Consideration of requests for the inclusion of an emergency item in the Assembly agenda

Request for the inclusion of an emergency item in the agenda of the 138th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union submitted by the delegation of Israel

On 22 March 2018, the Secretary General received from the Head of the Israeli delegation to the IPU a request and accompanying documents for the inclusion in the agenda of the 138th Assembly of an emergency item entitled:

"Repercussions of Iran's malign activities, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Quds Force, in core arenas in the Middle East, including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, and in the Palestinian arena".

Delegates to the 138th Assembly will find attached the text of the communication submitting the request (Annex I), as well as an explanatory memorandum (Annex II) and a draft resolution (Annex III) in support thereof.

The 138th Assembly will be required to take a decision on the request of the delegation of Israel on Sunday, 25 March 2018.

Under the terms of Assembly Rule 11.1, any Member of the IPU may request the inclusion of an emergency item in the Assembly agenda. Such a request must be accompanied by a brief explanatory memorandum and a draft resolution which clearly define the scope of the subject covered by the request. The IPU Secretariat shall communicate the request and any such documents immediately to all Members.

Furthermore, Assembly Rule 11.2 stipulates that:

(a) A request for the inclusion of an emergency item must relate to a recent major situation of international concern on which urgent action by the international community is required and on which it is appropriate for the IPU to express its opinion and mobilize a parliamentary response. Such a request must receive a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in order to be accepted.

(b) The Assembly may place only one emergency item on its agenda. Should several requests obtain the requisite majority, the one having received the largest number of positive votes shall be accepted.

(c) The authors of two or more requests for the inclusion of an emergency item may combine their proposals to present a joint one, provided that each of the original proposals relates to the same subject.

(d) The subject of a proposal that has been withdrawn by its authors or rejected by the Assembly cannot be included in the draft resolution submitted on the emergency item, unless it is clearly referred to in the request and title of the subject adopted by the Assembly.
COMMUNICATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL BY
THE HEAD OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION TO THE IPU

22 March 2018

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

I would like to inform you that in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Rules of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, the Inter-Parliamentary Group of Israel requests the inclusion of an emergency item on the agenda of the 138th Assembly, to be held in Geneva from 24 to 28 March 2018. The item reads as follows:

"Repercussions of Iran's malign activities, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Quds Force, in core arenas in the Middle East, including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, and in the Palestinian arena".

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Nachman SHAI
Member of the Knesset
Head of the Israeli Delegation to the IPU
REPERCUSSIONS OF IRAN’S MALIGN ACTIVITIES, LED BY THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AND ITS QUDS FORCE, IN CORE ARENAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING SYRIA, LEBANON, IRAQ AND YEMEN, AND IN THE PALESTINIAN ARENA

Explanatory memorandum submitted by the delegation of Israel

Iran is the chief sponsor of terrorists and terrorism around the world and especially in the Middle East. Through its Revolutionary Guards and, more specifically, the Quds Force, the regime has lent support to terrorists outside its borders in such arenas as Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip. Iran stands behind Hizbull;ah and Hamas, both designated terrorist organizations by the United States and the European Union, and it has consistently supplied them with the training and arms to carry out their sworn aim of destroying the State of Israel.

The Iranian regime has carried out acts of terrorism on its own, without resorting to proxies. For example, longstanding investigations point to direct Iranian involvement in two deadly attacks against Jewish targets in Buenos Aires – the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) community centre in 1994. It is therefore no wonder that Iran is on the US State Department List of State Sponsors of Terrorism – one of only four countries so designated.

Iran's efforts to expand its influence and destabilize the volatile Middle East have been consistent and unrelenting. It has established an outpost in southern Lebanon and is currently turning Syria into another base for its activities. Since the establishment of the ayatollah regime in Iran, it has been attempting to expand its influence in the Middle East. Since 1979, Iran has sought to export its Islamic revolution, extend its influence in neighbouring nations, and support Shia communities outside its borders. Its activities throughout the Middle East should be viewed in the wider context of its broad regional hegemonic aspirations which lead to Iranian activities that are destabilizing the entire region. These include funding, training and arming Shiite militias in Iraq, which are a clear destabilizing factor in that country; funding Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); and seeking to enhance its influence in the Red Sea region. Iran also supports the Houthis in Yemen, thereby diminishing any chance of reconciliation; is funding, training and arming Hizbullah to the teeth; and, of course, Iran is heavily involved in Syria.

Iran's involvement in Syria and Iraq is intended to create a sphere of influence stretching from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, all the way to Lebanon and the Mediterranean, thus severely undermining regional stability. Iran is active in Syria mainly through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force. The Shiite militias fighting in Syria are under the direct control of the IRGC-Quds Force, and its military presence in Syria is complemented by a robust presence of Hizbullah.

Iran and its proxies operating in Syria are involved in countless crimes against the civilian population, including destruction of property, starvation and sieges, all of which were condemned in numerous Human Rights Council resolutions. Iran is also heavily involved in Iraq, where it operates through local Shiite militias. Some of these militias even receive funding and direction from the Quds Force, a semi-independent body subordinate to the Revolutionary Guards. These militias act on behalf of the Quds Force as part of Iran's strategy to use sectarian Shiite forces in various countries to promote Iran's domestic and regional interests. Iran sees this movement and other Shiite Iraqi militias as an important tool for preserving and even increasing its influence in Syria, Iraq and other countries, without Iran having to send its own forces to these countries. In the scenario of a deterioration between Israel and Iran and/or Hizbullah, Shiite militia fighters may become involved in military activity against Israel from the Golan Heights, or even be sent by Iran to Lebanon. In the scenario of the continued American military presence in Iraq or even in Syria, Shiite militias operated by the Quds Force can be used by Iran as a tool to carry out guerrilla attacks against the US military and American targets, as it did during the American campaign in Iraq.
In recent months, there has also been a rapprochement in Iran-Hamas relations, after three years of worsening relations due to Hamas's hesitant stance towards the Assad regime and the evacuation of Hamas's Syrian offices. The rapprochement is reflected in the many Hamas delegations that have visited Iran, as well as public statements made by senior Hamas figures about the importance of relations and support from Iran. In this context, the current financial assistance that Iran provides Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is estimated at US$ 100 million a year.

Lately, Iran's actions are becoming bolder: Iran's clear and concerted effort to transfer knowledge and capabilities and to replicate the self-production capabilities of weapons by Hezbollah, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack – the first of its kind - against Israel (February 2018), and the ongoing launching of missiles from Yemen towards Saudi Arabia – including towards its capital, Riyadh – all are a clear indication that unless the international community fulfils its responsibility and takes action, the situation in the Middle East, rather than stabilize, will witness the continuation of instability and conflicts.
REPERCUSSIONS OF IRAN'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES, LED BY THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AND ITS QUDS FORCE, IN CORE ARENAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING SYRIA, LEBANON, IRAQ AND YEMEN, AND IN THE PALESTINIAN ARENA

Draft resolution submitted by the delegation of ISRAEL

The 138th Assembly of the Inter–Parliamentary Union,

(1) Recalling that the Inter–Parliamentary Union shares the objectives and principles of the United Nations,

(2) Recalling also the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and Security Council on combating terrorism, in particular Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2129 (2013), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2253 (2015), General Assembly resolution 60/288 of 8 September 2006 on the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and follow-up resolutions, and the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, as well as IPU resolutions adopted by the 116th Assembly (Nusa Dua, 2007), the 122nd Assembly (Bangkok, 2010), the 132nd Assembly (Hanoi, 2015), and the 134th Assembly (Lusaka, 2016), all of which underscore the need for cooperation in the fight against terrorism,

(3) Referring to the letter of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, dated 27 October 2016, which expresses "concerted alarm at the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which, through its political and religious figures, calls for the export of its revolution to other countries" and stressed that "the Islamic Republic of Iran is a State sponsor of terrorism in our region, from Hizbullah in Lebanon and Syria, to Houthis in Yemen and terrorist groups and cells in the Kingdom of Bahrain, Iraq, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and elsewhere",

(4) Also referring to the draft resolution dated 26 February 2018 from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which was vetoed, and taking note with particular concern that, as reported by the Panel of Experts on Yemen, weapons of Iranian origin were introduced into Yemen after the imposition of the targeted arms embargo, and that the Islamic Republic of Iran is in non-compliance with paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 2216 (2015) by failing to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of three types of prohibited items to designated persons or entities, including extended range short range ballistic missiles (ER-SRBM), ER-SRBM-related military equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology that can be considered military equipment,

(5) Noting that the US Department of State Country Report on Terrorism 2016 indicates that Iran was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, that Iran continued its terrorist-related activity in 2016, including support for Hizbullah, Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, and various groups in Syria, Iraq, and throughout the Middle East, that Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) to implement foreign policy goals, provide cover for intelligence operations, and create instability in the Middle East, that Iran has acknowledged the involvement of the IRGC-QF in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and that the IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad,

(6) Also noting that the US Department of State Country Report on Terrorism 2016 indicates that the Iranian Government maintains a robust cyberterrorism program and that it has sponsored cyberattacks against foreign government and private sector entities,

1. Calls on the United Nations, the Inter–Parliamentary Union and the international community to work cooperatively in order to stop Iranian worldwide terrorist activities;
2. *Also calls on* IPU Member Parliaments to diligently and strictly implement all existing sanctions against Iran, for example UN Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006), 2231 (2015), and 2216 (2015), that have emanated from the involvement of Iranian-led forces in Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip and Yemen;

3. *Also calls on* the United Nations and the international community to work so that Hizbullah, the IRGC-QF and any foreign elements under their command, immediately and completely to withdraw from Syrian territory;

4. *Further calls on* the Inter-Parliamentary Union to reconsider the decision by its Executive Committee to add Iran to the IPU High-Level Advisory Group on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism (HLAG) which has been established to serve as the global focal point for parliamentary activities related to counter-terrorism.