PLACE DU PETIT-SACONNEX
1211 GENEVA 19, SWITZERLAND
REPORT ON THE VISIT TO CYPRUS
Table of contents
1. The Committee to Monitor the Situation in Cyprus was set up by the IPU Council in May 1991 "to monitor the situation closely and report to the relevant bodies of the IPU on developments in Cyprus". It held its first session on the occasion of the 86th IPU Conference in Santiago in October 1991 and has, since then, held four further sessions, each on the occasion of the two yearly IPU Statutory Meetings.
2. It has developed as its regular practice (i) to receive memoranda on developments in the situation in Cyprus from the representatives of the two Communities in Cyprus and from the National Groups representing in the IPU the three Guarantor Powers under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom; (ii) to receive information on the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and (iii) to hear representatives of the two Communities in Cyprus; its attempts to hear likewise representatives of the National Groups of the three Guarantor Powers have not been successful so far despite reiterated requests to that end by the Inter-Parliamentary Council.
3. From the early stage of its work, the Committee felt that, in order to fulfil its mandate, it was indispensable to carry out an on-site visit and, at its 153th session in September 1993, the IPU Council approved the following for the carrying out of such a mission:
"- The delegation would hold meetings with, inter alia, the leaders of the two Cypriot Communities and representatives of all political parties; it would also hold meetings with the United Nations representatives in Cyprus.
- Prior to the visit, the IPU Secretary General would forward
information to the Committee on the status of the negotiations
held within the framework of the good offices mission of the UN
Secretary-General, and would further invite written submissions
from the representatives of the two Cypriot Communities, as well
as from those of the three guarantor powers, Turkey, Greece and
the United Kingdom."
4. Three of the six Committee members were able to take part in
the visit: Mr. M. FERRIS (Ireland), Mr. H. KEMPPAINEN
(Finland) and Mrs. H. MEGAHED (Egypt). Mr. M. CLARK (United Kingdom),
Chairman, Mr. J. BAUMEL (France), Vice-Chairman, and Mr. C. HOLDING
(Australia) were unable to do so; although their absence was due
to reasons beyond their control, certain representatives of each
of the two Communities suggested that it may have been politically
motivated, an allegation that was dismissed by the delegation.
Mr. M. FERRIS acted as Leader of the delegation. The delegation
was assisted by the Secretary of the Committee, Ms. C. Pintat.
5. For the purpose of this report, the Committee has felt it useful
to include (Annex II) a note on the historical background of the
6. The delegation received the following documents which are available upon request:
(i) Information on the status of the negotiations conducted since its September 1993 session within the framework of the good offices mission of the United Nations Secretary-General: Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus dated 14 September 1993 (document N° S/26438); Letter dated 20 September 1993 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General (document N° S/26475); Report of the Secretary-General in connection with the Security Council's comprehensive reassessment of the United Nations operations in Cyprus dated 22 November 1993 (document N° S/26777), and Security Council resolution S/889 of 15 December 1993;
(ii) A memorandum dated 12 January 1994 presented by the National Group of Cyprus in its capacity as the representative of the Greek Cypriot Community;
(iii) A memorandum dated 12 January 1994 presented by Mr. Ayhan H. Acarkan in his capacity as representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community;
(iv) A memorandum dated 22 December 1993 presented by the National Group of the United Kingdom in its capacity as the representative of one of the three guarantor powers established by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee;
(v) A memorandum dated 5 January 1994 presented by the National Group of Greece in its capacity as the representative of one of the three guarantor powers established by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee;
(vi) A memorandum dated 5 January 1994 presented by the National Group of Turkey in its capacity as the representative of one of the three guarantor powers established by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.
7. Background documents on a number of specific issues were further
provided to the delegation.
8. The detailed programme of the visit can be found in Annex I.
9. The delegation wishes to express its deep gratitude to all those it met whose explanations have considerably enlightened it, permitting it to acquire a better insight into the complex Cyprus problem. It wishes to address special thanks to the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, whom it met as representatives of the Greek Cypriot Community, H.E. the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Glafkos Clerides, the President of the House of Representatives and of the IPU National Group of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Alexis Galanos, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Alecos Michaelides. It also wishes to address special thanks to the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot Community, whom it met as representatives of that community, H.E. Mr. Rauf R. Denktash, Leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community, Mr. Ayhan H. Acarkan, Mr. Hakki Atun, Mr. Ozker Ozgur, and Mr. Atay Ahmet Rasit.. On both sides, leaders of political parties and representatives of the civil society made known their points of view to the delegation with an openness and a frankness for which it is very grateful.
10. The delegation is also very grateful to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Gustave Feissel, who not only provided it with thorough information on all aspects of the mission of good offices of the UN Secretary-General and UNFICYP activities, including through a visit of the buffer zone and Nicosia International Airport, but also facilitated the transit of the delegation to the northern part of the island.
11. Finally, the delegation wishes to express its gratitude to
all those persons of the two Communities in Cyprus who were instrumental
in arranging appointments with the figures and organizations whom
the mission had expressed the wish to meet and in facilitating
other practical aspects such as the travel of the mission's members
in their respective zones.
12. In all its activities, the delegation endeavoured to maintain an objective and neutral approach as a fact-finding mission, dealing with the representatives of both Communities on an equal footing, including through offering them the same share of its time on the island, and trying to obtain detailed information from all sources listed in the programme (Annex I) without endorsing the positions of any of those persons it met, with the sole aim of gaining the most accurate picture of the situation.
13. The delegation kept in mind at all times the stand taken by the Inter-Parliamentary Union with regard to the status of the Republic of Cyprus and that of the northern part of the island.
14. It also kept in mind that the IPU regards the Cyprus problem as one which is not only bi-communal but one in which the three guarantor powers have their share and say.
15. Its questions to all its interlocutors were inspired by the IPU's support to the initiatives of the UN Secretary-General in the context of his mission of good offices, which are aiming at changing the current status quo, i.e. the "Set of Ideas" and the confidence-building measures that were supported by the IPU Council at its 153rd session in September 1993.
16. Finally, the delegation initiated its visit having in mind that the passage of time is indeed working very much against the building up of a Cypriot nation formed of two distinct Communities who both have a legitimate claim to be part of the future of the island.
17. Before entering into the various aspects of the mission, it
wishes to clarify that neither during its visit nor in this report
has it pretended to cover all the many issues at stake. It is
also conscious that, having held interviews with over 50 individuals
and groups of persons, it may not have done complete justice to
the details of their views in this document. It hopes that in
compiling and summarizing them, it has not inadvertently distorted
18. In the delegation's appreciation, the main challenges in the search for a solution are emotional as much as political. Indeed, one of the things which struck it most is the constant reference to fear. This fear derives, of course, from the memory of past atrocities, which is still very vivid in the minds of people on both sides, but is certainly also nourished by 20 years of absolute absence of contacts and communication between the two Communities; the new generations have never been personally exposed to the people of the other Community, their habits and their values. "The island is also divided in the minds of people" is a common comment and it was even stated that Germans at the time of the Berlin wall were indeed less separated than the Cypriots are to-day.
19. This absence of contact - which is greatly deplored by some people on both sides - has led each of the two Communities to perceive the other rather in the abstract and as a complete stranger from whom mainly difficulties or even direct aggressions can be expected. Combined with a strong distrust which appears to have deep roots in history, and is in any case more ancient than the events in the sixties and the seventies, this fear, with all the irrationality that comes with it, tends to seriously complicate the search for a political solution agreeable to both sides.
20. With most of those it met, the delegation further noted that their permanent reference to the past and their unceasing analysis of it against this background of fear and distrust, may to some extent be detrimental to their planning for the future. Some of them even acknowledged this, stating that it was time for the Cypriots to change attitude in that respect.
21. On both sides, it was acknowledged that the passage of time did not help reduce these difficulties.
22. Against this background, it is clear to the delegation
that the key to any just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus
problem is the restoration of confidence and a readiness to compromise
on the part of all sectors of society, in particular political
leaders and the media who play a crucial role in shaping general
public feeling. The delegation therefore urges that everything
possible be done, especially by political forces, to promote such
attitudes of which it would have wished to see more examples.
23. In the context of the mission of good offices of the UN Secretary-General, for a number of years "proximity talks" have been held on an equal footing between the leaders of the two Communities. In an attempt to end the current status quo, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was able to propose, in August 1992, a "Set of Ideas on an overall framework agreement on Cyprus" (text available upon request) which was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution N° 774 of 26 August 1992. This "Set of Ideas" has so far not been approved by the Leaders of the two Communities; once approved by them, the two Communities are due to be consulted in separate referendums.
24. The "Set of Ideas" provides for a bi-communal and
bi-zonal federation and recognizes that "Cyprus is the
common home of the Greek Cypriot Community and of the Turkish
Cypriot Community and that their relationship is not one of majority
and minority but one of two communities in the federal Republic
of Cyprus". It covers the following issues: the constitutional
aspects of the federation, security and guarantee, territorial
adjustments (with a suggested map), displaced persons, economic
development and safeguards, and transitional agreements.
25. Faced with a lack of progress on the "Set of Ideas", the Secretary-General, in July 1993, proposed an intermediary step in the form of a package of confidence-building measures (reproduced in Annex V) which include two measures of major significance: the reactivation of Varosha and the reopening of Nicosia International Airport. This initiative was extensively referred to in the September 1993 report of the Committee to Monitor the Situation in Cyprus and supported by the Inter-Parliamentary Council.
26. Before the events in 1974, Varosha, which is a part of Famagusta, was a well developed tourism centre, almost entirely held by Greek Cypriots. In 1974, Varosha was deserted by its Greek Cypriots inhabitants who feared for their lives, and fenced up by the Turkish forces; it has since become a ghost city (with the exception of three buildings). The Government of Turkey has been deemed responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area. Nicosia International Airport (NIA), which is part of the UN protected area and was visited by the delegation, has been closed to air traffic for the past twenty or so years, its facilities having suffered from weather conditions and lack of maintenance.
27. In June 1993, President Clerides had already indicated that he was agreeable to the arrangement proposed for Varosha and NIA, provided that no provisions were added that would have the effect, directly or indirectly, of recognizing the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". Mr. Denktash had subsequently withheld any reply on the matter while Turkey had for its part indicated a positive approach.
28. In the meantime, the UN Secretary-General asked a team of experts from various fields, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to report on the economic benefits to both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Communities of the package of CBMs involving the reopening of Varosha and NIA and to address issues related to the modalities for its implementation. Their reports (which are considered as "non official" papers by the two sides) provide a clear picture of the pros and cons of the package of CBMs; this is why the delegation felt it appropriate to include the "executive summary" of their findings in Annex V. Their main conclusion is that "implementation of this package of CBMs would indeed be the most important development in Cyprus in almost two decades" (and) "would yield significant benefit to both communities. The benefits would be relatively greater for the Turkish Cypriot side because of the relative size of its economy and its impact in alleviating the serious obstacles currently confronting the Turkish Cypriot economy."
29. On the day when the delegation concluded its work it was announced that Mr. Denktash had conveyed his reply regarding the CBMs to the Secretary-General; the exact substance of the reply was however not available at that time.
2. The CBMs: a step towards a solution or de facto the scale-down model of the final arrangement ?
30. The IPU Council having shared, in September 1993, the UN Secretary-General's aspiration that the CBMs might help open up a window of hope in what could be qualified as a deadlock in the Cyprus situation, the delegation placed special emphasis on this question and tried to obtain the views of all those it met on them.
31. The delegation understood that the approval and implementation of the CBMs have in no way been deemed by the UN Secretary-General as suspending the search for a general solution to the Cyprus problem. It nevertheless heard, on both sides, that implementation of the CBMs would delay any solution by some eight to ten years, i.e. until after the "workability" of the CBMs had been tested and assessed in practice.
32. In the words of the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. G. Feissel, "the CBMs are just a catalyst, not the solution." However, many persons in both Communities expressed the fear that, if the CBMs were approved, their implementation could hamper the search for a global solution. Many even expressed the fear that they may de facto turn into the scale-down model of the final arrangement.
33. Both Mr. G. Clerides, President of the Republic of Cyprus, and Mr. A. Michaelides, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the Government accepted the philosophy of the CBMs but felt that the modalities for their implementation should be discussed as any such modality that would imply, directly or indirectly, a recognition of the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (a self-declared entity that has only been recognized by Turkey - see Annex II, para. 9 to 13), would be unacceptable.
34. On the Greek Cypriot side, the delegation gathered from discussions held with leaders of all political parties that the point made regarding the non-recognition of the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was shared by all parties. Their approach of the CBMs however varies:
35. On the Turkish Cypriot side,
36. In support of these views, a number of practical and even technical aspects of the CBMs were mentioned by the various leaders, who analysed how they saw their impact on various of the questions referred to in this report and more especially: territory, population, economy, contacts.
37. The delegation noted that, with the exception of those who
rejected the CBMs, all those it met in both Communities stated
that the CBMs should be discussed and negotiated; to that end,
the reports of the UN team of experts were considered as reference
documents and not as official documents. Certain of the persons
met by the delegation suggested including additional measures
in the package or modifying the scope of some of the measures
already included, in the form of an extension or, on the contrary,
of a restriction. Being aware of the fact that the CBMs - which
have been the subject of arduous "proximity negotiations"
for months - were indeed conceived as an indissoluble package,
the delegation fears and warns that all these suggestions,
as legitimate and well founded as they may be, may imply a reopening
of the whole process of negotiations on the substance of the very
package of CBMs and may indeed signify their mere "burial",
without in parallel easing the search for a global solution.
38. From all discussions held, it was clear to the delegation that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots recognized that the island, being in a unique strategic location in the Mediterranean, was the prime element of a balance of power, mainly between Turkey and Greece, their immediate neighbours. For the delegation, it was clear that the question of security in Cyprus should be seen in perspective with the shift in the strategic balance in the region since 1974.
39. The strategic component of the Cyprus problem and past experience of inter-communal strife made the question of security and international guarantees for peace a key issue which was at the core of all interviews.
40. The Turkish Cypriot side indeed placed special emphasis on security, arguing that it could only be ensured as long as Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were living in distinct areas of the island and guarantees were provided by a third force. All Turkish Cypriots with whom the delegation spoke excluded any possible return to the situation existing before 1974 when both Communities were co-existing in all parts of the island. They insisted that "people have made their homes here" (Mr. Eroglu, Leader of the National Unity Party). They further stated that Turkey had, in 1974, acted in compliance with the Treaty of Guarantee and that the permanent presence since then on their part of the island of Turkish troops - which they generally qualified as being a "peace force" as opposed to the qualification of "force of occupation" by the Greek Cypriot side - remained the key guarantee for their security.
41. All Turkish Cypriots met by the delegation insisted that the Greek Cypriots were "armed to their teeth", stating that this nourished fear and mistrust as to their intentions and made Turkey's military guarantee indispensable. They all condemned the fact that President Clerides had, in December 1993, made a military agreement with the Government of Greece.
42. On the other hand, the following statement contained in a letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General on 17 December 1993 by President Clerides reflects a permanent concern conveyed to the delegation by all its Greek Cypriot interlocutors : "There is no doubt that the massive presence of Turkish military forces in the occupied part of Cyprus creates serious anxieties and mistrust among the Greek Cypriot Community regarding Turkish intentions." The withdrawal of Turkish troops is the first and most important demand of the Greek Cypriots.
43. In the delegation's perception, there is no doubt that any move to reinforce security alliances with either Greece or Turkey can only reinforce fear and distrust instead of promoting the spirit of compromise indispensable to reach an overall solution.
44. The strength of the Turkish military force in northern Cyprus is a matter of constant and bitter controversy between the two sides. It is estimated to some 30,000 men by the United Nations. The Turkish Cypriot side stated that it was formed of two divisions without wishing to specify the exact number of men. The delegation was only able to observe that there was a number of Turkish soldiers in the streets of the northern part of Nicosia.
45. In the letter already referred to above, President Clerides offered "in order to brake the counter-productive climate of fear and mistrust and thus enhance the prospects of a negotiated settlement", to repeal and disband the National Guard and place its arms and equipment under UNFICYP's custody as well as to stop the purchase of arms, and (after deducting the cost of UNFICYP) to deposit the money thus saved in a UN account "to be used after the solution of the problem for the benefit of both Communities." The offer was made "provided the Turkish side agrees also that parallel to the above the Turkish Forces are withdrawn from Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot armed forces disband and hand their weapons and military equipment to the custody of United Nations Peace-Keeping Force".
46. The Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey rejected the proposal.
47. Stationed in Cyprus since March 1964, UNFICYP has a double function: (i) to maintain the military status quo and prevent the recurrence of fighting, (ii) to carry out humanitarian and economic activities to promote a return to normal conditions.
48. The strength of UNFICYP, which is under the command of Irish Major-General M.F. Minehane, included 1,168 military personnel and 35 civilian police personnel at the time of the visit. Forces from Argentina, Austria and the United Kingdom are ensuring that the buffer zone (extending from some 180 kms from north-west to south-east, varying in width from a few metes to 7 kms and representing 3% of the territory of the island) is not violated by either of the two sides (which never agreed on its exact delineation): roughly, the Argentine battalion (364 men) is in charge of the monitoring and supervision of the western portion of the buffer zone, the United Kingdom battalion (377 men) is in charge of the Nicosia area of the buffer zone - indeed the most sensitive one - and the Austrian battalion (336 men) is in charge of the eastern portion of the buffer zone.
49. The delegation was highly impressed by the dedication and professionalism of UNFICYP personnel in performing the difficult task assigned to them, especially considering that their strength had been reduced by 43.6% since December 1990 while the reasons for their presence had not changed and their tasks remained basically the same, and it wishes to commend it.
50. As mentioned in the November 1993 report of the UN Secretary-General, "it is often asked whether UNFICYP is not part of the problem of Cyprus rather than part of the solution. The ancillary question is how long UNFICYP will remain on the island" (doc. N° S/26777, para. 101). It was clear in any case that UNFICYP's presence is not perceived in the same manner by the two Communities and that its maintenance has much more importance for the Greek Cypriot side (which in fact finances about a third of the cost to the United Nations) than for the Turkish Cypriot side which, as mentioned above, relies on Turkey for its security.
51. In the delegation's perception, the maintenance of UNFICYP (whose mandate is renewed on a six monthly basis) is highly needed. In the current state of fear and distrust existing between the two Communities, and with extremist groups on both sides able to engage into provocative acts in the buffer zone that could easily degenerate into inter-communal strife, it was clear that UNFICYP is performing the beneficial role of a neutral force of interposition as well as of contact, and any attempts to withdraw it from the island could expose the two Communities to a repetition of dramatic events.
52. While being aware of the financial constraints that the development
of the deployment of United Nations missions and forces in places
of crises and conflict may impose on the international community,
the delegation feels also that governments should be urged to
allocate the necessary funds for the pursuance of UNFICYP's mandate
and it suggests that Parliaments should take an interest in this
matter. UNFICYP - which since June 1993 has been financed on a
basis of voluntary contributions and contributions assessed on
the entire membership of the UN - was in fact facing over 200
million US dollars deficit in November 1993.
53. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and indeed the 1960 Constitution prohibit both the union, in part or in whole, to another country, and any form of partition or secession.
54. In all its discussions with the Turkish Cypriot side, the delegation heard expressions of fear that the Greek Cypriot side may continue to aspire to "Enosis" (union with Greece); in support of this fear, various leaders, including Mr. Denktash, reported that only a few hours previously President Clerides had encouraged the National Guard (which they in any case consider as being an illegal force since it is only formed by Greek Cypriots) to liberate the "occupied" part of the island and fight for the "triumph of hellenism"; this led them to reiterate that Turkey should continue to be their guarantor power.
55. The delegation must state, however, that neither President Clerides nor any other Greek Cypriots whom it met advocated "Enosis". On the contrary, the delegation heard from them a constant wish to build up a Cypriot, independent, State. This appeared to be also the objective of the Turkish Cypriots.
56. On the other hand, all Greek Cypriots insisted on the importance
of the non-recognition by the international community, whether
direct or indirect, of the so-called "Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus". They also expressed their concern at
the close links existing between that entity and Turkey.
57. The 1960 Constitution - which is still in force in the Republic of Cyprus, although the provisions concerning the Turkish Cypriot Community are suspended de facto, and which is deemed to be "dead and buried" by the Turkish Cypriot side since 1963 - provided for a bi-communal unitary State. Taking into account the post-1974 de facto situation, the "Set of Ideas" envisages a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation and suggests a constitutional and legal framework with specific guarantees for each Community. Once approved by the Leaders of the two Communities, it is due to be submitted to the approval of the people of the two Communities in separate referendums.
58. Although there are nowadays some "grey zones" as to the distinction to be made between a federation and a confederation, the delegation tried, with almost everyone it met, to understand how they saw the future of the island, i.e., as a federation, as a confederation, or with two entirely separated States. The delegation always clarified that, by federation, it understood a State formed of two or more politically equal entities, having a single sovereignty and international personality, a single citizenship, a single currency and, as a minimum, the control of federal foreign policy, federal defence and federal finances.
59. All Greek Cypriots stated, without any ambiguity, that they favoured the creation of a federation as defined by the delegation.
60. In the words of Mr. R.R. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot Community aspired to the application to Cyprus of the Swiss model, on the understanding that Switzerland, which is still officially called a confederation, had with time become a loose federation. He stated that there should be "one army with two wings but not a federal army; a co-operation only". Mr. H. Atun and Mr. A. Rasit spoke of "two States with a sovereignty invested in a loose central government and the residual sovereignty invested in the two States". For his part, Mr. O. Ozgur, Leader of the Republican Turkish Party, which is part of the "governmental" coalition, stated that his Party was in favour of a federation as defined by the delegation.
61. The main concern expressed by all Turkish Cypriots was that their Community - a co-founder of the Republic of Cyprus - should be recognized by the Greek Cypriot Community as a politically equal one and that any constitutional arrangements decided for the future should be those linking, not a majority and a minority, but two Communities: a kind of partnership. This concern is indeed covered in the "Set of Ideas".
62. In general, the common denominator appears to be the acceptance of sovereignty vested in a central government controlling foreign affairs and general finances, with freedom of action in all local affairs for the two components.
63. For the delegation, it became clear that the answer to the question of establishing a federation or a confederation lay less in dogmatic definitions that in political will to draw up a definition acceptable to both Communities. As stated by various leaders on both sides, the Cyprus federation may, in the end, be sui generis.
64. Since 1974, the part of the island which is north of the buffer zone has been under the administration of the Turkish Cypriot Community; it represents almost 37% of the total territory. Prior to the events in 1974, the Turkish Cypriot Community represented 18% of the total population of the island and the Maronites (almost all of whom lived in the northern part of the island) and others represented some 2% of the population.
65. The question of territorial adjustments remains a key, and
indeed very sensitive, issue, as evidenced by the discussions
regarding the reopening of the Varosha fenced area. In his "Set
of Ideas", the UN Secretary-General suggested territorial
adjustments and a map which are still on the table. One of the
most difficult aspects of the question, in addition to the complex
economic and water resources considerations, is that of the necessary
arrangements regarding persons of both Communities affected by
the territorial adjustments.
66. Various Greek Cypriot leaders asserted that, before 1974,
72% of the island's GNP was generated in the northern part of
the island; income stemmed basically from industries, farming
and tourism, of which Varosha was the most active centre. After
1974, tourism became the major source of income of the south where
it represent 19 % of the GDP. This industry was now also being
developed to some degree in the northern part. As already mentioned,
the implementation of the Varosha and NIA package would have an
important impact on tourism, particularly in the northern part
of the island.
67. There is currently an economic gap between the two sides which could easily be observed when visiting the northern part and the southern part of Nicosia. As stated by both sides, the per capita income is 12 to 13,000,- US dollars in the southern part while it is only about 4,000,- US dollars in the northern part. All Turkish Cypriots met by the delegation claimed that this gap was due to the harsh effect of the embargo imposed on their economy while investments were pouring into the south, but that every effort was being made to stimulate the economy. Various Greek Cypriots complained that the electricity, which until now is entirely provided by the south to the north, had never been paid for since 1974.
68. Asked about the possibility of developing economic co-operation between the north and the southern part of the island, Mr. Denktash stated: "Even for economic co-operation you have to go step by step because we have different systems. Otherwise, the stronger economy will swallow up the weaker market".
69. The delegation was able to note that contacts between the Chamber of Commerce and Industry on the Greek Cypriot side and the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Industry on the Turkish Cypriot side, were rare, which was regretted on both sides. On both sides, interest was further expressed by trade union leaders in pursuing a project envisaged almost a year ago, i.e. the holding a Pancyprian Conference of Trade Unions.
70. All those interviewed by the delegation in the southern part of the island stated that, due to the shortage of local manpower, it had been necessary to call on foreign labour force : some 20,000 foreign workers were working in the Republic of Cyprus according to Mr. M. Ioannu, Secretary General of the Cyprus Workers Union. All Greek Cypriots met lamented that Turkish Cypriots were not allowed to come to the south for work.
71. In fact, some 800 to 900 Turkish Cypriot are authorized to cross the buffer zone every day to work in the southern part of the island; where salaries are 3 to 4 times higher than in the north. According to Turkish Cypriot sources, they do not want to stay overnight because they have a feeling of insecurity in a totally Greek Cypriot environment, and if a choice had to be made between security and income, security would come first.
72. Mr. Denktash and other Turkish Cypriots complained that these workers had to report to the Greek Cypriot police and were being treated as second class persons and spies from the north; the southern press tended to present them as workers coming from the "occupied" part to the "free" part, which was an unacceptable insult. Asked why more Turkish Cypriots were not allowed to go and work in the southern part of the island where were jobs were available, Mr. Denktash further state that any opening up of the "border" to workers had to be done step by step. While sharing the view than an opening up should be made step by step so as to prevent serious economic and social risks, the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot trade union TURK-SEN regretted that special permissions for Turkish Cypriot workers to work in the southern part were being delivered by the "Prime Minister" and not by the trade unions.
73. The delegation discussed with trade unions in the southern
part as well as in the north the question of contributions of
Turkish Cypriot workers who were originally living in the southern
part and were now in the northern part as well as the question
of contributions of the Turkish Cypriot workers who daily crossed
the buffer zone to work in the southern part. That question was
also discussed in connection with that of the reactivation of
Varosha and NIA.
74. It is estimated that some 160,000 Greek Cypriots and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced as a result of the events of 1974. There still are some 500 Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island and some 300 Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island, who enjoy special protection from UNFICYP and benefit from its humanitarian activities (such as regular distribution of food and assistance for reallocation in their Community if they so desire). In addition, some 300 Maronites are living in the northern part of the island.
75. "Title deeds" were delivered by the Turkish Cypriot authorities to post-1974 occupants of properties of Greek Cypriots located in the area which is now under Turkish Cypriot control (not all refugees from the south were however "allocated "properties", which appears to be a source of difficulties in the north).
76. The "titles" are not recognized by the original owners who claim that their properties were illegally confiscated and demand their return, while the current Turkish Cypriot occupants claim that they have become the legal owners. The question of the value of properties in 1974 and currently is of course an important aspect. While Turkish Cypriot leaders state that a return to the pre-1974 situation is excluded, the Greek Cypriot leaders state that recognition of a massive confiscation of the properties of displaced persons is out of the question.
77. Similarly, Turkish Cypriot properties in the southern part of the island are also occupied by Greek Cypriots. However, according to the information offered to the delegation, they are under the control of the State and are kept on trust for their real owners; the refugees who were allocated these properties have to pay a small rent to the State; these properties are said to be available for return to their original owners as soon as they are able to occupy them.
78. For the delegation it was clear that this question is a major one, the solution of which will deserve a great amount of good will and negotiation.
79. The question of Turkish settlers in the northern part of the island is one on which the delegation heard many expressions of concern, not only among the Greek Cypriot Community who claim that the influx of these settlers drastically affects the demographic composition of the island, but also among some leaders of political parties in the northern part of the island for whom it appears to be a major concern.
80. These settlers mainly come from Anatolia, which is one of the less developed regions of Turkey, and they provide inexpensive manpower. According to Turkish Cypriot leaders, they were called in after 1974 to perform jobs which had to be done in the absence of the Greek Cypriots who had been running them until then.
81. In fact, the delegation was not able to obtain any precise information as to the number of these settlers. According to the UN, a conservative figure would be 45,000. The Greek Cypriot side asserted that the number has reached almost 100,000. M. H. Atun, for his part, stated that the flow of settlers stopped in 1978/79 following an agreement with the Turkish Government and that there were currently some 25,000 to 30,000 settlers whom he said were perfectly integrated with the Turkish Cypriot population. According to the President of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, some of the early 40,000 Turkish settlers in 1974 have created families on the island while others have returned to Turkey, and the current number of settlers without family connections was a maximum of 5,000.
82. Mr. M. Akinci, Leader of the Communal Liberation Party, and Mr. A. Durduran, Leader of the New Cyprus Party, expressly deplored that only the "Government" had the exact figures and that no one, not even parties, had access to them; they assessed that the total number of settlers was "a little bit less than us". Both they and Mr. O. Ozgur, Leader of the Turkish Republican Party (which is part of the "governmental" coalition set up in January 1994) deplored that many Turkish settlers were offered Turkish Cypriot citizenship "overnight" and that the electoral law (which provides for a five year residence on the island for foreigners to acquire the right to vote) had not been respected in the establishment of electoral lists in the 1990 elections. Mr. Akinci stated that some persons were granted electoral cards without even being citizens and that their number was unknown. This was the reason why, in 1990, all opposition parties had refused to sit in the "legislative assembly". Mr. Ozgur however stated that the 1993 elections were fair, while Mr. Akinci stated that, if all technical aspects of the vote were proper, with electoral registers not being established properly, it was difficult to confirm that the elections had been entirely fair.
83. The delegation was told by Turkish Cypriot leaders that some of the settlers live either in mixed villages with the Turkish Cypriots or in Turkish villages, mainly in the Famagusta area.
84. Reference was often made to the important emigration of Turkish
Cypriots, mainly intellectuals and skilled workers. Combined with
the influx of settlers, this massive emigration had a negative
effect on the composition of the population in the northern part
of the island. Furthermore, it had a negative impact on its economic
85. As already mentioned, since 1974, the two Communities have been separated in the most drastic way. Not only are physical contacts between persons impossible - except in rare cases - but telephone communications from one side of the island to the other are excluded. Each part of the island is however able to receive radio and TV programmes from the other. It should however be noted that, with the absence of contacts, the knowledge of the other Community's language tends to be lost, especially with the young generation.
86. Asked about a possible change in this situation, both Mr.
Clerides and Mr. Denktash as well as various political leaders
on both sides stated that any changes should be made step by step
during years. They felt that any sudden change might lead to a
87. Except for a very limited number of schools where the "elite"
used to send their children, before 1974, there existed separate
schools for each Community. Since 1974, on both sides, education
has tended to build up a negative vision of the other Community
in the mind of children and students. The delegation was encouraged
to hear on both sides statements that this should be changed as
minds had to be prepared for peace and mutual respect and that
a revision of text books was urgently needed.
88. Between 1963 and 1974, an alleged number of 1,619 Greek Cypriots and 803 Turkish Cypriots have been reported missing. In 1981, a three-member Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) - composed of one Greek Cypriot Member, one Turkish Cypriot Member and a Third Member nominated by the ICRC and appointed by the United Nations (currently Ambassador P. Wurth, of Switzerland) - has been entrusted with looking "into cases of persons reported missing in the intercommunal fightings as well as in the events of July 1974 and afterwards". Since then, the CMP has however been presented with only 210 cases of missing persons by the Greek Cypriot side and only 318 cases by the Turkish Cypriot side and has been confronted with serious difficulties in defining criteria for the study of the complaints. This has considerably hampered its activities. The passage of time has complicated further the CMP's task as, in addition to possible reluctance in presenting testimony, some of the witnesses may have difficulties in remembering with clarity the events surrounding a disappearance having occurred 15 or event 25 years ago, or may have left the country or even died.
89. Having heard both the third member of the Committee on Missing Persons and the leader and members of the Pancyprian Committee of Parents and Relatives of Missing Persons (set up on the Greek Cypriot side), and having also heard the views of various representatives of the two Communities on the question of missing persons, the delegation urges that, as recommended by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a complete list of alleged missing persons and all available evidence regarding these persons be submitted without any further delay to the Committee on Missing Persons. It also urges the three members of the Committee to agree as soon as possible on criteria for dealing with the complaints submitted to it.
90. If these two actions were taken, they would not only
enable significant and indispensable progress to be made in clarifying
the fate or the situation of the persons allegedly missing, thus
alleviating the deep sorrow of parents and relatives of those
persons and doing justice to their legitimate right to know the
truth, but they would also help in dispelling allegations heard
that the question of missing persons is being used as a political
91. Although it mainly concentrated on contacts with political leaders of the two Communities and the United Nations, the delegation holds the view that the Cyprus problem is not one that can be resolved by political forces and through political negotiations only. This is why it held at the Ledra Palace (which is in the buffer zone and has been established in July 1993 as UNFICYP exchange point to foster contacts between the two Communities) a long discussion with members of the Bi-Communal Steering Committee (commonly known as "Oxford Group"). The group was formed some two years ago by intellectuals of the two Communities who believe that civil society on both sides should be an active protagonist of its own history and who have decided to bring together their thinking and their hope for the building up of a Cyprus where the two Communities can co-exist and develop in peace.
92. The delegation was very impressed by the quality of discussions and contacts between the representatives of the two Communities present at the meeting and it wishes to commend this group's initiative which is unique and is undoubtedly one deserving to be supported, including through independent financial sources.
93. It feels that the Group would greatly benefit if it were joined by persons belonging to all walks of life and that through wider publicity of its activities it would strengthen the momentum for a settlement.
94. This could greatly contribute to preparing and educating
the public for reconciliation. It would also increase the
necessary pressure by public opinion on political forces to achieve
an early and satisfactory overall solution.
95. As already mentioned, Mr. Denktash and various other Turkish Cypriot personalities stated that, whenever Turkish Cypriots were crossing the buffer zone for contacts with Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot press reported that they had come from the "occupied" part to the "free" part of the island, a language which they deemed was not only unacceptable but was creating a negative reaction.
96. It was clear that, on both sides of the buffer zone, the press
could play a key role in building a different image of the other
Community and in preparing the minds of the general public for
peace and inter-communal reconciliation. On both sides, there
seemed to exist a conviction that, unfortunately, the press had
so far mainly contributed to nourishing fears and distrust and
that this approach should be changed. The delegation can only
encourage such a change of attitude.
97. One of the main question currently under discussion is that of the accession to the European Union of the Republic of Cyprus, which has lodged its application.
98. Both the Turkish Cypriot Community and Turkey (which is associated with the EU and is also an applicant for membership) have strongly challenged the affiliation, arguing that, while it would be in the interest of the Turkish Cypriot Community to form part of the EU, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus had no right to speak for the whole of Cyprus. This position is based on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the provisions of the 1960 Constitution which grant the President and Vice-President (a Turkish Cypriot) a veto over any foreign policy decision, particularly any decision on joining an international organization or alliance that does not include both Greece and Turkey among its members.
99. The opinion on that application delivered in July 1993 by the competent Committee nevertheless recalls the following : "The Community, however, following the logic of its established position, which is consistent with that of the United Nations where the legitimacy of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and non-recognition of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" are concerned, felt that the application was admissible and initiated the procedures laid down by the Treaties in order to examine it." It clarifies however: "Lastly, the Commission must envisage the possibility of the failure of the intercommunal talks to produce a political settlement of the Cyprus question in the foreseeable future, in spite of the endeavours of the United Nations Secretary-General. Should this eventuality arise, the Commission feels that the situation should be reassessed in view of the positions adopted by each party in the talks and that the question of Cyprus's accession to the Community should be reconsidered in January 1995."
100. In December 1993, the Council of the EU appointed an observer to the negotiations on Cyprus whose mandate is to report periodically on the implications for the requirements of the acquis of the Union of political developments in Cyprus, including progress in the UN Secretary-General's mission good offices mission in Cyprus". This appointment was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot Community which felt that this is illegal.
101. The Turkish Cypriot leadership was unanimous in stating that the affiliation of Cyprus to the EU should take place once a solution to the problem had been found. They considered that affiliation of the Republic of Cyprus in the present circumstances could only perpetuate the division of the island. They also insisted that, in keeping with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the affiliation of Cyprus could be concomitant with that of Turkey but should not precede it.
102. President Clerides, for his part, said to the delegation
that the integration of Cyprus in the European Union was the only
possible path to confidence as it would constitute a guarantee
against Turkey's expansion at the expense of a member of the EU.
He, and many other Greek Cypriot leaders, added that Turkey should
also become a member, either at the same time as the Republic
of Cyprus, or after.
C. FUTURE ACTION BY THE IPU
103. The delegation feels that the visit has been extremely useful, enabling it to look at all the complex aspects of the situation in Cyprus in the light of all the shades of opinion existing on both sides. The seeds of inter-communal risk which still exist in Cyprus and the fact that a solution to the problem does not seem to be within immediate reach make it feel that the Cyprus problem should remain high on the agenda of the international community and certainly a priority for the IPU, which should continue to work actively for its solution. It therefore considers that the Committee to Monitor the Situation in Cyprus should be able to pursue and reinforce its activities.
104. It believes that the Committee's practice of carrying out hearings of representatives of the two Communities should be pursued. It further deems it central to the Committee's work that it should be able, as repeatedly requested by the IPU Council, not only to receive written material from the National Groups of the three guarantor powers, but also to hear their representatives. Such hearings are essential since, as recalled under para. 14, the IPU's action regarding Cyprus is based on the fact that the problem is not only a bi-communal one but one in which the three guarantor powers have their share and say.
105. The delegation hopes that, at its VIth session, in Paris from 22 to 24 March 1994, the Committee to Monitor the Situation in Cyprus will have before it, together with this report, observations on it presented by the representatives of the two Communities and the Guarantor Powers, as well as information on any developments in the situation in Cyprus since the visit took place. The Committee should, on that basis, be in a position to present concrete recommendations for future action to the Inter-Parliamentary Council on 27 March 1994.
106. The delegation already wishes to suggest that the IPU, being
a political organization and an efficient tool for parliamentary
diplomacy, may be an appropriate framework for encouraging, or
even facilitating, regular direct contacts between leaders and
members of the political parties of both Communities. For the
time being, such contacts have been rather rare and irregular
but those who have participated in them have indicated that they
have been extremely valuable and productive. It goes without saying
for the delegation that, as stated by various leaders, not only
political leaders but also trade unions, professional bodies,
etc. should maintain a continuous dialogue.
PROGRAMME FOR THE VISIT
MONDAY, 17 JANUARY
08.30 Meeting with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Gustave FEISSEL, at his office at UNFICYP HQ
09.30 Courtesy call on the Force Commander of UNFICYP, Major-General M.F. MINEHANE, at his office, UNFICYP HQ
09.45 Coffee and VIP briefing on UNFICYP's mandate and operations by Lt. Col. H.J. BRUNNINGS-HANSEN, Chief Operations Officer, UNFICYP
10.45 Driving tour of Nicosia International Airport (MIA)
Briefing by Major Tim SHOP, Commander of the helicopter wing
11.45 Meeting with the Third member of the Committee on Missing Persons, Ambassador P. WURTH, at his office in the Ledra Palace (buffer zone)
15.00 Operational briefing and line tour in the old city of Nicosia, given by Commanding Officer, sector 2 UNFICYP, Lt. Col. Stephen WHITE.
17.00 Meeting with H.E. the President of the House of Representatives and President of the Inter-Parliamentary Group of Cyprus, Mr. Alexis GALANOS, at the House of Representatives
18.00 Meeting with the Chairman of the Free Democrats Party, Mr. George VASSILIOU, at his office (Party not represented in the House of Representatives)
19.00 Meeting with the Chairman of the Liberal Party, Mr. Nicos ROLANDIS, M.P., at the House of Representatives
20.00 Dinner by H.E. the President of the House of Representatives,
Mr. Alexis GALANOS, at the Hilton Hotel
TUESDAY, 18 JANUARY
08.00 Meeting with the Chairman of the Democratic Rally Party, Mr. Yiannakis MATSIS, M.P., at the Democratic Rally Party Offices
09.00 Meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alecos MICHAELIDES, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
10.00 Meeting with the Parliamentary Leader of the Democratic Party, Mr. Tassos PAPADOPOULOS, M.P., at his office
11.00 Meeting with the Chairman of the EDEK Socialist Party, Dr. Vassos LYSSARIDES, M.P., at his residence
12.00 Meeting with H.E. the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Glafkos CLERIDES, at the Presidential Palace
13.00 Lunch with representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
15.30 Meeting with the Chairman of the Democratic Socialist Reform Movement (ADISOK), Mr. Michael PAPAPETROU, at the ADISOK Party Offices (Party not represented in the House of Representatives)
16.30 Meeting with the Secretary-General of AKEL, Mr. Demetris CHRISTOFIAS, M.P., at the AKEL Party Offices
Meetings with representatives of the Trade Unions at the Hilton Hotel
17.30 The Pancyprian Federation of Labour
18.00 The Cyprus Workers Union
18.30 The Democratic Labour Federation of Cyprus
19.00 Meeting with the Pancyprian Committee of Parents
and Relatives of Missing Persons at the Hilton Hotel
WEDNESDAY, 19 JANUARY
08.15 Delegation crossing the buffer zone from the Greek Cypriot chekpoint to the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint (adjacent to the Ledra Palace)
09.00 Working breakfast with Mr. Ayhan Halit ACARKAN, "President" of the "Legislative Assembly", at Saray Hotel
10.30 Meeting with Mr. Ozker OZGUR, "Vice-Prime Minister", Leader of the Republican Turkish Party, at the Republican Turkish Party Offices
11.15 Meeting with Mr. Hakki ATUN, "Prime Minister", Leader of the Democrat Party, and Mr. Atay Ahmet RASIT, "Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence" at the Democrat Party Offices
12.00 Meeting with Mr. Dervis EROGLU, Leader of the National Unity Party, at the National Unity Party Offices
12.45 Meeting with H.E. Mr. Rauf Raif DENKTASH, "President", at his residence
13.00 Luncheon with H.E. Mr. Rauf Raif DENKTASH, at his residence
15.30 Meeting with Mr. Mustafa AKINCI, Leader of the Communal Liberation Party, at the Communal Liberation Party Offices
16.15 Meeting with representatives of the Chamber of Commerce at the Chamber
17.00 Meeting with representatives of the Chamber of Industry at the Chamber
17.45 Meeting with representatives of the Young Businessmen Organization at the Organization Offices
18.30 Meeting with representatives of TURK-SEN (trade union) at the their Offices
20.00 Dinner by Mr. Aykan Halit ACARKAN, at the Dome Hotel in Kyrenia
22.30 Delegation crossing the buffer zone from the Turkish
Cypriot chekpoint to the Greek Cypriot checkpoint (adjacent to
the Ledra Palace)
THURSDAY, 20 JANUARY
08.15 Delegation crossing the buffer zone from the Greek Cypriot chekpoint to the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint (adjacent to the Ledra Palace)
Parties not represented in the "Legislative Assembly"
09.00 Meeting with the Chairman of the Free Democrat Party, Mr. Ismet KOTAK, at the Free Democrat Party Offices
09.45 Meeting with the Chairman of the Nationalist Justice Party, Mr. Zorlu T&OUML;RE, at the Nationalist Justice Party Offices
10.30 Meeting with the Chairman of the Homeland Party, Mr. Orhan UCOK, at the Homeland Party Offices
11.15 Meeting with the Chairman of the New Cyprus Party, Mr. Alpay DURDURAN, at the New Cyprus Party Offices
12.00 Meeting with the Chairman of the Turkish Unity and Sovereignty Party, Mr. Arif Salih KIRDAG, at his residence
12.45 Delegation crossing the buffer zone from the Turkish Cypriot chekpoint to the Greek Cypriot checkpoint (adjacent to the Ledra Palace)
13.15 Luncheon by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Gustave FEISSEL, at the international mess, UNIFICYP HQ
15.15 Meeting with the Bi-Communal Steering Committee (Oxford Group) at the Ledra Palace (buffer zone)
Afternoon Preparation of the mission's report at the Ledra
Palace (buffer zone)
1. Between 1571 and 1878, Cyprus was under Turkish rule. In 1878, the island was placed under the administration of the British Government under a secret Treaty in which Turkey ceded Cyprus to Great Britain in exchange for that country to assist it if Russia attacked certain frontier provinces in Asia Minor. The island was annexed by Great Britain in 1914 and become a Crown Colony in 1925.
2. Especially in the years following World War II, the Greek Cypriots demanded union with Greece (Enosis); the Turkish Cypriots strongly opposed such union. From 1950 onwards, anti-British action grew under the leadership of Mgr. Makarios III and the Commander of EOKA (National Organization for the Cyprus struggle), General Grivas (a Geek national). In 1955, the struggle for liberation from the colonial power became an armed struggle and, in that context, differences between the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot Communities were exacerbated.
3. "Cyprus became independent on 16 August 1960 and a member of the United Nations one month later. The Constitution of the Republic, which came into effect on the day of independence, had its roots in agreements reached between the Governments of Greece and Turkey" (Zurich, 11 February 1959) and later of the United Kingdom (London, 19 February 1959) that were embodied in treaties: the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and the Treaty of Alliance, signed by Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.
4. The Republic of Cyprus was established "with a régime specially adapted both to the ethnic composition of its population (approximately 80 per cent Greek Cypriot and 18 per cent Turkish Cypriot) and to what were recognized as special relationships between the Republic and the three other States concerned in the agreements. Thus, the agreements recognized a distinction between the two communities and sought to maintain a certain balance between their respective rights and interests. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom provided a multilateral guarantee of the basic articles of the Constitution. In the event of a breach of the Treaty of Guarantee, the three Powers undertook to consult on concerted action, and if this proved impossible, each of them reserved the right to take action "with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs" set out in the Treaty. Both the union of Cyprus with any other State and the partitioning of the island were expressly forbidden. The settlement also permitted the United Kingdom to retain sovereignty over two areas to be maintained as military bases, these areas being in fact excluded from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus."
5. "The application of the provisions of the Constitution encountered difficulties almost from the birth of the Republic and led to a succession of constitutional crises and to accumulating tension between the leaders of the two Communities." On 30 November 1963, the Head of State, Mgr. Makarios, proposed 13 amendments to the Constitution that were rejected by the Turkish Cypriot Community and led to the withdrawal of its representatives from all institutions.
6. In the face of the outbreak of intercommunal strife, the three Guarantor Powers, on 24 December 1963, offered their joint good offices. Following the acceptance of the offer, a joint force was established on 26 December and on 30 December it was agreed to establish a neutral zone along the cease-fire line - commonly called the "green line" - between the areas occupied by the two communities in Nicosia.
7. A Conference of representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey and of the two Communities of Cyprus, which was held in London on 15 January 1964, failed to reach agreement and in February that year the Security Council of the United Nations - which was acting at the request of the representatives of the United Kingdom and Cyprus - agreed to the creation of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
8. UNFICYP became operational in March 1964 having as its mandate "in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions". UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) further became operational in April 1964 with a mandate of "establishing liaison with the Cypriot police; accompanying Cypriot police patrols which were to check vehicles on the roads for various traffic and other offences; manning UN police posts in certain sensitive areas where tension existed and might be alleviated by the presence of UNFICYP police elements; observing searches of vehicles by local police at road-blocks; and investigating incidents where Greeks or Turkish Cypriots were involved with the opposite Community, including searches for persons reported as missing." In January 1994, the strength of UNFICYP was 1,168 military personnel and that of UNCIVPOL was 35 civilian police personnel.
9. In July 1974, a coup d'Etat was perpetrated by Nikos Sampson, Commander of the National Guard, whose departure was requested by Mgr. Makarios. The coup was supported by Greece, then under a military régime. The three Guarantor Powers failed to come to an agreement as to action to be taken in the face of that situation. The Turkish Army intervened, occupying more than one third of the island. To justify the intervention, Turkey invoked the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee but its action went much beyond the provisions of the Treaty and became a military occupation which is still prevailing to-day: some 30,000 men at the time of the delegation's visit according to United Nations estimates.
10. The Turkish military intervention in July 1974 resulted in the establishment of a separate area in the northern part of Cyprus (Turkish Cypriots). Since then, a buffer zone (representing 3% of the island territory) under the control of UNFICYP has divided the country from east to west. Its exact delineation has been a matter of dispute between the two Communities since the cease-fire, leading to continuing attempts by both parties "to advance their cease-fire line through persistent movements forward and encroachments into the buffer zone."
11. After 1974, the authority of the Republic of Cyprus has, "de facto", been extending only to the southern part of the island (Greek Cypriots). The Republic of Cyprus has retained the 1960 Constitution, although all provisions relating to the participation of the Turkish Cypriot Community in the exercise of Executive, Legislative and Judicial powers are no longer applied.
12. The 1960 Constitution provides for a unicameral 80-seat House of Representatives. 56 members (70%) of the House have to be elected by the Greek Cypriot Community and indeed elections have regularly been held in the south after expiration of the five-year term of the members (the latest elections took place on 19 May 1991 - see Annex III). 24 seats (30%) of the House have to be elected by the Turkish Cypriot Community but that Community has refused to do so since 1963 when it considered that the 1960 Constitution was "dead and buried".
13. On 13 February 1975, the northern part of Cyprus (representing 37% of the total area) was unilaterally declared the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus", an entity that was granted recognition by Turkey only, and on 8 June 1975 a "Constitution" for that part of the island was approved by referendum carried out in the zone. The "Constitution" provides for a Government and a unicameral "Legislative Assembly" which has currently 50 members (the latest elections were held on 12 December 1993 - see Annex IV).
14. On 15 November 1983, a unilateral declaration of independence brought about the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"; that entity was also granted recognition by Turkey only. In resolution 541 (18/11/1983), the Security Council stated that the declaration was "legally invalid" and it called upon "all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus". In resolution 550 (11/04/1984), the Security Council further "(condemned) all secesionist actions, including the purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkey Cypriot leadership, (declared) them illegal and invalid and (called) for their immediate withdrawal" and it also called "all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus".
15. A population of some 570,000 lives in the southern part of the island. In addition to some 120,000 Turkish Cypriots, between 45,000 and 50,000 Turkish settlers (according to UN estimates) live in the northern part of the island where a Turkish military force (currently some 30,000 strong according to UN estimates, as already mentioned) has also been stationed since the 1974 military intervention.
16. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has been carrying
out good offices functions in respect of Cyprus since 1964 and
his special representative (currently Mr. Joe Clark, former Prime
Minister of Canada) has been engaged in promoting an agreed overall
settlement since 1966. Since 1975, in application of Security
Council resolution N° 367, his mission of good offices has
had the following characteristics : "to convene the parties
under new agreed procedures and place himself personally at their
disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the
progress of comprehensive negotiations, carried out in a reciprocal
spirit of understanding and moderation under his personal auspices
and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated".
In that context, "proximity talks" have been held
on an equal footing between the Leaders of the two Communities
for a number of years.
DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL FORCES IN THE GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
On 14 February 1993, Mr. Glafkos Clerides (DISY) was elected President of the Republic for a five year term.
Previously, general elections to the House of Representatives held on 19 May 1991 had resulted in the 56 seats of the Greek Cypriot Community being distributed as follows among political parties:
DISY and the Liberal Party have established a coalition.
Two other registered parties have no representation in the House of Representatives:
DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL FORCES IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS
On 22 April 1990, Mr. Rauf R. Denktash was re-elected "President" of the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" for a five-year term. At that time, he was supported by the National Unity Party; at the time of the mission, his support came mainly from the Democratic Party.
Following elections held on 12 December 1993 the representation of political parties in the so-called "Legislative Assembly" of the northern part of the island is as follows:
On 31 December 1993, the Democratic Party and the Turkish Republican Party signed a protocol of coalition and a coalition "Cabinet" was immediately set up.
Five other parties as follows did not obtain any seats:
Varosha (Document S/26026) :
"Para. 37. The proposal concerning Varosha, as supplemented in the New York discussions, is that the fenced area would be placed under United Nations administration as from an agreed date, pending a mutually agreed overall solution to the Cyprus problem. It would be a special area for bicommunal contact and commerce, a kind of free-trade zone in which both sides could trade goods and services.
Para. 38. In detail, the proposal provides for the following:
Nicosia International Airport (Document S/26026)
"Para. 42. The proposal on Nicosia International Airport, as supplemented in New York, would open the airport for the equal benefit of both sides.
Para. 43. In detail, the proposal provides for the following:
REPORT OF THE TEAM OF EXPERTS ON THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE
VAROSHA AND NICOSIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PACKAGE
"A team of experts from various fields, including from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, visited Cyprus at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and in co-operation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The team was mandated to assess the economic benefits for both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities of the package of confidence-building measures involving the re-opening of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport and to address issues related to the modalities for the implementation of the package.
The findings and conclusions set out in the report of the team are the results of five weeks of field work in Cyprus during which the team had extensive discussions with a large number of political, business, trade union leaders and technical experts on both sides about the economic situation in the two communities of Cyprus and the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package. In carrying out its work, the team also had the benefit of a considerable amount of documentation relevant to its mandate provided by both sides and by international organizations.
The team of experts is convinced that the implementation of the package would yield significant benefit to both communities. The benefits would be relatively greater for the Turkish Cypriot side because of the relative size of its economy and its impact in alleviating the serious obstacles currently confronting the Turkish Cypriot economy.
The team's recommendations have been designed to enable both sides to enjoy the benefits of the package without exposing either economy to possible negative effects which could result from price, duty and other differentials between the economies of the two sides.
The main benefits of the package for the Greek Cypriot side would be the return of the Greek Cypriots to their properties in the fenced area of Varosha and thus to rehabilitate Varosha as an important tourism centre. This could represent a 15 per cent increase in the Greek Cypriot tourism capacity. In addition, the reconstruction of Varosha, which is estimated to require at least US$1 billion in investment over about five years, would involve significant economic activity for the Greek Cypriot economy through the demand for skilled personnel and material. The reconstruction of Nicosia International Airport, at an estimated cost of some US$37 million, and its operation would also result in significant economic activity on the Greek Cypriot side.
For the Turkish Cypriot community the package should result in a 20 per cent increase in its annual GDP in the near term. The benefits can be summarized as follows:
The re-opening of Varosha: the Turkish Cypriot share of the employment and to a lesser extent the contracting opportunities from the reconstruction of Varosha over five years could amount to as much as US$500 million. About half of the estimated 9,000 new jobs which the re-opening of Varosha would create could be expected to be taken up by Turkish Cypriots. In addition, a portion of the sale of goods and services which a re-opened Varosha would generate could be expected to go to businesses owned by Turkish Cypriots. The joint ventures which the Chambers of Commerce of the two sides would together identify and develop can be expected to be of significant benefit to both communities. The flow of tourists from the southern part of the island through Varosha to the Northern part and of tourists originating in Varosha visiting the North should generate some US$34 million and US$19 million per year respectively for the Turkish Cypriot economy.
The re-opening of Nicosia International Airport: The re-opening of the Airport would give the Turkish Cypriot tourist industry a major boost. Without increasing the present hotel capacity, the direct flow of tourists through Nicosia International Airport could increase the overall occupancy rate from 31 per cent to 55 per cent, with a resulting increase in Turkish Cypriot revenue of some US$43 million per year. In addition, a re-opened Nicosia International Airport should make the planned expansion of capacity by 3,000 beds over the next five years more achievable and result in an increase in revenue of some US$90 million per year. The Turkish Cypriot side could also be expected to benefit from the significant number of jobs that a re-opened Nicosia International Airport will generate, in addition to a fair share of the goods which will be needed at the Airport. Nicosia International Airport would also provide Turkish Cypriots with a direct link with other countries and thereby greatly facilitate its trade and tourism.
The benefits which the two communities would derive from the implementation of the package of CBMs would go far beyond the significant economic benefits just described. The implementation of the package would also serve as an important catalyst for overcoming the existing mistrust between the two communities and for achieving an overall settlement. The political, social and cultural benefits may thus be even more important for the future of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and for Cyprus as a whole. The re-opening of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport would at long last provide avenues of contact between the two communities and would give them the opportunity, in a limited setting devoid of risk to their respective communities, to become reacquainted and to reveal to each other their goodwill and respect, and their desire to get together and to co-operate with each other in a harmonious manner. This would bring closer the federal objective to which both communities are committed.
During the course of its field work, the team of experts heard
questions and concerns about the manner in which the package would
be implemented. These were carefully considered by the team and
a number of suggestions for dealing with these matters are set
out in the report. Some of the issues that were raised are indeed
central to the effective implementation of the package, particularly
arrangements to ensure the unhindered travel by Turkish Cypriots
from Nicosia International Airport, arrangements for ensuring
the availability of premises in Varosha for persons who do not
own property but who wish to engage in commercial activities there,
arrangements to ensure safe air traffic control at Nicosia International
Airport and vicinity, and the precise means by which the costs
of the administration of the fenced area of Varosha and of Nicosia
International Airport will be borne. These matters will need to
be satisfactorily worked out in order to implement the package.
The team is of the view that with a minimum of goodwill, these
questions can be resolved without undue difficulty. Many other
questions will need to be dealt with, but their resolutions are
not necessary for deciding on the merits of the package. These
issues include the legal framework in the fenced area of Varosha
and fiscal and financial matters in the fenced area. These matters
could be resolved by the United Nations as the Administrator of
Varosha and of Nicosia International Airport, with the assistance
as required, of technical experts, and in consultation with the
REPORT OF THE TEAM OF EXPERTS
"The team of experts was mandated to undertake a thorough examination of the current condition of Nicosia International Airport and identify the requirements for making it operational. This report presents a comprehensive set of proposals for the rehabilitation of Nicosia International Airport, which has been out of service since 1974 and which is now contained within the United Nations-controlled Buffer Zone between the National Guard cease-fire line and the Turkish forces cease-fire line. The airport itself is contained within the United Nations-protected area, and is bordered by a number of British retained properties, now under British administration but required by their acquisition treaties to be returned to the Republic of Cyprus when no longer required by the British. These areas present no problem to the rehabilitation of the airport.
The set of proposals in this report are based on the technical requirements for an airport operating fully in accordance with ICAO Technical and Operational standards. If these proposals were implemented, the airport would fulfil all the requirements for an international civil airport at Nicosia as contained in the current issue of ICAO's European Regional Air Navigation Plan under "Cyprus", and notated as "temporarily closed". It would be operated under United Nations Administration in fulfilment of its mandate to provide long term solutions to the "Cyprus Problem".
The rehabilitation plan calls for immigration, customs, etc., processing of passengers to be carried out at two satellite terminals - each located outside the airport perimeter - one in the area to the North of the Buffer Zone and one in the area to the South. Only processed outgoing passengers and their baggage would be transported to the airport terminal in secure vehicles with security provided by personnel of the United Nations Administration. At the airport terminal, passengers would be matched with their baggage and processed by airline personnel for boarding in the usual manner. Incoming passengers would be united with their baggage and directed by personnel of the United Nations Administration to buses to carry them to their destination satellite terminal under UN security. Under this arrangement, only authorized airport employees and passengers would have access to the airport terminal. Outgoing passengers would be separated from, and incoming passengers would be united with, well-wishers at the satellite terminals. Additionally, departing passengers would pass through security checks at the satellite and airport terminals.
The United Nations Administration could have its own processing procedures for incoming passengers, for such purposes as facilitating their subsequent movement between the North and South parts of the island. Outgoing passengers could also be processed by the United Nations Administration if necessary.
The airport navigational facilities, mobile communication facilities, lighting system, air traffic services, meteorological services and fire fighting services have either been removed or vandalized beyond repair, and will have to be replaced completely. Most buildings have been vandalized to some extent, and have been subject to neglect, so that considerable cost will be involved in rehabilitating them. The runways, taxiways and parking areas have been unused for close to twenty years, and deterioration is mainly due to weathering and vegetation growth. Even in their deteriorated state, they nonetheless represent a considerable asset. A ring power distribution system is considered to be partly usable.
The cost of renovating the various elements required to operate the airport in accordance with ICAO international standards is estimated as follows:
(a) Runways and movement areas 5,930,000 $
(b) Airfield lighting 3,900,000 $
(c) Buildings, including new buildings 12,520,000 $
(d) Airport handling and processing equipment, including 9,318,000 $
security and transportation
(e) Rescue and fire fighting services 1,750,000 $
(f) NAVAIDS and COM equipment 2,163,000 $
(g) Air traffic, aeronautical information, 575,700 $
meteorological and search and rescue services
TOTAL 36,156,700 $
As estimation of the personnel required to operate the airport is 584 persons. This is higher than usual for an airport of this capacity, largely due to double processing, and transportation personnel requirements.
It is expected that revenues will consist almost entirely of landing and handling fees which, it is understood, will be in line with those used at other airports on the island of Cyprus. Revenues from motor vehicle parking, concessions, etc., constitute a considerable source of income at some modern airports, but these revenues will accrue mostly to the operators of the satellite terminals on each side where passengers will be separated from well-wishers. On the other hand, operating costs are expected to be higher than at normal airports, due to double security checks, ground transportation of passengers, and more complex administrative procedures.
Operation of the airport will require the co-operation of both sides. Because of prevailing winds, the majority of aircraft will take off over territory to the North of the United Nations-controlled Buffer Zone controlled by the Turkish Cypriot side, and arrangements must be made for such things as immediate access by rescue and fire-fighting vehicles in case of an accident. While it is anticipated that all essential navigation aids and mobile communication equipment can be confined to the airport or the neighbouring United Nations-controlled Buffer Zone, with easy access by personnel of the United Nations Administration, organization of the airspace requires close co-ordination with the sides. Safe approach procedures can be developed based on geographical division of the airspace, but these procedures would be much more effective if the system operated as a co-ordinated terminal approach area. In any event, co-ordination will be required between the four or five aerodromes and airfields in the vicinity of Nicosia International Airport, and, for maximum efficiency, there should be access to safety facilities located on both sides of the buffer zone. These are all measures to satisfy one of the principle objectives stated in the preamble to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: "...that international air transport services may be developed in a safe and orderly manner, and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically".
The field work was done over an intensive working period of 15 days, and while considerable experience and informed judgment support the findings in the report, it cannot be considered an action document, since no tests or in-depth investigations could be carried out in the time available. Before proceeding with any of the major recommendations, therefore, it would be necessary that detailed planning and design be carried out by qualified specialists for all works proposed in the recommendations. This could be done in a number of ways, ranging from working with the ICAO Technical Co-operation Bureau for the provision of specialists and purchasing assistance to the engagement of an independent consulting firm to design and supervise construction by contractors, or the engagement of a contractor on a design/construct basis.
In addition, it would be advisable at an early stage to develop a phased development plan to meet planned objectives and to ensure the continued maintenance and improvement of airport facilities in an orderly and logical manner.
Finally, in the judgment of the Team, the rehabilitation programme
could be carried to completion approximately 18 months from final
approval of the rehabilitation project."