assist MPs	0%
ICT support/helpdesk	89%


Training priorities

Seventy per cent of parliaments report offering training or induction in ICT to members and 85% do so for staff. The top training priorities for members in 2026 are parliamentary systems and applications (67%) and security, which includes cybersecurity (64%). While other tools and technologies become less important as such tools become normative, email has fallen from 42% to 33% and instant messaging from 13% to 6%. The rising importance and impact of AI is obvious in the increase from 16% of parliaments identifying this as a training priority for members in 2024 to 49% in 2026.

Mainstreaming cyber awareness

As parliaments increasingly rely on digital systems and remote access, the human element becomes the most significant security vulnerability. The National Assembly of Mauritius recognized that technological safeguards alone were insufficient without user education. The institution mandates that dedicated cybersecurity experts provide continuous training for ICT personnel on emerging threats. Critically, this education extends beyond technical staff: the parliament conducts regular security awareness sessions for administrative staff and MPs, treating cybersecurity as a shared institutional responsibility rather than solely an IT department concern. This approach – embedding security literacy across all roles – addresses the reality that cyber threats exploit human behaviour as often as they exploit technical gaps.

Figure 25. Priorities for member training



The importance of security around the use of technology is reinforced when parliaments are asked to identify their top training needs for staff. A total of 77% state that security is a priority, consistent with 2024. AI features strongly for staff training, with 65% identifying AI tools and 47% AI literacy (in 2024, 43% identified AI generally as a priority, still the second-highest area). Other functional areas are broadly in line with the 2024 figures or falling as they become normative – again, social media has fallen (from 7% in 2024 to 2%).

Figure 26. Priorities for staff training



This data reinforces the importance that parliaments place on digital security for both members and staff. During the last two years, training or information campaigns to raise awareness about information security/cybersecurity have been organized by 71% of parliaments for staff, 58% for members and 24% for external suppliers and contractors.

Table 24. Organized cybersecurity training or awareness

	%
Members	58%
Staff	71%
External suppliers/contractors	24%

Proactive AI literacy

The Estonian Parliament adopted a proactive approach to generative AI adoption, prioritizing user education over restrictive governance. Rather than draft overarching rules, the parliament delivered practical training events where external experts taught MPs and staff how to use tools like ChatGPT and Copilot for daily tasks – analysing text, preparing presentations, compiling documents. The focus was explicit: prompt-writing skills and human-in-the-loop oversight, treating AI as a personal assistant under human control. This approach – education first, governance second – enabled safe adoption while maintaining institutional accountability. It reflects a strategic choice: empowering users to experiment within clear boundaries rather than constraining adoption through blanket restrictions.

Professional certification of ICT staff

Technical certifications are valuable for both ICT staff and the parliaments that employ them. They validate knowledge, demonstrate a commitment to professional development and ensure ICT staff are equipped with the latest knowledge and practices. Overall, 56% of parliaments surveyed said they required or encouraged their technical staff to be certified in at least one area. For those parliaments that do require or encourage certification, this on average covers five technical areas. The primary areas for certification are information systems security (92%), networking (76%) and IT infrastructure (70%). Those areas least likely to have staff with certification are data design and modelling (33%) and cloud practitioner (32%), although a higher share of parliaments (52%) encourage certification in cloud security.

Table 25. Technical areas for professional certification of ICT staff (parliaments that encourage or require certification only)

Technical area	%
Information systems security	92%
Networking	76%
IT infrastructure	70%
Software development	68%
Web development	62%
Database administration	60%
Project management	54%
Cloud security	52%
Data privacy	38%
Data design and modelling	33%
Cloud practitioner	32%
Other	19%


Nearly half of parliaments (44%) report no formal certification requirements for ICT staff, indicating that certification is not yet standard practice globally.

The relationship between national income and certification requirements displays a counter-intuitive pattern that diverges sharply from most other digital maturity measures. Unlike tool provision for MPs (which increases with income), ICT staff certification follows an inverted gradient. Low-income parliaments average six certifications compared to four for high-income parliaments and three for upper-middle-income parliaments. Only 38% of low-income parliaments require no certifications, versus 43% for high-income and 50% for upper-middle-income. This suggests that less-resourced parliaments rely more heavily on formal credentials to validate staff competence, while wealthier institutions can invest in broader on-the-job training or recruit from deeper talent pools where formal certification is less necessary.

Geographical variation is substantial and reveals strategic differences in how parliaments allocate limited capacity-building resources. Despite leading on most digital maturity indicators, Europe shows the highest zero-certification rate (58%), while the Pacific (20%) and the Middle East and North Africa (30%) have the lowest. Most strikingly, Pacific parliaments average six certifications, the highest of any region. Sub-Saharan Africa also shows strong certification commitment, averaging five certifications, with notably high rates for networking (63%), information systems security (59%) and database administration (48%). These patterns suggest that resource-constrained parliaments with limited digital infrastructure compensate through strategic investment in staff skills development, creating a form of institutional specialization: wealthier parliaments equip members with tools; less wealthy parliaments invest proportionally more in formalizing staff qualifications.

Among the most digitally mature institutions (tier 1), a clear majority require or encourage professional certification for ICT staff, suggesting that certification is part of a broader, formalized approach to ICT governance. By contrast, 60% of tier 3 parliaments have zero certification requirements. Parliaments in tier 2 display a mixed picture, indicating that progress in digital maturity does not automatically translate into structured professional development frameworks for ICT personnel.

Figure 27. Certification across four key areas by decile (all parliaments)



The distribution of formal certification requirements across parliaments reveals that professional ICT certification remains an emerging practice rather than a universal standard in parliamentary administrations. This finding points to a significant gap in human capital development, but one that is distributed unevenly. The 2026 survey results suggest that, even among highly digital parliaments, there remains room to strengthen formal certification frameworks. For less mature institutions, introducing or scaling up certification policies could support more sustainable capacity-building over time. The counter-intuitive finding – that some lower-income parliaments invest more in certification – offers a model worth considering: that formal qualification requirements can sometimes be a cost-effective lever for raising staff capability when capital investment in infrastructure is constrained. However, the modest correlation between the range of certifications and digital maturity also suggests that the quality and strategic targeting of certification programmes matter more than comprehensive coverage across all technical domains.

Digital content and publishing

Over this report series, parliaments have made significant progress in improving digital content provision and management, and the technology involved has changed dramatically: from static websites to interactive social media and the growing importance of open data. The latter has emerged as a defining trend. Several parliaments have developed or enhanced open data portals, making parliamentary data more readily available. These moves towards greater transparency encourage civic engagement and informed public discourse.

Open data can result from an intent to build transparency and accountability, but enhanced legislative management software often enables it. Behind the scenes, many parliaments have streamlined their document management processes through upgraded systems, enabling more efficient creation, processing and storage of parliamentary documents while ensuring information is organized and retrievable.

Parliaments use social media to reach the public, sharing digital content, live-streaming sessions and facilitating two-way communication. Some have developed mobile applications for convenient access to parliamentary information. Investments in streaming infrastructure have also improved the quality and reliability of live-streamed sessions and video content.

Accessibility remains an important focus, with many parliaments implementing closed captioning, audio description and user-friendly interfaces to ensure their content is accessible to persons with disabilities.


Table 26. DMI: Top 15 ranking of parliaments in digital content and publishing

Country	Digital Maturity Index	Governance and strategy	Infrastructure	Parliamentary systems	Supporting users in parliament	Digital content and publishing	Public engagement	Artificial intelligence
Bahrain – Shura Council	10	10	9	10	9	10	10	10
Brazil – Chamber of Deputies	10	10	10	10	9	10	10	10
Brazil – Federal Senate	10	7	6	10	6	10	8	10
Chile – Chamber of Deputies	10	9	10	10	7	10	8	10
Estonia	9	5	8	10	7	9	5	9
European Parliament	10	10	10	4	10	10	10	10
Fiji	8	10	9	4	5	9	9	5
Finland	10	6	9	9	10	10	9	7
Israel	9	6	10	9	7	10	4	8
Mexico – Senate	8	9	9	7	7	9	5	9
Poland – Sejm	7	1	7	10	6	9	5	6
Republic of Korea	10	8	9	10	9	10	10	10
Slovakia	9	8	9	10	9	10	9	7
Spain – Congress of Deputies	7	6	8	9	6	9	2	3
Ukraine	9	8	5	7	9	9	9	9

Digital content strategy

Fifty-four per cent of parliaments have a formal policy in place to manage their digital content and 45% for publishing open data. This suggests that, while many parliaments have invested in digital infrastructure and content delivery, fewer have adopted formal governance frameworks to guide that investment. Adoption varies substantially by region, income level, chamber size and digital maturity.

Figure 28. Formal policies relating to digital content



Europe shows balanced policy adoption (57% each), while the Middle East and North Africa is ahead with 89% content policy adoption, suggesting strategic prioritization despite average maturity scores. Asia mirrors Europe (60% both policies). The Pacific region is a significant outlier (20% content, 10% open data), reflecting lower overall digital infrastructure. Sub-Saharan Africa shows interesting divergence: 52% have content policies but only 33% have open data policies, suggesting prioritization of internal document management over public transparency. This mirrors the previous section, where less-resourced parliaments invest in operational efficiency before expanding public-facing initiatives.

Chamber size is a more reliable predictor than income or region. Large parliaments (200+ members) are nearly twice as likely to have content policies as small ones (78% versus 39%) and more than twice as likely to have open data policies (70% versus 29%).

Digital maturity correlates with policy adoption. Seventy-eight per cent of tier 1 parliaments have content policies and 87% have open data policies, dropping to 59% and 55% for tier 2, and just 29% and 5% for tier 3. This reflects a fundamental reality: formal digital content strategy is a characteristic of institutionally mature parliaments. Low-decile parliaments, which often lack robust document management systems and publishing infrastructure, rarely have the operational foundation to support such frameworks.

Table 27. Strategic responsibility for digital content

Role/department	%
Communications	49%
ICT	45%
Press office/public relations	40%
Speaker	37%
Library/research services	26%
Outreach/education	16%
Knowledge management office	4%
External agency	0%

Multiple roles or departments have responsibility for setting the strategic priorities for digital communications in 73% of parliaments. The responsibility lies with the communications department in 49% of parliaments (up from 40% in 2024), the ICT department for 45% of respondents and the press office/public relations department (40%). These figures repeat the 2024 report's more balanced picture, reinforcing the shift away from digital content being the sole responsibility (72% of parliaments in 2020). Notably, no parliament relies on an outside agency in 2026.

The Speaker has a formal role in setting digital communication priorities in 37% of parliaments, up from 27% in 2024. The data suggests a trend towards a leadership-driven model in developing and lower-income institutions, and a professionally delegated model in digitally mature, higher-income parliaments.


The Speaker's involvement varies significantly by geography and maturity. They are most likely involved in the Pacific (60%), Asia (50%) and the Middle East and North Africa (50%), and least likely in the Americas (31%) and Europe (22%). They are substantially more involved in lower-maturity parliaments: 48% in tier 3 versus 26% in tier 1.

These patterns reflect differing approaches. In developing and lower-income parliaments with limited digital resources, the Speaker is more likely to drive the digital communications strategy – and without executive political will and the Speaker's authority, digital transformation may not occur. By contrast, in mature, higher-income parliaments (particularly in Europe), digital governance is professionally delegated to specialists, and the Speaker remains removed from operational decisions. Notably, parliaments with professionally delegated models tend to score higher on overall digital maturity, suggesting that institutionalized, specialism-led models are more effective than leadership-dependent approaches.

Digital media

Digital media platforms remain central to parliaments' engagement with the public. Overall adoption is broad, with websites and social media approaching near-universality at 98% and 97% respectively. Live-streaming through third-party platforms is also well established at 85%. Radio continues a downward trend seen throughout this series, falling from 29% in 2024 to 23%.

Figure 29. Digital media for communicating with the public



Regional patterns reveal different digital media strategies. The Americas shows the highest overall breadth, with strong instant messaging (75%), broadcast TV and radio (75–80%), and video archives (93%). European parliaments favour web TV (82%) and video archives (97%) but rarely adopt broadcast radio (18%) or instant messaging (46%), reflecting a shift towards asynchronous, web-based delivery. Asian parliaments report universal live-streaming yet low broadcast radio (25%) and TV (50%). Sub-Saharan Africa presents a striking "digital leapfrog" pattern: high live-streaming adoption (88%) but low web TV (25%), with 38% planning to adopt it. This suggests parliaments are adopting third-party platforms such as YouTube rather than building proprietary infrastructure. The Middle East and North Africa leads in instant messaging (83%), while Pacific region parliaments show the lowest breadth with website adoption at 80%, broadcast radio at 25% and web TV at 50%.

Engaging younger voters through social media

Recognizing the need to engage first-time and younger voters ahead of the 2024 elections, the Parliament of Austria launched a modern multimedia newsroom and an official TikTok channel. To address institutional concerns regarding TikTok's data privacy practices, it employs a standalone smartphone disconnected from parliament's core IT infrastructure.

Income level demonstrates a clear gradient. Low-income parliaments average four media types, with web TV (20%) and video archives (25%) as major gaps; 43% plan to adopt instant messaging, the highest planning rate. Lower-middle-income parliaments average five types, with video archives (53%) and web TV (29%) lagging behind. Upper-middle-income and high-income parliaments both average just over five types but employ markedly different strategies: upper-middle-income parliaments lead in instant messaging (90%) and broadcast radio (69%), while high-income parliaments dominate in web TV (84%) and video archives (98%), showing notably low instant messaging (57%) and radio usage (25%).

Parliament size correlates with media diversity. Large parliaments average six types, with strong broadcast TV (90%), web TV (83%) and video archive adoption (90%). Medium-sized parliaments perform particularly well on web TV (68%) and live-streaming (95%). Small parliaments lag behind at only 44% for broadcast radio and web TV.

Breadth of media adoption correlates directly with digital maturity. The least digitally mature parliaments average three types of digital media, with under half employing live-streaming and none using web TV. Adoption expands through tier 2, reaching five types by decile 5. Within tier 2, decile 6 stands out, with high instant messaging (91%) and broadcast TV (100%) adoption. Web TV peaks in deciles 7–8, while broadcast radio remains consistently low throughout.

Notable exceptions reveal the complex relationship between resources and strategy. Several high-income parliaments rely on only two or three media types despite their capacity. These are predominantly small parliaments, suggesting size is a stronger predictor of diversity than income alone. Conversely, some low-income parliaments adopted six types, demonstrating that ambitious digital strategies are achievable across income levels. The largest growth opportunities lie in video archives (14 parliaments planning), web TV (11 planning), and broadcast TV or radio (10 planning), concentrated among low- and lower-middle-income countries.

Website content

Parliamentary websites offer a wide range of content, with most categories showing high adoption rates. On average, websites provided 13 of the 15 content areas surveyed. The highest adoption rates were for a list of MPs (99%), information about parliamentary committees, commissions and other non-plenary bodies (98%), and details of parliamentary leadership (97%). Information about the functions, composition and activities of parliament was also widely available at 95%, as were details about the history and role of parliament (93%) and the administration of parliament (81%).

Parliamentary processes remain well documented on most websites. An explanation of the legislative process was available on 77% of parliamentary websites, while charts or diagrams showing how parliamentary business is conducted appeared on 47%. Information about the budget and public financing processes was less frequently provided, at 49%. The full text of standing orders, rules of procedure or similar rule-setting documents was available on 89% of websites, and explanations of parliamentary terms, procedures and routine order of business on 76%.

Transparency regarding website operation and parliamentary contact information varies more widely. About 65% of websites explained their ownership, management and update policy. Contact information for questions about parliament itself was provided on 83% of websites, while contact information for website-related queries appeared on 77%. Information about visiting parliament was available on 89% of websites, reflecting continued public interest in physical parliamentary engagement.

Table 28. Website content areas

Content area	%
Visiting parliament	89%
History and role of parliament	93%
Functions, composition and activities	95%
Parliamentary leadership	97%
Parliamentary committees, commissions and other non-plenary bodies	98%
List of MPs	99%
Explanation of parliamentary terms, procedures and routine order of business	76%
Full text of the standing orders, rules of procedure or similar rule-setting documents	89%
Chart or diagram showing how the business of parliament is conducted	47%
Explanation of the legislative process	77%
Explanation of the budget and public financing processes	49%
Administration of parliament	81%
About the website (who owns it, manages it, update policy, etc.)	65%
Whom to contact for questions about the operation of the website	77%
Whom to contact for questions about parliament	83%

Publishing parliamentary business

Parliaments publish a wide range of documentation relating to their work online. Fifty-six per cent publish digital content in more than one language and three quarters (75%) take steps to ensure that their digital content is accessible to persons living with disabilities.

The most widely published information is the schedule of parliamentary business (94%), followed by the activities of committees, commissions and other non-plenary bodies (86%), audio or video from plenary meetings (85%), and the text of all enacted legislation (80%). Parliamentary questions and government responses are published by 67% of parliaments, while audio or video from committee meetings is less frequently available, at 60%.

Table 29. Publishing parliamentary business

Content area	%
Schedule of parliamentary business	94%
Text and status of draft legislation	77%
Text of all enacted legislation	80%
Parliamentary questions and government responses	67%
Activities of committees, commissions and other non-plenary bodies	86%
Audio or video from plenary meetings	85%
Audio or video from committee meetings	60%

High-income parliaments publish across all categories at consistently higher rates, with 86% publishing draft legislation and 68% publishing audio or video from committee meetings. Low-income parliaments, despite limited numbers in the survey, publish legislative text and activities information at 88% and 63% respectively, although parliamentary questions (63%) and committee audio or video (25%) are less frequently available.

Regional patterns reveal notable differences. Parliaments in the Americas and Europe publish more comprehensively than those in other regions. The former stands out for publishing activities of committees, commissions and other non-plenary bodies (94%) and audio or video from plenary meetings (100%). European parliaments are similarly strong across most categories, particularly parliamentary questions and government responses (82%) and draft legislation (91%). Asia also publishes draft legislation widely (70%) and audio or video from plenary meetings (70%). By contrast, the Middle East and North Africa region shows lower publication of draft legislation (60%) and particularly low publication of audio or video from committee meetings (10%). Sub-Saharan Africa similarly lags behind on draft legislation (59%) and parliamentary questions (52%). The Pacific region shows the most variable pattern, with strong live plenary publication (90%) but weak draft legislation publication (30%).

Parliament size correlates with publishing breadth. Large parliaments publish across all categories at high rates, including 83% for draft legislation and 74% for committee audio or video. Medium-sized parliaments show broadly similar patterns, although slightly lower for draft legislation (75%) and committee materials (57%). Small parliaments lag behind on draft legislation (71%) and committee audio or video (53%), although they maintain strong coverage of parliamentary business schedules (90%) and plenary sessions (82%).

Most parliaments publish their important documentation ahead of time and there are marginal improvements in the overall efficiency of this since the last report. For plenary agendas, 42% of parliaments publish at least one week in advance, while a further 32% publish at least two days ahead. A smaller share (19%) publish on the day of the sitting, and only 4% do so afterwards. Committee agendas follow a similar pattern, with 38% publishing at least one week in advance and 36% at least two days ahead, although 10% do not publish at all. Draft legislation shows greater variation: 49% of parliaments publish at least one week in advance, yet only 13% publish at least two days ahead, and 11% publish on the day of introduction. Ten per cent publish after the fact and a further 16% do not publish draft legislation at all.

Table 30. Timeliness of publication before a session

Time frame for publication	Plenary agendas	Committee agendas	Draft legislation
At least one week before action	42%	38%	49%
At least two days before action	32%	36%	13%
Same day of action	19%	10%	11%
After action taken	4%	4%	10%
Not available	3%	13%	16%

Parliaments increasingly publish their proceedings promptly online and only 3% do not publish them. Seventy-eight per cent of parliaments publish plenary proceedings within one day of the session, with 53% doing so on the same day. A further 15% publish within one week. For plenary voting records, the picture is less encouraging and, while 53% publish on the same day, 21% do not publish voting records online at all, a significant gap in transparency. Committee proceedings show similar patterns to plenary sessions, with 62% publishing within one day (36% same day, 26% within one day), although 23% do not publish online. Committee voting records present the starkest challenge: only 43% of parliaments publish within one day (28% same day, 15% within one day) and 41% do not make them available online, indicating a major transparency gap at committee level for many parliaments.

Table 31. Timeliness of publication after a session

	Plenary proceedings	Plenary voting record	Committee proceedings	Committee voting record
Same day of action	53%	53%	36%	28%
One day after action taken	25%	17%	26%	15%
One week after action taken	14%	4%	16%	8%
More than one week after action taken	11%	3%	4%	3%
Not available	3%	21%	23%	41%

Open data publishing

Open data publishing has become increasingly widespread among parliaments. Ninety-two per cent of parliaments now publish open data, representing strong institutional commitment to data transparency. PDF remains the dominant format, with 85% of parliaments providing documents in this format. While PDFs were traditionally difficult to parse automatically, recent advances in AI and extraction tools have made them considerably more usable for data reuse and reformatting. Nevertheless, structured formats such as XML and JSON remain preferable for large-scale automated analysis and integration. Parliaments relying solely on PDFs are encouraged to investigate more appropriate, machine-readable formats to maximize the utility and accessibility of their data.


Table 32. Open data publishing technology

	Yes	Planning
PDF	85%	6%
Searchable text	57%	20%
Downloadable spreadsheet	44%	17%
Downloadable XML	34%	18%
API	27%	20%
Unspecified	2%	0%
JSON	1%	0%
ePub	1%	0%

Searchable text is the next most common format, used by 57% of parliaments, with a further 20% planning or considering it. Downloadable spreadsheets are provided by 44%, although 22% of parliaments do not offer this format and a further 17% are still considering it. More advanced formats show lower adoption: 34% of parliaments offer downloadable XML files, with 25% having no plans to adopt it; 27% provide APIs, with 32% having no intention to do so; and JSON and electronic publication (ePub) remain marginal, each used by only 1% of parliaments with no parliaments planning to adopt them. This suggests that open data publishing has reached a plateau, with growth concentrated in foundational formats rather than more sophisticated machine-readable options.


Digital maturity strongly predicts open data adoption. The lowest-maturity parliaments (decile 1) adopt searchable text and downloadable spreadsheets at minimal rates (8% each) and lack XML and API provision entirely, although 42% provide PDFs. Adoption rises gradually through tiers 2 and 3, with most formats remaining below 50%. A sharp acceleration occurs at decile 7 onwards: 77% of decile 7 parliaments provide searchable text and 46% offer APIs, rising to 91% and 55% respectively in decile 9. The highest-maturity parliaments (decile 10) lead substantially, with 92% providing searchable text, 92% downloadable spreadsheets, and 83% APIs. Notably, PDF adoption remains universally high across all deciles (82–100%), whereas JSON and ePub are rare throughout. This pattern suggests that growth in open data is organic, as parliaments upgrade their underlying technology platforms in line with their broader digitalization journey rather than proactively seeking standalone open data opportunities.

Figure 30. Open data publishing technology by decile



When parliaments do publish open data, 86% make it available through their own website or data portal. A smaller share (27%) make data available on request via their website or data portal, while 17% release data through government or national open data portals. Very few parliaments (3%) use external organizations such as parliamentary monitoring organizations to distribute their data, indicating limited coordination with civil society partners in the open data ecosystem.

Figure 31. Where open data is published



User-centred open data platforms

The Brazilian Chamber of Deputies recognized that simply publishing open data was insufficient; they needed to tailor digital platforms to meet user needs. They developed a separate, less formal website specifically to showcase open data in accessible formats (XLSX (Excel Open XML Spreadsheet), CSV (Comma Separated Values), XML, JSON), designed for both non-programmers and technical users. To ensure genuine user engagement, the Chamber hosted hackathons and programming challenges to gather feedback on data usability and established a GitHub presence to communicate directly with software developers, enabling developers to build citizen-facing applications presenting legislative information from different perspectives.

Future trends for digital content

Parliaments plan to deploy AI for real-time transcription, AI-powered chatbots for citizen engagement, intelligent search and natural language processing, automated content generation for social media, and AI-driven sign language interpretation and multilingual translation. The common goal is reducing manual processing while expanding access and improving the user experience.

Website redesign and accessibility are foundational. Nearly all parliaments report planned improvements incorporating modern design, improved navigation, mobile responsiveness, and Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) compliance. Enhancements include assistive technologies, plain-language content, video transcripts and subtitles, and sign language interpretation. Several are migrating to new content management systems to facilitate these improvements.

The European Parliament's Digital Accessibility Competence Centre

The European Parliament's approach is based on accessibility having a senior mandate and leadership. It is embedded into procurement decisions from the outset, and training tailored to specific roles: editors and designers need different skills from developers.

The parliament includes staff with lived experience of disability within the accessibility team, helping to identify real-world barriers that technical teams might overlook. This also sends a clear signal that genuine institutional commitment to accessibility must go beyond compliance.

Open data initiatives are moving from peripheral to core strategy. Parliaments plan to publish data in structured, machine-readable formats (XML, JSON, APIs) rather than PDFs alone, develop dedicated open data portals, and implement data governance frameworks. This shift reflects recognition that structured data enables reuse by researchers, civil society and the media.

Video is expanding as a primary engagement channel. Parliaments plan to expand live-streaming, develop searchable video archives, produce short-form content for social media, and create thematic educational content. Many are moving from external broadcasting dependence to in-house production, reflecting the targeting of younger audiences.

The data shows parliaments moving from publishing-centric models towards more sophisticated engagement models. AI-based tools can enhance citizen input and support a diverse range of user needs through accessibility, multilingualism and multimedia. However, implementation capacity and sustained funding remain concerns for many.

Public engagement


Public engagement is where parliaments can be accountable, transparent and responsive to the needs and concerns of citizens. Actively involving the public in the legislative process allows parliaments to access a wider pool of knowledge and expertise, bringing more diverse perspectives to the debate. This is also important because research elsewhere shows that effective public engagement helps to build trust and confidence in the democratic process, as citizens feel their voices are being heard and that they have a stake in shaping the future. This can lead to increased civic participation and a more resilient democracy.

Table 33. DMI: Top 15 ranking of parliaments in public engagement

Country	Digital Maturity Index	Governance and strategy	Infrastructure	Parliamentary systems	Supporting users in parliament	Digital content and publishing	Public engagement	Artificial intelligence
Austria	9	7	9	6	9	8	10	7
Bahrain – Shura Council	10	10	9	10	9	10	10	10
Brazil – Chamber of Deputies	10	10	10	10	9	10	10	10
Burundi – Senate	5	4	3	5	5	6	10	9
European Parliament	10	10	10	4	10	10	10	10
Fiji	8	10	9	4	5	9	9	5
Finland	10	6	9	9	10	10	9	7
France – Senate	10	7	8	9	5	7	9	10
Malawi	3	6	2	5	4	8	10	4
Paraguay – Chamber of Deputies	9	9	7	4	5	9	10	5
Republic of Korea	10	8	9	10	9	10	10	10
Slovakia	9	8	9	10	9	10	9	7
Tanzania (United Republic of)	7	10	8	7	9	5	10	7
Ukraine	9	8	5	7	9	9	9	9
Zimbabwe	7	9	7	5	2	7	10	8

Despite the well-documented benefits of strong public engagement, fewer than half of respondents to this survey have a formal strategy for online public participation (48%). Only 53% have digital educational and outreach resources to support engagement. This suggests that, while some parliaments recognize the importance of engaging the public online, many have yet to develop a comprehensive approach. Parliaments have rarely developed a public engagement strategy that effectively combines online and in-person activities and considers their ability to engage with all sectors of society. The lack of a formal strategy in many parliaments suggests resource constraints, limited internal expertise or limited recognition of the importance of online engagement.

Figure 32. Digital engagement strategy and resources by decile



Strategic governance and responsibility for public participation

Public engagement strategies are developed through distributed responsibility. In 6 out of 10 parliaments (60%), the secretary general is involved in setting strategic objectives for public participation, while the Speaker is involved in 47% and members directly in only 18%. However, the data point to an important distinction: where public participation remains embedded within communications functions (46% of parliaments) rather than being treated as a strategic responsibility, parliaments risk remaining in broadcast mode rather than developing genuine two-way engagement. This suggests that many parliaments lack the institutional conditions necessary for meaningful public dialogue. The prevalence of communication-centric approaches indicates that engagement is often seen as a dissemination tool rather than as a democratic practice requiring specialist expertise and sustained commitment.

Responsibility varies significantly by digital maturity and resource level. Regional variations are also pronounced. Fifty-six per cent of parliaments in the Americas and 53% in Europe have a formal strategy for online public participation, versus only 20% in the Pacific. The latter fares better in terms of digital educational and outreach resources (40%), ahead of Asia (30%), but lagging behind the Middle East and North Africa (70%) and Europe (58%). These disparities reflect broader patterns of digital investment and institutional capacity: wealthier, larger parliaments tend to have more developed strategic frameworks, while resource-constrained institutions often lack the formal governance structures that enable systematic engagement.

Half of all parliaments (50%) said they specifically employed digital-based methods to communicate with young people, with a further 23% planning or considering this approach. This focus on youth engagement reflects growing recognition that digital channels are essential for reaching younger audiences and for strengthening democratic participation among first-time voters. However, the concentration of these efforts in only half of parliaments suggests significant variation in strategic priorities across institutions.

Table 34. Responsibility for defining strategic objectives for public participation

	%
Secretary general	60%
Speaker	47%
Director of communications	46%
Parliamentary committee	21%
Specially designated committee or group	21%
CIO/ICT director	20%
Members	18%
Other	17%

Resourcing public participation

The survey reveals important insights into the specialist staff employed by parliaments to manage and promote public access and engagement. Overall, 84% of parliaments said they had specialist staff for outreach and education, 71% for public engagement and 49% for helping the public make use of open data. This represents notable increases across all three categories since 2024, with the most significant growth in open data utilization – a rise of 17 percentage points. The expansion of specialist roles suggests growing institutional recognition that public engagement requires dedicated expertise and sustained investment.

However, significant disparities persist across regions and income levels. Parliaments in high-income countries continue to lead in open data utilization (58%). Europe leads all regions in this area (66%), while sub-Saharan Africa remains the lowest at 41%. The regional picture for outreach and education is dominated by Europe (94%) and sub-Saharan Africa (91%), while Asia lags behind considerably at 71%. For public engagement staffing, the Americas stands out with 94% of parliaments reporting having specialist staff, nearly double the proportion in Asia (43%).

Just 36% of small parliaments have specialist staff in this area, compared with 52% of medium-sized parliaments and 72% of large parliaments. This reflects both the resource constraints of smaller institutions and the greater technical complexity of open data systems. Outreach and education staffing is more evenly distributed across parliament sizes, ranging from 86% in small parliaments to 78% in large ones, suggesting that engagement foundations are more universally prioritized. This divergence indicates that while most parliaments are investing in basic outreach capacity, only larger, better-resourced institutions can afford the technical expertise required for sophisticated open data management.

Digital maturity strongly predicts resource allocation for public engagement. The most digitally mature parliaments (decile 10) have universal provision of specialist staff across all three functions – 100% for both outreach and education, and open data. Conversely, the least digitally mature parliaments (decile 1) show considerable variability, with only 17% having open data staff and 67% having public engagement staff. This suggests a self-reinforcing pattern: parliaments with the capacity to invest in engagement infrastructure continue to enhance those capabilities, while lower-capacity institutions struggle to develop the necessary expertise.


Table 35. Specialist staff to manage public participation

	%
Outreach and education	84%
Public engagement	71%
Making use of open data	49%

Barriers to effective participation

Parliaments were asked to identify barriers to public engagement online. Seventy-four per cent of respondents identified at least one such barrier, down from 81% in 2024. This improvement suggests that global progress is being made in addressing some foundational obstacles to digital engagement. However, significant disparities persist between well-resourced and developing countries. The most common barriers across all parliaments were citizens lacking the skills and training to use the tools that parliament provides (33%) and a lack of access to the internet (35%). Additionally, feeling overwhelmed with the quantity of communication received has emerged as a significant challenge, cited by 33% of parliaments – a substantial increase from 20% in 2024. Just over one fifth (21%) of parliaments reported being unable to trust the authenticity of the communications they received, and 15% said they were concerned that what they heard through online engagement was unrepresentative of the wider public.

Figure 33. Barriers to online participation



Throughout this report, the data highlights significant differences between well-resourced parliaments and those from developing countries. Nowhere is this truer than in public participation. For instance, 88% of parliaments in low-income countries reported a lack of access to the internet for citizens as a barrier to public participation, yet only 11% of those in high-income countries saw this as a challenge – a persistent and significant gap. Similarly, while internet access was not cited as a barrier by any of the European parliaments surveyed, 78% of parliaments in sub-Saharan Africa reported it as a challenge. This disparity in infrastructure is further underscored by concerns about outdated technology: 75% of low-income parliaments identified this as a barrier, compared with just 9% of high-income parliaments. This reflects a fundamental reality: digital participation requires reliable infrastructure as a precondition.

Barriers relating to digital literacy have also changed since 2024. While 56% of parliaments in sub-Saharan Africa identified a lack of digital skills among citizens as a barrier, this was true of only 9% of European parliaments. In the Americas, where 60% of parliaments cite this challenge, the barrier is more pronounced than in 2024. Conversely, high-income parliaments are now more likely to report feeling overwhelmed with the quantity of communication (41%) than to worry about citizens' lack of skills (13%). This divergence is revealing: parliaments in developed countries are managing problems of engagement success (too much communication), while those in developing countries struggle with foundational infrastructure and literacy challenges.

Small parliaments are significantly more vulnerable to infrastructure-related barriers: 50% report lack of internet access and 43% report lack of citizen skills, compared with 16% and 16% respectively among large parliaments. Security and trust in technology are also a more acute concerns for small parliaments (39%), suggesting that resource constraints may limit their ability to implement robust digital security measures. These findings underscore that engagement barriers are not equally distributed: smaller institutions, those in developing regions, and those with limited capacity face compounding challenges that require targeted support.

This picture highlights the fact that using digital tools to promote greater public engagement with parliament is easier when a nation is digitally connected and has high levels of digital literacy. Parliaments in developing countries, as well as in other countries facing connectivity challenges, poor infrastructure and lower levels of digital literacy, will find it harder to engage the public online. However, the overall decline in barriers since 2024 suggests that progress is being made in addressing some of the foundational obstacles.

Use of digital tools for engaging the public

Parliaments use a wide range of digital tools to reach the public and encourage greater participation. Social media dominates public engagement channels, with 92% of parliaments using it to engage citizens – close to universal adoption. E-petitions, the second-most common tool, are used by only 35% of parliaments, with 33% planning or considering adoption. Dedicated smartphone apps remain underutilized at 27%, although notably 35% of parliaments are planning or considering this approach, suggesting growing interest in app-based engagement. The concentration of adoption around social media, combined with the limited uptake of specialist tools such as e-consultation (30% on bills, 23% on issues) and online discussion groups (12%), reveals a strategy gap: while parliaments have embraced the most accessible digital channel, they have invested less in tools designed specifically for genuine public dialogue and consultation.

Table 36. Digital methods of public engagement

	Using	Planning
Alerting services	27%	22%
Blogs	13%	20%
E-consultation on bills	30%	29%
E-consultation on issues	23%	34%
E-petitions	35%	33%
Mainstream media	19%	13%
Instant messaging	26%	15%
Online discussion groups	12%	19%
Online polls	13%	26%
Smartphone app	27%	35%
Social media	92%	2%

This pattern reflects both strategic choice and capacity constraints. Social media offers low-cost, wide reach with minimal infrastructure investment, making it accessible to all parliaments regardless of size or resources. Specialist consultation and engagement tools, by contrast, require greater technical capacity, moderation resources and sustained institutional commitment. Regional variations are pronounced. The use of social media is near-universal in regional distribution, ranging between 90% and 100%. However, e-petitions show significant regional variations: half of all European parliaments use them, but only 10% do so in the Pacific and 11% in the Middle East and North Africa. E-consultation tools show similarly stark regional divergence, with the Americas leading at 57% while the Pacific region does not use them at all. Use of these tools also shows a strong correlation with digital maturity: social media is evenly distributed across parliaments but dedicated digital tools for consultation are much more likely to be found in higher-decile parliaments.


Moderating live dialogue in the Finnish Parliament

The Parliament of Finland hosted "Ask the Speaker" Facebook live sessions allowing citizens to submit questions before and during 30-minute broadcasts. Engagement regularly reached 4,500 participants. A small team of four – the Speaker, two moderators and an assistant – managed live discussion using strict pre-existing moderation guidelines prohibiting hate speech, threats and external links. This approach sustains large-scale citizen-to-representative dialogue while maintaining a respectful, secure environment. The experience demonstrates that transparent, rigid moderation protocols can enable direct engagement at scale without requiring disproportionate staffing investment.

The most significant engagement opportunity emerging from the data is the limited use of dedicated smartphone apps: only 27% of parliaments have them, yet 55% of decile 10 parliaments have adopted them, demonstrating that the most digitally mature institutions recognize their value. Only 4% of decile 1 parliaments have dedicated apps, showing a sharp fall across the maturity spectrum. This suggests that smartphone app adoption represents an area of significant growth potential, particularly for parliaments seeking to reach younger or more digitally native audiences (noting issues of cost for the end-user).

Half of all parliaments (50%) specifically employ digital-based methods to communicate with young people, and a further 23% are planning or considering this.

Figure 34. Use of digital tools to communicate with young people



Use of digital tools for committee engagement

In terms of committees, 79% of parliaments said they used a website to communicate with citizens. This represents a decline from 91% in 2024, although it remains the most widely adopted channel. There has been sustained growth in the use of social media, which rose from 35% in 2018 to 45% in 2020 and to 70% in 2024. The 63% figure reported for 2026 represents some consolidation rather than continued expansion. This suggests that social media adoption for committee engagement has stabilized at a high level, with further growth unlikely without significant strategic drivers or changes in platform adoption patterns.

Table 37. Use of digital tools by committees

	Website	Email	Social media	App
Communicating information about their work, scope and process	79%	41%	63%	13%
Communicating the committee's position on issues	58%	29%	48%	8%
Seeking submissions, comments and opinions	44%	42%	37%	4%
Directly involving members of the public	38%	20%	33%	4%
Responding to submissions and comments received	26%	43%	30%	3%
Publishing the findings or results of the committee	73%	31%	40%	11%

The most common purposes reported by parliaments for using digital tools for committees were to communicate information about the work, scope and process of a committee (79%), and to publish the outcomes of committee work (73%). Social media remains the second-most common digital medium for committees, now used by 63% of respondents, followed by email (41%). Only 13% of parliaments said they used mobile apps to communicate information about committees, showing modest growth from 11% in 2024. This concentration on publishing and information dissemination over interactive engagement reflects a publishing-oriented approach to committee transparency.

Fewer parliaments use websites and social media to interact and engage directly with the public (38% for websites and 33% for social media). Forty-four per cent of parliaments reported using websites to seek submissions and comments, while 37% said they used social media for this purpose. Notably, 42% of parliaments use email for responding to submissions and comments – significantly higher than the 2024 baseline (29%) – and only 4% use apps. This shift suggests that, while parliaments are expanding their use of digital channels, they continue to favour email for direct, asynchronous dialogue with the public. The reliance on email for response indicates that many parliaments are managing engagement through familiar, lower-cost tools rather than investing in more sophisticated platforms.

Analysing public submissions and impact assessment

Data on the effectiveness of engagement efforts remains limited. Only 32% of parliaments have conducted assessments of the impact of their digital communications with citizens. When asked about methods for analysing public submissions, most parliaments reported no use of specialized tools. The predominant approach is manual analysis: staff and committee secretaries read and summarize submissions, identify key arguments and stakeholder positions and present these to members, with minimal use of systematic qualitative analysis.

A second tier of parliaments employ basic digital tools such as spreadsheets, content categorization and standard web analytics, often through citizen engagement platforms for collecting submissions. A small group are piloting AI tools to analyse public responses and examples include sentiment analysis, using AI to process reactions gathered via "opinion-sharing" platforms and AI tools to assess media content from online citizen events. Many parliaments emphasize that while they do not yet use advanced tools or AI, they are evaluating possibilities, planning projects or considering implementation alongside broader digital parliamentary developments. Some parliaments also report using alternative mechanisms for understanding public views, such as citizen initiative platforms, virtual parliament tools, hearings with experts and opinion surveys.

Parliaments report being held back from adopting more advanced analytical tools by technology infrastructure constraints or security concerns. This suggests that the adoption of sophisticated public engagement analytics is not simply a matter of strategic choice but depends on foundational infrastructure capacity. For many parliaments, particularly those with limited technical resources, the current reliance on manual analysis represents a reasonable approach given institutional constraints, although it limits the depth of understanding they can achieve.

Working with external organizations

Many parliaments recognize that working with CSOs extends their reach and impact. Seventy per cent of parliaments work with CSOs – such as parliamentary monitoring organizations – to improve access to parliamentary activities and open data. Forty-seven per cent work directly with such organizations; 23% informally support them. This relationship is strongest in sub-Saharan Africa (82% in total, 67% formally) and the Americas (66% in total, 53% formally). Europe shows a higher total (72%), but this is more likely to be informal (41%) than formal (31%), perhaps reflecting greater internal capacity to manage engagement directly.

The most digitally mature parliaments prefer informal arrangements (again, perhaps because of greater internal capacity), while mid-maturity parliaments are more strongly focused on formal relationships to expand parliamentary reach and share data. This pattern suggests that, for lower-maturity parliaments, formalized partnerships with CSOs offer a scaling mechanism that compensates for limited internal resources.

Table 38. Parliaments working with CSOs by region

	Americas	Asia	Europe	Middle East and North Africa	Pacific	Sub-Saharan Africa
Works directly with CSOs	53%	50%	31%	50%	40%	67%
Informally supports CSOs	13%	0%	41%	20%	20%	15%

Formalizing civil society participation in legislation

The Assembly of People's Representatives of Tunisia has a comprehensive digital platform enabling direct interaction between CSOs and elected representatives. It provides dedicated spaces for citizens to submit opinions and proposals on draft legislation in progress. Notably, CSOs can submit legislative proposals that, if endorsed by a minimum of 10 members, become official parliamentary initiatives. This approach moves beyond information broadcasting to embed citizen participation in the legislative process itself. The platform shows how parliaments can institutionalize civil society engagement through purpose-built digital infrastructure, creating formal pathways for citizen input to influence parliamentary work.

Lessons learned from experience

Parliaments were asked what lessons they had learned over the last two years about how to engage the public with parliamentary work. The responses cluster around a small set of recurring themes, highlighting both the promise and the limits of digital communication channels. Many parliaments report that live-streaming, social media, short-form video and other online tools have significantly improved access to and visibility of parliamentary work, particularly among younger audiences. However, they consistently stress that greater visibility does not automatically translate into deeper understanding or meaningful participation. Broadcasting alone does not create engagement: sustained effort to develop genuine two-way communication is required.

Across the responses, there is a strong emphasis on communication that is clear, simple and story-driven. Parliaments note that engagement improves when parliamentary work is explained in plain language, supported by visual formats – such as infographics, short clips and graphical summaries – and framing through narrative techniques that focus on people, issues and impacts rather than procedure. Conversely, long unedited sittings, dense text and technical or institutional jargon are barriers that suppress interest and exclude citizens. This learning suggests a maturation in parliamentary communications as institutions move away from faithful reproduction of proceedings towards deliberately edited, accessible content designed for non-specialist audiences.

A further theme concerns the need for targeted, inclusive and hybrid approaches. Several parliaments report that segmenting audiences – such as children, young people, persons with disabilities, rural or socioeconomically deprived communities, retirees and migrant communities – and tailoring channels and formats accordingly yields better results than "one-size-fits-all" strategies. Hybrid models that combine in-person workshops with digital tools, including videoconferencing and email, are effective in widening participation, if communication is timely, staff are trained and potential participants have sufficient notice. This reflects recognition that different publics have different communication needs and preferences.

Many responses highlight persistent inequalities in access and digital literacy. The digital divide is driven by weak infrastructure, the cost of data and uneven skills in using online tools – all structural constraints that limit who can participate in digital engagement initiatives. Some parliaments also point to citizens' difficulties in using participation platforms and to the need for more dynamic, didactic mechanisms to explain parliamentary work in diverse cultural contexts. These observations underscore that digital engagement initiatives, while valuable, cannot overcome foundational inequalities in connectivity and literacy without complementary offline engagement strategies.

Trust and information integrity form another concern. Several parliaments describe how low public trust, misinformation and confusion between parliament and government shape how engagement efforts are received, sometimes leading well-meant initiatives to be met with scepticism. Social media is seen as both indispensable and risky: while it amplifies reach and interaction, it also exposes institutions to bots, abusive behaviour, changing platform rules and security threats. In response, parliaments stress the importance of active moderation, monitoring and cybersecurity, alongside timely countering of misinformation. This reflects the dual nature of social media: a powerful tool for reaching citizens, yet one that requires substantial institutional investment in safeguards and moderation.

Finally, the responses underline that meaningful engagement depends on dialogue, institutional capacity and long-term citizenship education. Parliaments distinguish between generating a high volume of interactions and fostering serious exchanges that feed into policymaking, arguing that feedback mechanisms, public hearings, consultations and petitions are essential ways to build a sense of ownership over decisions. Internal factors – such as additional education officers, new digital communications units, cross-media newsrooms and better coordination between parliamentary services – are reported to enhance the timeliness and quality of outreach, whereas resource constraints and fragmented adoption of tools limit its impact. Many institutions therefore place civic education programmes in schools and partnerships with universities and civil society at the heart of their engagement

strategies, seeing them as crucial to demystifying parliamentary work, strengthening democratic culture and rebuilding public trust. This represents engagement addressing the core cultural and educational foundations of democratic participation.

Artificial intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming parliamentary operations, raising both opportunities and governance challenges. This is the first issue of the *World e-Parliament Report* series to assess AI adoption across parliaments in detail. This section will examine the governance structures being developed to manage AI, where AI is being deployed, and the barriers and opportunities parliaments face as they move from experimentation to deployment. It reveals a proliferation of AI tools – particularly generative AI – which has outpaced governance frameworks.


Table 39. DMI: Top 15 ranking of parliaments in AI

Country	Digital Maturity Index	Governance and strategy	Infrastructure	Parliamentary systems	Supporting users in parliament	Digital content and publishing	Public engagement	Artificial intelligence
Bahrain – Council of Representatives	8	7	7	8	7	3	9	9
Bahrain – Shura Council	10	10	9	10	9	10	10	10
Brazil – Chamber of Deputies	10	10	10	10	9	10	10	10
Brazil – Federal Senate	10	7	6	10	6	10	8	10
Canada – House of Commons	9	10	9	10	7	7	6	9
Chile – Chamber of Deputies	10	9	10	10	7	10	8	10
European Parliament	10	10	10	4	10	10	10	10
France – Senate	10	7	8	9	5	7	9	10
Germany – Bundesrat	5	1	5	2	2	6	2	10
Germany – German Bundestag	7	10	5	5	3	6	4	9
Ireland	10	10	10	8	9	8	8	9
Mauritius	8	7	8	6	9	7	3	10
Morocco – House of Representatives	9	9	8	9	4	5	9	9
Republic of Korea	10	8	9	10	9	10	10	10
Ukraine	9	8	5	7	9	9	9	9

Growth of AI in parliament

Eighty-eight per cent of parliaments now use AI in some form, yet only 48% have reported formal institutional adoption. While 78% of staff and 61% of members use AI, this represents a 30–40-percentage-point gap between actual use and formal recognition. It suggests tools being adopted faster by end-users than parliaments' governance frameworks can manage them.

Figure 35. Growth of AI adoption, 2020–2026



Staff often use AI without formal approval, which creates risks around data protection, confidentiality and quality. The 17% of parliaments that are unaware of member AI use reflects institutional blindness to technology diffusion and suggests adoption strategies are urgently needed. Parliaments need pragmatic frameworks, acknowledging current usage, creating legitimate pathways and establishing boundaries with clear reasoning. Prohibition is unrealistic, driving activity underground.

Table 40. Use of AI in parliament

Using AI?	At the institutional level	Ad hoc use by members	Ad hoc use by staff
Yes	48%	61%	78%
No	36%	13%	10%
Don't know	8%	17%	3%

Adoption patterns vary across parliament size. Large parliaments report near-universal staff usage (95%) but lag behind on institutional adoption (50%); medium-sized parliaments lead formal adoption at 65%. Members in small parliaments use AI most (61%) despite the lowest institutional adoption (33%), suggesting individual exploration runs ahead of formal oversight.

Regional differences are sharp. The Middle East and North Africa leads institutional adoption (70%), followed by Europe (60%); the Americas (38%) and Asia (10%) lag behind significantly, yet staff usage in Asia remains at 70%. The Pacific shows the widest gap: 78% staff adoption against only 33% institutional.


Low-income parliaments report the highest ad hoc staff usage (88%), matching high-income levels at 85%. Tool access is not the constraint; institutional capacity to formalize and govern use is.

Digital maturity is the strongest predictor: institutional adoption ranges from 83% (decile 10) to 0% (decile 1), with a sharp drop-off below decile 7. Even decile 1 parliaments report 75% staff usage despite zero institutional adoption. The most digitally mature parliaments (tier 1) cluster around 80–90% adoption.

Governance structures for AI


Governance of AI remains fragmented and unevenly distributed across parliaments. The 2026 data reveals emerging governance activity, but this remains concentrated in larger, wealthier institutions. Board-level oversight and steering committees are the most common formal structures, present in 32% and 28% of parliaments respectively. Yet formal AI policy documents exist in only 24% of parliaments, and designated AI coordinators in just 15%. Most strikingly, external ethics committees or advisory bodies – key mechanisms for addressing the ethical dimensions of AI deployment – are found in only 5% of parliaments.

Figure 36. AI usage and policy/strategy in place by decile



Nearly half (49%) of all parliaments are planning or considering governance structures, suggesting momentum, but 14% remain unengaged with governance entirely. With 88% of parliaments using AI in some form, the persistent gap between adoption and governance is a structural risk that demands urgent attention.


Figure 37. Formal governance of AI



The governance gap mirrors the adoption gap: institutions with capacity are establishing structures; those without are not. Large parliaments report board-level oversight at 57%, against 20% of small parliaments; high-income parliaments have structures across multiple mechanisms (42% steering committees, 42% board-level oversight, 38% formal policy documents). Low-income parliaments report 0% across all mechanisms – a critical vulnerability, as those least able to manage AI risks are those without any oversight.

Digital maturity creates the sharpest divide. Decile 10 parliaments have embedded governance at multiple levels: 92% have board-level oversight and steering committees, 58% formal policies and 42% designated coordinators. Below decile 7, these structures collapse: board oversight reaches 0% at decile 6 and remains absent through decile 1, where parliaments are using AI tools with no institutional framework to guide, monitor or evaluate that use.

Figure 38. Formal governance of AI by decile



Europe and the Middle East and North Africa lead regional governance development (44–45% board-level oversight and steering committees); the Americas shows moderate engagement (25–31%). Asia is concerning: 33% of parliaments lack governance planning entirely and none has appointed a designated AI coordinator. Sub-Saharan Africa has the sharpest gap: only 8% have steering committees and 16% board-level oversight, yet 68% are planning or considering governance – recognizing the need but lacking the capacity to act on it.

Even among high-income parliaments with otherwise robust governance structures, only 3.8% have established external ethics committees. Governance is focused on operational dimensions – steering, coordination, policy – while ethical accountability remains largely unaddressed. External ethics oversight provides legitimacy and independent scrutiny that internal governance cannot supply.

Progress since 2024 is evident: the 39% considering governance then has grown to 49% planning or considering in 2026. Yet formal structures – board oversight (32%), steering committees (28%), formal policy (24%) – remain modest relative to 88% adoption. Governance capacity has not scaled with technology deployment.

Governance approaches to AI adoption

No single governance model dominates. Central authority governance is most common (46%), followed by user-centred approaches (42%) and collaborative frameworks (41%). The critical insight, however, is not which approach is most prevalent, but which works at which maturity level. Many parliaments are pursuing governance models mismatched to their institutional capacity.

Central authority governance – strong oversight from parliamentary leadership or the ICT department – dominates in digitally mature parliaments (92% in decile 10, 80–92% across deciles 8–10). It requires mature ICT infrastructure, clear hierarchies and established processes: without these foundations, top-down mandates fail to take root. The approach collapses below decile 7, falling to 31% at decile 6 and 0% at decile 1. Smaller parliaments experience this acutely: 37% report central authority governance against 55% of large ones, and 33% of small parliaments have no process for AI adoption at all.

Table 41. Governance approaches to managing AI adoption

	%
Central authority governance	46%
Internal collaboration within shared framework	41%
Respond to staff/member needs	42%
Establish compliance boundaries first	26%
No process for AI adoption	27%

At decile 7 – the inflection point between higher and lower maturity – user-centred approaches peak at 69% while central authority drops to 46%, reflecting a shift towards grass-roots needs and departmental collaboration as top-down capacity weakens. Yet in very low-maturity contexts (decile 1), user-centred approaches fall to just 10%: without governance frameworks in place, responding to user needs becomes reactive problem-solving rather than strategic design.

The compliance-boundaries-first approach is adopted by only 26% of parliaments overall but shows a clear maturity gradient: absent in decile 1, present in 42–50% of deciles 8–10. Those most capable of establishing safeguards are most likely to do so; those most in need of protection lack the capacity. High-income parliaments adopt compliance-first approaches at 35%; low-income parliaments report 0%, defaulting instead to user responsiveness (50%).

Twenty-seven per cent of parliaments have no process for AI adoption, a figure that rises to 70% at decile 1 and 56% in the Pacific. These institutions have not chosen uncontrolled adoption; rather, they lack the capacity to establish a governance approach. The absence of a process can itself be a symptom of low digital maturity.

Tier 1 parliaments layer multiple approaches simultaneously: decile 10 reports 92% central authority, 67% collaborative frameworks, 58% user-centred design and 42% compliance-first guardrails. Tier 2 parliaments, by contrast, show fragmented patterns with central authority at 27–31% and user-centred approaches vary wildly (7–45%), reflecting experimentation without strategic clarity.

The governance approach a parliament follows must fit its maturity level. Central authority works where institutions have capacity to implement and enforce it; collaborative frameworks suit the transition zone (deciles 6–7), where departments need space to experiment within guardrails; user-centred approaches require basic governance frameworks to be meaningful rather than reactive. Parliaments with no process do not need complex models – they need clear ownership, basic policies and simple decision-making.

Parliaments in tiers 2 and 3 must resist the trap of copying high-maturity governance models. The path forward is iterative: establish lightweight governance, empower collaboration, listen to users, and build capacity for more sophisticated approaches as maturity develops.

Emerging frameworks for responsible AI governance

Parliaments leading in AI maturity treat AI not as a procurement challenge but as a governance imperative requiring formal frameworks, ethical safeguards and democratic oversight.

The Council of Representatives of Bahrain achieved ISO 42001:2023 certification for its AI management systems, establishing governance structures, risk protocols and oversight mechanisms that ensure AI applications operate securely and ethically. The Swiss Parliamentary Library demonstrates a complementary approach centred on user sovereignty: users can switch off AI generation to view source documents alone, and human staff retain final authority on all decisions. The library prioritizes completeness over technical precision – in a democratic context, missing a critical minority opinion is more dangerous than retrieving an irrelevant document.

These examples illustrate the universal principle: AI must function as assisting intelligence, with human oversight remaining mandatory to safeguard democratic accountability.

Application of AI across parliamentary functions

The survey assessed deployment across 21 functional areas. Production and pilot systems are well balanced across all functions (averaging 12% each), indicating that parliamentary AI remains in its formative stages, with most applications yet to transition from pilot to production.

Parliamentary operations show the most maturity. Transcription of proceedings is live in 39% of parliaments (with a further 27% piloting), making it the most-scaled application. Translation services (30% production, 18% pilot) and document summarization (24% production, 19% pilot) follow.

All other functional domains remain predominantly pilot-focused and relatively low in numbers. Tools supporting members' legislative work (legislative research, bill drafting, amendment assistance) average only 8% in production and 10% in pilots – parliaments have not yet found stable approaches for AI-assisted legislative analysis or drafting. Public-facing services show mixed results: accessibility improvements are live (15%) but chatbots for citizen enquiries are far more common in pilot (21%) than production (10%).

Enterprise search and knowledge management tools are piloted in 27% of parliaments but operational in only 11%, suggesting that scaling these systems across large, complex institutions remains challenging.

Table 42. Application of AI across parliamentary functions

Area	Function	In production	Pilot project
Members/ legislative work	Legislative research and analysis	14%	17%
	Regulatory impact analysis	4%	8%
	Constitutional/legal compliance	5%	5%
	Bill drafting assistance	8%	9%
	Amendment drafting assistance	7%	9%
	Committee preparation and briefings	6%	11%
Parliamentary operations	Transcribing proceedings	39%	27%
	Translation services	30%	18%
	Document summarization	24%	19%
	Meeting scheduling and coordination	7%	5%
	Email management and triage	9%	8%
Public-facing	Public engagement/ consultation analysis	6%	10%
	Chatbots for citizen enquiries	10%	21%
	Content generation for communications	12%	10%
	Social media monitoring	6%	8%
	Accessibility improvements	15%	15%
Internal administration	Enterprise search/ knowledge management	11%	27%
	Data analysis/ business intelligence	12%	15%
	HR and admin functions	8%	8%

Where AI can add value

Parliaments were asked what systematic approaches they use to determine where AI could add value. Pilot projects are the dominant methodology, but the sophistication of evaluation varies significantly across institutions.

Pilot projects and proofs of concept appear in 63% of responses. Pilots are often user-driven: staff and members propose areas where AI could help, and ICT departments evaluate through testing at small scale. The use cases most frequently mentioned are high-volume operational tasks with clear success metrics – automated transcription, document summarization and enhanced search – where measurable efficiency gains justify deployment.

The most sophisticated parliaments embed pilots within formal governance structures: cross-functional working groups identify needs, risk and ethics assessments accompany utility evaluation, and multiple pilots run as a portfolio rather than sequentially. Governance approval gates determine whether pilots transition to production. A minority also partner with universities, research institutions or vendors to bring in specialist expertise.

Around 28% of parliaments lack systematic evaluation approaches, operating in an ad hoc fashion through informal requests or opportunistic exploration. While piloting is widely recognized, the full cycle of needs assessment, governance oversight, risk evaluation and impact measurement is not yet standard practice.

The pattern reflects a clear lesson: AI delivers measurable value on high-volume, routine tasks with defined success criteria. More complex or interpretive tasks – policy analysis, legislative drafting support – appear far less frequently, indicating they remain experimental rather than operationally validated.

Compliance and risk assessment

Compliance and risk assessment activities are foundational to responsible AI adoption, yet the survey reveals a significant gap: 46% of parliaments have conducted none of the five key compliance or risk assessment activities measured. This represents a fundamental governance failure. The IPU *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments* identifies risk evaluation and management as a defining characteristic of AI maturity, yet fewer than half the parliaments surveyed have attempted this foundational step. This gap exposes parliaments to unmanaged risks around data protection, algorithmic bias, system integrity and democratic impact.

The activities measured – legal and regulatory assessment (38%), risk assessment of AI applications (45%), documentation and traceability (16%), impact assessment on parliamentary functions (21%), and vendor system review (23%) – represent the minimum governance baseline.

The digital maturity gradient exposes the structural problem. All decile 10 parliaments conduct legal and risk assessments (100% each), coupled with documentation (73%). This comprehensive approach is sustained through deciles 8–9 (90–91% assess risks). But the pattern collapses below decile 7: at decile 6, 54% conduct none of these activities. By decile 1, 92% conduct no compliance activities. This represents the inverse of responsible governance: those using AI most informally assess its risks least.

Table 43. Compliance and risk assessment activities by decile

Tier	Decile	Legal/regulatory requirements assessment	Risk assessment of AI applications	Documentation and traceability requirements	Impact assessment on parliamentary functions
1	10	100%	100%	73%	45%
	9	64%	91%	9%	27%
	8	60%	90%	40%	30%
2	7	58%	58%	17%	17%
	6	31%	38%	15%	38%
	5	45%	55%	9%	27%
	4	0%	9%	0%	0%
3	3	9%	9%	0%	9%
	2	9%	9%	0%	18%
	1	8%	0%	0%	0%

Documentation and traceability are reported by only 16% overall and 0% of deciles 1–3: without it, parliaments cannot explain their AI use or learn from it. Only 21% conduct impact assessment on parliamentary functions, and only 23% review vendor systems – leaving parliaments structurally blind to the effects of tools they are already deploying.

Regional and income disparities expose unequal capacity. Europe leads (65% risk assessment, 56% legal); Asia reports zero risk assessments and in the Pacific, 70% conduct no compliance activity at all. High-income parliaments maintain multiple activities (60% risk, 49% legal, 38% vendor review); lower-middle-income parliaments report only 8% legal and 13% risk assessment, with 71% doing nothing. Small parliaments (34–36% activity, 52% doing nothing) lag well behind large ones (52–57% activity). Compliance capacity is concentrated in larger, wealthier institutions.

The compliance – adoption gap is the most dangerous finding. Eighty-eight per cent of parliaments use AI, yet only 45% assess risks. Seventy-eight per cent report staff using AI, yet only 38% assess legal requirements. This means a significant number of parliaments are using AI at scale but have never assessed the risks. The IPU *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments* identifies this state as Level 0 (ad hoc): no governance in place. Yet Level 0 should be a transition point, not a sustained state.

Digitally mature parliaments (tier 1) are shifting focus from periodic assessment to continuous monitoring; parliaments in transition (tier 2) must treat compliance as foundational – structured risk questionnaires, vendor review, documented AI use; and low-maturity parliaments (tier 3) need immediate support in building compliance capacity. Without assessment infrastructure, parliaments cannot claim their AI use is managed or accountable.


Identifying governance gaps through structured assessment

When the Senate of Spain applied the IPU *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments* to its parliamentary systems, the assessment revealed significant misalignment. While technical capabilities scored highly, governance and risk management lagged substantially behind. Democratic impact assessment – evaluating how AI applications affect citizens and monitoring systemic risks – was identified as the least-developed area, with no systematic evaluation mechanisms in place. The structured framework exposed what rapid technical deployment had masked: a gap between operational AI use and institutional governance capacity. The assessment provided senior management with evidence that AI adoption requires holistic institutional oversight, going beyond technical procurement and implementation.

Barriers to AI implementation

Capacity and resources are the dominant barrier, cited by 74% of parliaments, followed by technical readiness (56%), lack of training and AI literacy (52%), and lack of governance clarity (39%). User and staff resistance – cited by just 31% – is notably lower than infrastructure and skills barriers. Only 12% report no barriers, making constraint near-universal.

Figure 39. Barriers to AI implementation



Tier 1 parliaments report capacity constraints at 65% and only 21% proceed without barriers. Tier 2 faces the most acute capacity pressure at 80%, with governance clarity a challenge for 37%. Tier 3 reports 78% capacity barriers but also higher technical readiness concerns (70% versus 38% in tier 1) and governance clarity gaps (53% versus 19%): for these parliaments the barriers are distributed more broadly across infrastructure, training and policy.

Capacity is a universal constraint across income levels (72–79%), but the critical distinction is skills: low-income parliaments cite training and AI literacy barriers at 88% – the highest of any group – against 47–63% elsewhere. Small parliaments similarly report elevated training concerns (66%) and user resistance (42%) compared with large parliaments (27%).

The Middle East and North Africa region is a notable outlier: only 20% cite capacity constraints against a global average of 74%, and nearly 60% proceed without barriers – the highest figure of any region. Sub-Saharan Africa reports the highest capacity barrier rate (85%), followed by the Pacific (80%) and the Americas and Europe (79%).

The primary barrier to AI implementation is institutional capacity, not cost or cultural resistance. For tier 2 parliaments, pressure on capacity peaks at 80%; for low-income parliaments, investment in training and AI literacy offers greater impact than capital funding. The modestly low resistance figures across all groups confirm that AI adoption faces infrastructure and skills barriers, not cultural rejection.

Communicating AI adoption to stakeholders

AI communication is about more than planning and policies, and across parliamentary responses, several consistent themes emerge.

Training and capacity-building is the most prominent theme. Sustained, practical, hands-on engagement – workshops, demonstrations, concrete examples – is consistently preferred to one-time announcements or policy documents. Tailoring communication to audience matters: members respond to brief, benefits-focused briefings; staff benefit from detailed operational guidance on access, tools and support pathways.

Formal AI charters and usage policies provide essential structure for stakeholder communication: they clarify what is permitted, prohibited and governed, enabling informed discussion rather than creating bureaucratic obstacles.

Effective AI communication requires multiple channels – intranet, newsletters, workshops, departmental meetings, informal engagement – reaching different groups through different means. Risk, safeguards and ethical use must feature alongside benefits: responsible use messaging, covering data protection, confidentiality and human oversight, builds legitimacy rather than creating barriers. Concrete, parliament-specific examples – transcription, translation, document analysis – are far more persuasive than abstract discussion of AI capability.

It is notable that almost a quarter of parliaments have not yet begun formal communication about AI adoption. Typically, these are parliaments in the early planning or pilot stages where communication strategy has not been prioritized. Parliaments further ahead recognize that AI adoption is not a discrete event but an ongoing change process requiring sustained engagement, structured feedback mechanisms and messaging that evolves as different stakeholder groups respond.

Measuring staff engagement during AI transition

The House of Commons of Canada launched an AI hub on its intranet in June 2024, providing guidelines for responsible AI use and supporting staff through the adoption process. To assess the effectiveness of its communication strategy, parliament conducted regular employee sentiment surveys. Positive sentiment regarding AI tools rose from 60% in May 2024 to 74% by April 2025, following targeted engagement efforts, including an awareness campaign and an interactive AI kiosk. The sustained improvement suggests that active, practical engagement with staff – moving beyond information dissemination to dialogue – builds institutional confidence and reduces apprehension during technological transition.

Pathways to effective AI adoption

Cross-question analysis identifies three pathways to AI maturity, each characterized by different levels of adoption, governance development and readiness for framework support.

Shadow adoption characterizes approximately one sixth of parliaments surveyed – AI is in use (14–38% adoption) but formal governance exists in fewer than 12%, and none is planned. These institutions accumulate operational and compliance risk without frameworks to manage it. Support should prioritize entry-level (Level 1) maturity in the IPU *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments*: establishing basic awareness, documenting where AI is in use, and implementing simple decision-making tools (steering committee charters, risk assessment templates, vendor review checklists) before informal practices become institutional habits.

Planned maturation characterizes just over half of parliaments – the largest group. These institutions report moderate AI adoption (40–62%) and are actively planning or beginning to establish formal governance. They present the highest-value intervention opportunity: analytically engaged, receptive to frameworks and well positioned to reach Level 2 maturity (systematic risk evaluation, structured decision-making, documented AI inventories) rapidly with support. This window is time-sensitive and extended planning risks deepening shadow adoption, making accelerated framework deployment and modular governance packages the priority.

Mature governance characterizes approximately one quarter of parliaments: high AI adoption (80%+), established governance structures and routine compliance assessment. The challenge here has shifted to scaling AI into production and into new domains, managing emerging regulatory requirements, and addressing explainability and bias in production systems. Support should focus on advancing beyond Level 2: continuous risk monitoring, impact measurement, transparency requirements, bias detection and evidence-based guidance on scaling from pilot to production.

Effective support for AI adoption cannot be uniform. The IPU *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments* addresses this directly: its scalable, multi-level architecture enables each parliament to identify where it stands, prioritize appropriate governance actions and understand its pathway to the next maturity level. Tailoring support to trajectory, maturity level and identified barriers offers the greatest potential to accelerate responsible AI adoption across parliaments of all capability levels.

Inter-parliamentary collaboration

Learning and knowledge transfer is a key aspect of the modern digital parliament and often the most useful, relevant and timely learning comes from our peers. The IPU Centre for Innovation in Parliament (CIP) was launched in late 2018 based on the premise that knowledge generated by parliaments for parliaments is a critical success factor for modernization and underpins digital transformation. Such meaningful communities of practice proved key to developing rapid solutions during the COVID-19 pandemic and are proving their value again as AI adoption accelerates at pace.

The CIP's contributions to parliamentary knowledge since the last report include the IPU *Guidelines for AI in parliaments*, *Use cases for AI in parliaments* and *Maturity Framework for AI in Parliaments*, as well as hub activities, webinars, the *Innovation Tracker* series and "peer assists", where the CIP and a small group of parliaments share knowledge in closed sessions.

The benefits of this knowledge exchange are demonstrated in the 48% of parliaments that have participated in CIP activities and the 32% that, while they have not, wish to in the future. The number of parliaments not planning on participating has fallen from 13% in 2020 to only 5% in this report.

Table 44. Involvement with the Centre for Innovation in Parliament

		2026	2024	2020
Aware of CIP	Participated in a CIP hub, project or event	48%	45%	27%
	Would like to participate in the future	32%	32%	43%
	Not planning on participating	5%	10%	13%
Not aware		14%	13%	17%


In addition to the CIP, many parliaments participate in a range of global networks and organizations that support parliaments. Most prominent among these are the ECPRD and the IFLA. Several parliaments are also members of smaller regional or intra-country groupings for legislatures and, often, libraries. Membership percentages are stable across recent issues of this report.

Network	%
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA)	22%
European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD)	51%
International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA)	35%
Internet Governance Forum (IGF)	11%
Open Government Partnership (OGP)	16%
ParlAmericas	10%

Providing support

Ninety-three per cent of parliaments said they provided or were willing to provide support to others, with 64% currently doing so across at least one functional area. The most common areas where support is provided are legislative process and procedures (35%), staff development and training (32%), administrative capacity (32%) and ICT services for members, committees and plenary (30%). Substantial willingness to assist exists in document standards (38%), document management systems (34%), ICT planning (34%) and application development (35%).

Figure 40. Provision of support to other parliaments



Since 2016, support provision has grown notably in ICT services for members, committees and plenary (16% to 30%), ICT management (19% to 30%), citizen engagement and outreach (15% to 26%), and administrative capacity (23% to 32%). Yet in most functional areas, willingness far exceeds provision – most markedly in document standards (8% providing, 38% willing), application development (19% providing, 35% willing), and cloud and document management systems (both 15-percentage-point gaps). This represents significant untapped potential, particularly for knowledge transfer around technical infrastructure.

Support for the cloud has grown modestly since 2024, from 9% to 12%, while AI provision has increased substantially from 7% to 34% – reflecting the rapid rise of AI and early-stage experimentation among technologically advanced parliaments.

Parliaments provide support across an average of six functional areas and are willing to assist across eight. While there is a positive correlation between digital maturity and active provision of support to other parliaments, willingness to provide support is more broadly distributed across all deciles, including lower-ranked parliaments. The gap between willingness and provision in lower-decile parliaments presents an opportunity for capacity-building to activate peer-to-peer support, enabling less mature parliaments to learn from similar legislatures.

Receiving support


Just over three quarters of parliaments receive external support (77%). Of these, half receive support from other parliaments (50%) and 53% from other external organizations.

AI is the single largest area of inbound support, with 24% of parliaments receiving assistance from peers and 28% from external organizations. This is consistent with the rapid acceleration of AI adoption noted elsewhere in this report. Beyond AI, the most common areas of peer-to-peer support are staff development and training (19%), legislative process and procedures (14%), library and research services (14%), websites (12%) and administrative capacity (11%). Notably, legislative process and procedures is one of the few areas where parliaments are a more common source than external organizations (14% versus 9%), reflecting the inherently parliamentary nature of the expertise involved.

External organizations dominate as a source of support in technical infrastructure. The largest gaps between external and peer provision are in hardware, software and network operations (24% external versus 4% peer), document management systems (17% versus 2%), cloud services (26% versus 10%) and application development (21% versus 7%). These are precisely the areas where willingness to provide peer support substantially exceeds current provision, suggesting that parliaments turning to commercial vendors or intergovernmental bodies for technical assistance could be served by their peers as capacity-building efforts mature.

Citizen engagement and outreach (23%), staff development and training (23%) and administrative capacity (21%) also draw heavily on external organizations, pointing to a sustained role for international bodies and specialist providers alongside the growing peer-to-peer channel.

Figure 41. Provision of support to parliaments from peers and external organizations



Benefits of inter-parliamentary collaboration

The most dominant benefit identified by respondents is the value of learning from peers facing similar challenges. Parliaments emphasize that "often other parliaments have already considered or solved an issue we are facing", enabling them to "avoid reinventing the wheel". This is framed not as abstract knowledge transfer but as pragmatic problem-solving grounded in comparable contexts.

The concept of "sharing and learning" emerges as particularly powerful: "Knowledge and experience shared together is always more than the sum of individual experiences". Respondents highlight the value of exposure to "different perspectives and seeing how other parliaments approach problems", which helps refine their own work and build relationships that support ongoing exchange. ECPRD and IPU events on AI in parliaments are cited as models for structured peer learning. These examples stress the importance of combining "specific topics, practitioners but also strategic dimensions" rather than large, generic assemblies.

The value of peer learning extends across parliamentary functions. Parliaments benefit from exposure to colleagues' experiences in many areas, with one respondent noting it is "always fascinating to see that parliaments – even in very different circumstances – are often confronted with similar challenges and issues".

A second major theme concerns the use of inter-parliamentary collaboration for benchmarking, validation and comparative assessment. Parliaments describe using cooperation to "benchmark with legislatures that have advanced in ICT", which "leads to quick adoption of [good] practices". This is framed as both an efficiency mechanism that helps avoid duplication and a confidence-building exercise.

Respondents speak of gaining "insights into emerging innovations, practices and applications", and having "opportunities to objectively assess the efforts of our parliament through the collection and exchange of practices from other parliaments". Benchmarking against peers provides validation that chosen approaches align with international standards and global good practices.

The benchmarking function is particularly valued by parliaments undergoing digital transformation, which use peer examples to inform "evidence-based modernization" and ensure institutional readiness: "Without being able to meet our peers internationally to learn from them … we would not have been able to make the advances we have".

Cooperating with other parliaments is widely valued as a mechanism for targeted skills development. Responses highlight benefits for both staff and members, including "capacity-building and the development of parliamentary work," "enhanced capacity for both staff and members", and "access to ICT services" and "ICT knowledge".

Specific mechanisms mentioned include training programmes, study visits and bilateral exchanges that enable technical staff to learn operational details of digital systems. The theme extends beyond technical ICT training to broader institutional development: "strengthening institutional transparency and modernization efforts", and support for "women MPs and parliamentary staff".

Respondents also highlight the cost-effectiveness of cooperation. They share that bilateral exchange and cooperation help overcome research and development limitations, providing results faster and in a more cost-effective way.

Beyond operational learning, several respondents frame inter-parliamentary collaboration as strategic and institutional in scope. For some, cooperation is "a strategic instrument for advancing national interests, reinforcing democracy and influencing regional and international decision-making" and "a strategic instrument of governance strengthening, regional integration, peace promotion and international visibility". Cooperation is seen to strengthen democratic processes and the position of parliaments worldwide, while promoting shared values and principles. It builds "mutual trust and professional networks, enhancing institutional capacity and democratic resilience".

Cooperation builds lasting professional relationships that facilitate future collaboration. Respondents emphasize that networking with colleagues generates fresh perspectives and reduces barriers to future communication, and that visits and exchanges create relationships that "make it easier to share ideas and support each other over time". This relationship-building dimension is valued alongside technical knowledge transfer.

Future priorities and direction

AI emerges as the most pressing shared challenge requiring urgent inter-parliamentary attention. Respondents identify AI both as a significant governance concern and as an essential tool to enhance legislative efficiency. Several parliaments explicitly seek peer learning on AI governance frameworks, reflecting broader acknowledgement that sustainable AI adoption requires shared learning on governance, risk management and ethical implementation, besides understanding technical deployment.

Beyond immediate technology priorities, respondents signal evolution in cooperation itself. Several parliaments have formalized feedback mechanisms to refine partnership approaches, while others propose shared digital infrastructure, including repositories of parliamentary software, technical working groups, and structured staff exchange programmes. The success of sustained twinning arrangements – notably Fiji's emergence as a digital transformation leader in the Pacific – demonstrates the transformative potential of long-term, hands-on cooperation. This points towards cooperation structures moving from episodic engagement and peer networking towards deeper institutionalization: sustained staff exchanges, shared technical platforms, collaborative problem-solving and cumulative learning loops. For some parliaments, cooperation has expanded in scope to encompass institutional resilience and continuity of democratic function under duress, as exemplified by proposals for shared backup infrastructure and crisis response frameworks. Across all contexts, respondents emphasize continuous staff training and capacity-building as fundamental to embedding technological and procedural change.

Conclusion

The *World eParliament Report 2026* draws on data from 118 parliaments and reflects a sector that has moved decisively beyond the question of whether digital transformation matters. In 2026, the question is how to sustain it. Political ownership has intensified, technology decisions are increasingly championed by senior parliamentary leadership and by members, and the evidence base for what works has never been stronger.

The second iteration of the DMI provides valuable insights into the state of digital adoption across parliaments. It reveals broad-based, sector-wide advancement, yet also a growing gap between the highest and least digitally mature parliaments. This is not indicative of decline among lower-maturity institutions; many have improved their absolute digital capability substantially. Rather, it reflects the accelerating pace of innovation among leading parliaments, particularly driven by AI and sophisticated data governance.

Cloud infrastructure and disaster resilience have become institutional norms, even for small and developing parliaments, although deployment must balance resilience with sovereignty, security and jurisdictional requirements. Chamber modernization has generated tangible efficiency gains, with paperless operations and electronic voting becoming more widely adopted practice. Public engagement increasingly requires active, strategic data engagement rather than passive publication. AI adoption is happening at pace but must be seen as a governance challenge, not merely a technical one. AI requires effective oversight and formal risk assessment frameworks before deployment.

Inter-parliamentary collaboration remains a crucial accelerator of digital transformation. The diversity visible in the highest maturity tier reflects effective knowledge transfer and cooperation. Parliaments need not innovate in isolation; shared frameworks, capacity-building and peer exchanges enable institutions at all levels of maturity to advance their digital capability.

Based on these findings, the report recommends that parliaments establish governance as the strategic foundation of digital transformation, treat data as a strategic institutional asset and invest in infrastructure modernization aligned with resilience and sovereignty needs. Chamber operations should be modernized through hybrid sittings and paperless workflows, with end-users positioned at the centre of technology selection. Public engagement requires active strategies leveraging contemporary platforms and user-centric data formats.

The evidence in this report highlights that the parliaments advancing most effectively are those that have made deliberate institutional choices – about governance, about data, about who is involved in technology decisions – rather than those that have simply invested most heavily in technology. Digital maturity, this report shows, is achieved through a sustained commitment at all levels of parliament.

Appendices

Appendix A – Sample and methodology

This report is based on the results of a survey that was distributed to, and promoted directly with, parliaments through the IPU's usual channels and through the CIP networks. Additional direct contact was made with senior ICT personnel in parliaments to encourage completion, and there was ongoing follow-up with parliaments to maximize the sample size. The survey instrument was available online and as a Microsoft Word document, and could be completed in English, French or Spanish. Data was collected between December 2025 and February 2026.

Responses were received from 122 parliaments and chambers in total, spanning legislatures in 89 countries plus 2 supranational parliaments. Four respondents are not included in this report, making the sample 118 parliaments. This response rate is consistent with previous surveys, providing both longitudinal strength and refreshed perspectives, making this a valuable longitudinal data set.


Given that the global population of parliaments is small, the sample cannot be considered statistically significant. Rather, it is representative. The results cannot be generalized beyond the responding parliaments and may not represent the experiences of non-responding parliaments, particularly from low-income and lower-middle-income countries.

Where qualitative data is presented in this report, it has been interrogated using a process of thematic analysis, whereby data is analysed to identify emergent patterns (themes) within it, which are organized to give meaning to the question.

The largest parliament or chamber participating in this research was the United Kingdom House of Lords, with 822 members. The smallest was the Senate of Burundi, with 13 members. The average number of members across all respondents was 178 – 21 fewer than the average in 2024. Across the whole sample, 43% of respondents were classed as "small" parliaments (with fewer than 100 members), 37% as "medium-sized" (between 100 and 299 members) and 19% as "large" (300 or more members). Thirty-eight per cent of responses were from parliaments in Europe (up slightly from 36% in 2024), 23% from sub-Saharan Africa, 14% from the Americas, and 8% each from Asia, the Middle East and North Africa and the Pacific region.

As in previous surveys, the data is biased somewhat in favour of parliaments in higher-income countries. High-income and upper-middle-income countries represent 48% and 24% of the sample respectively. Conversely, just 21% and 7% of responses came from parliaments in lower-middle-income and low-income countries respectively. For reference, globally, 12% of countries are classified as low-income and 40% as high-income. While comparisons are made in this report with data sets from previous surveys, the parliaments participating in each survey do differ. Of the 118 parliaments participating in this study, 79% also took part in 2024 and 52% in 2020.

Figure 42. Parliaments participating in the survey



The DMI was compiled from a subset of the survey data that was then consolidated to create a single entry for bicameral parliaments that submitted a single survey for both chambers. Survey data for one respondent was incomplete and was removed, leaving 102 parliaments. Responses from selected questions in the first seven sections of the survey were scored using a methodology developed by the CIP. This provided a "raw" total score for each parliament. The CIP then carried out a critical review of the data to identify edge cases and where scores did not match knowledge of the institution. Four parliaments saw their score increased and seven were reduced. The final score was used to rank all entries and, from this, a decile ranking was allocated: the highest ranked ~10% of parliaments were placed in decile 10 and the lowest ~10% in decile 1. This report refers to both deciles and tiers. Tier 1 means the parliaments with the highest digital maturity (decile 8–10), tier 2 are mid-maturity parliaments in deciles 4–7 and tier 3 are low maturity parliament (deciles 1–3). A parliament's decile ranking within each of the individual categories can vary substantially from its overall ranking: a parliament with low overall digital maturity can excel in one or more sub-areas (and vice versa).

This report focuses on the technological aspects of digital transformation in parliaments. It does not apply a specific gender lens, as the data collected does not allow for an analysis of the differential contributions of men and women, or of the ways men and women may be impacted by the systems under consideration. As such, there is an implicit assumption that digital transformation affects all parliamentary members and staff equally, regardless of gender.

In other research, the IPU has explored the extremely important question of the use of social media by parliamentarians and the public. Social media is frequently a source of intimidation and harassment towards MPs, as well as of gender-based violence.

The authors of this report recognize that, as digital technology becomes increasingly strategic to parliaments, gender balance and gender-responsive digital initiatives are likely to become increasingly important aspects of inclusive governance.

Appendix B – Parliaments and chambers taking part in the research

Country	Parliament or chamber	Unicameral	Lower chamber	Upper chamber
AMERICAS				
Brazil	National Congress		●	●
Canada	Parliament		●	●
Chile	Chamber of Deputies			●
Costa Rica	Legislative Assembly	●		
Dominican Republic	Chamber of Deputies		●	
Ecuador	National Assembly	●		
Guyana	National Assembly	●		
Mexico	Senate			●
Paraguay	Chamber of Deputies			●
Suriname	National Assembly	●		
Trinidad and Tobago	Parliament		●	●
Uruguay	General Assembly		●	●
ASIA				
Bangladesh	Parliament	●		
Bhutan	National Assembly		●	
Indonesia	House of Representatives	●		
Japan	National Diet		●	●
Kazakhstan	Senate			●
Maldives	People's Majlis	●		
Pakistan	Parliament		●	●
Republic of Korea	National Assembly	●		

Country	Parliament or chamber	Unicameral	Lower chamber	Upper chamber
EUROPE				
Andorra	General Council	●		
Armenia	National Assembly	●		
Austria	Parliament		●	●
Azerbaijan	National Assembly	●		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Parliamentary Assembly		●	●
Denmark	Parliament	●		
Estonia	The Estonian Parliament	●		
Finland	Parliament	●		
France	Parliament		●	●
Germany	German Bundestag & Bundesrat		●	●
Greece	Hellenic Parliament	●		
Hungary	National Assembly	●		
Iceland	Parliament	●		
Ireland	Parliament		●	●
Italy	Parliament		●	●
Lithuania	Parliament	●		
Luxembourg	Chamber of Deputies	●		
Montenegro	Parliament	●		
Netherlands	States General		●	●
North Macedonia	Assembly of the Republic	●		
Norway	Parliament	●		
Poland	Parliament		●	●
Portugal	Assembly of the Republic	●		
Republic of Moldova	Parliament	●		
Romania	Parliament of Romania		●	●
Slovakia	National Council	●		
Slovenia	National Assembly		●	
Spain	The Cortes		●	●
Sweden	Parliament	●		
Switzerland	Federal Assembly		●	●
Ukraine	Parliament	●		
United Kingdom	UK Parliament		●	●
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA				
Algeria	Parliament		●	●
Bahrain	National Assembly		●	●
Israel	Parliament	●		
Lebanon	National Assembly	●		
Libya	House of Representatives	●		
Morocco	House of Representatives		●	
Oman	Majles		●	●
PACIFIC				
Australia	Senate			●
Fiji	Parliament	●		
Kiribati	House of Assembly	●		
New Zealand	House of Representatives	●		
Palau	Parliament		●	●
Papua New Guinea	National Parliament	●		
Solomon Islands	National Parliament	●		
Tonga	Legislative Assembly	●		
Vanuatu	Parliament	●		
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				
Angola	National Assembly	●		
Botswana	National Assembly	●		
Burundi	Senate			●
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Senate			●
Djibouti	National Assembly	●		
Ghana	Parliament	●		
Kenya	Parliament of Kenya		●	●
Lesotho	Parliament		●	●

Country	Parliament or chamber	Unicameral	Lower chamber	Upper chamber
Madagascar	Parliament		●	●
Malawi	National Assembly	●		
Mauritius	National Assembly	●		
Namibia	Parliament		●	●
Rwanda	Parliament		●	●
Seychelles	National Assembly	●		
Sierra Leone	Parliament	●		
South Africa	Parliament		●	●
Tanzania (United Republic of)	National Assembly	●		
Zambia	National Assembly	●		
Zimbabwe	Parliament		●	●
OTHER				
African Union	Pan-African Parliament	●		
European Union	European Parliament	●		

Four parliaments, Latvia, Monaco, Niue and Türkiye, submitted data for the survey but these could not be included in the report.



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